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 Most academic research concerning organ transplants focus on the methods of procuring 
organs and the definition of brain death; few have been devoted to the very allocation of 
human organs to selected recipients. Given that human organs are life saving medical 
resources, the denial of access to this resource can mean the death of the patient. It is a fact 
that the demand for organs outstrips the supply, how then do decision-makers decide whom 
to let live or die? 
 
Decision-makers often claim that allocative decisions are made using medical criteria. 
However, the allocation of goods or burdens (not only in the field of organ transplantation) is 
not an issue that can be dealt with using technical or medical means; it is an ethical issue, or 
more specifically, one of distributive justice. The allocation of organs goes through the three 
stages of the medical triage: referral, admission, and selection. Medical criteria are mostly 
only applicable at the admission stage, but the fact that more patients are admitted onto the 
waiting list than there are organs available means that a significant amount of rationing must 
be done at the selection stage. Selection requires much more than the application of medical 
criteria. Other non-medical considerations are often involved, including economic, political 
and ethical ones. Often, the local transplant centres themselves make the decisions, with 
powers vested in the hands of a few. Therefore, the values that decision-makers hold greatly 
influence the outcome of those decisions.  
 
 It has been shown from previous research conducted in the West that the strictness and 
objectiveness of criteria depends a lot on the relationship between demand and supply. 
Criteria tend to be more strict and absolute when demand for far outstrips supply. This 
reflects the many non-medical aspects of organ allocation. It has also shown that 
modernization resulted in the individualization of morality and liberalization of organ 
allocation criteria. Allocative principles had moved from utilitarian emphasis towards those 
concerned with justice, especially for medical fields that have been around longer than others 




 The cases in Singapore generally reflect the above hypotheses. Firstly, in kidney 
transplantation, the oldest field in all three (kidney, liver and heart), one can see the greater 
emphasis on notions of justice or compassion. In addition, the programme handles larger 
numbers of patients, which require more objective quantifiable criteria to make the allocation 
process easier. Heart transplantation, which deals with the smallest pool of patients, tends to 
be more moralistic in its approach, and uses more qualitative approaches to patient selection. 
Finally, liver transplantation falls in-between the two, exhibiting both moralistic and 
utilitarian tendencies, and employing a mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
All three centres reflect, generally, the values of the state ideology, which is meritocratic and 
non-welfarist. Therefore, allocating organs based on the principle of desert still largely 
remains. It is hard to predict how organs will be allocated in the future, but through this 
exploratory study, and with comparisons with cases from the West, one can perhaps make 






Chapter 1:  
The Research Problem: Medicine and Morality 
 
This thesis explores some of the ethical issues involved in the allocation of 
life-saving human organs used for heart, liver, and kidney transplantation in 
Singapore. Transplantation has emerged to be the preferred form of treatment for 
organ failures because of the improvement in surgical techniques and post-transplant 
care. However, this new medical option is not always available to all who require it 
because of organ scarcity and the cost of the surgical procedure. Difficult decisions 
thus have to be made regarding who is to get the limited supply of life-saving organs 
and ultimately, the question of who lives and who dies. A great deal of normative 
work has been done about how this problem ought to be dealt with in an ethically 
appropriate manner, but very little is known about how it is in fact dealt with in the 
real world (Schmidt and Lim, 2004: 2174). 
 
The research objective of this thesis is to offer some insights into how these 
decisions are made in Singapore in the fields of kidney, liver, and heart transplant. 
This thesis is exploratory and comparative. No such research has been undertaken in 
Singapore before, thus this thesis serves as a foremost exploration into how organs 
are allocated in the country. The knowledge offered here may allow subsequent 
researchers to build upon, and to pursue other issues with greater precision. This 
thesis also incorporates a comparison with how the issue of organ allocation is dealt 
with by western countries. The main research on such issues has been done in 
America (Elster, 1992; Kilner, 1990; Fox and Swazey, 1978) and Germany (Schmidt, 
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1998), but fewer literature exists that focuses on Asia. This thesis serves to 
supplement what is already known about this issue in the West and sheds light on 
whether a different political, economic, social and cultural location has any possible 
implications on how organs are allocated.  
 
Although organ failures are medical problems, they require more than 
medical solutions. The fact that the demand for human organs outstrips the supply 
means that organs have to be rationed. How organs are rationed is not a medical 
problem, it is an ethical one that requires non-medical considerations. It has been 
shown that decision-makers in the West use fairly heterogeneous criteria to allocate 
organs, even though what they are dealing with, is allegedly a common medical 
issue. Kilner (1990), for example, demonstrated how scarce medical resources like 
organs and treatment in ICUs are allocated differently, with different groups of 
decision-makers preferring different models of allocation to others, and how 
decisions are justified with appeals to different principles as well. This plurality in 
the ways a similar problem is dealt with makes the issue worthy of a sociological 
investigation.  
 
The thesis will proceed in the following manner. Firstly, the reader will be 
introduced to some basic medical knowledge regarding the functions and failings of 
the organs, and the different treatments available. Secondly, I shall present some data 
to show how serious the organ scarcity problem is, and henceforth move on to the 
ethical problem of rationing organs. Lastly, I shall show how to sociologically 




 The Medical Problem 
 
Organ failures: an introduction 
 
Kidney failure 
Kidneys function as filters for waste products present in the blood. Their 
main tasks are the removal of metabolic waste products and the regulation of the 
bodys water, electrolyte and acid/base balance (Forensius, 2002). In addition, 
kidneys produce important hormones (erythropoietin and rennin). The final filtered 
waste products are then passed through the ureters and stored in the bladder as urine.  
 
The main causes of kidney disease in Singapore are diabetes and 
hypertension (Forensius, 2002); these two are the main causes for kidney failure in 
the U.S. as well (National Kidney Foundation, 2002b). 50% of all reported cases of 
kidney failure in Singapore are caused by diabetes and 9% by hypertension (it is also 
currently the number 6th killer disease in Singapore; Ministry of Health, 2002).  
 
There are three main types of kidney failures:  
! Acute Renal Failure (ARF) 
! Chronic Renal Failure (CRF) 
! End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) 
 
ARF is characterized by a sudden drop in kidney functioning, indicated by a rapid 
increase of toxicity in the blood. This condition is usually temporary but if left 
untreated, it leads to ESRD. CRF is characterized by slow irreversible impairment of 
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kidney functioning. Again, if left untreated, it leads to ESRD 
(WebHealthCentre.com, 2002). ESRD, as the name implies, refers to the final and 
most serious stage in kidney failure. The difference between CRF and ESRD is that 
the former refers to kidneys that are operating at approximately 50% effectiveness 
while the latter refers to the total damage of the mechanisms.  
 
ESRD cannot be treated by drugs alone. Patients with ESRD must be put on 
dialysis and await transplantation. Both ARF and CRF can be treated with drugs, 
with ARFs usually being treated with dialysis as well. Patients with ARF are given 
dialysis temporarily while their kidneys take the time to recuperate from the damage. 
Total recovery from ARF is possible, but not for CRF because under this condition 
the kidneys have been permanently damaged. CRF is either treated with drugs, 
dialysis and transplant, depending on how damaged the kidneys are. Some patients 
can still survive without dialysis or transplantation because attention is paid to diet 
and medication to take the workload off their kidneys (National Kidney Foundation, 
2002a). However, for those with ESRD, a new kidney is the only way to take them 




The liver performs over 100 functions vital to the human bodys survival. It is 
somewhat similar to the kidneys functions in that it is responsible for cleansing the 
body of toxic substances. The liver also produces numerous chemicals and other 
substances needed by the body. It breaks down alcohol and it maintains hormonal 




The very complexity of the liver subjects it to many diseases. However, most of 
the diseases are rare, but there are a few common ones that are serious enough to 
threaten the functioning of the liver. They include hepatitis, liver cancer and bacterial 
infections (e.g. E.coli) while biliary atresia (dysfunctional bile ducts) and Wilsons 
disease (large buildup of copper in the liver) affect childrens livers. In addition, liver 
problems are closely related to lifestyle as well, for liver failure is commonly caused 
by alcohol and drug abuse. Alcohol and drug abuse result in liver cirrhosis, which is 
the hardening of the liver due to damaged liver cells being replaced by scarred tissue. 
Liver cirrhosis is the most common form of liver failure in adults, and it is the 9th 
killer disease in Singapore (Ministry of Health, 2002a). 
 
Liver cirrhosis, besides being treated through liver transplant surgeries, can be 
dealt with by eliminating the underlying cause of the disease. Besides trying to cure 
hepatitis or cancer (the causes of liver cirrhosis), most of the treatment is supportive 
in nature. In other words, the liver is given a lighter workload in order for it to 
recover (similar to treatments for acute renal failure). This can include abstinence 
from alcohol or other chemicals, and undergoing specialized diets like diuretics 
(fluid diet). Such form of supportive treatment is also applied in the post-transplant 
stages, and compliance with such treatments is often seen to be essential for 
post-transplant prognosis. In addition, liver dialysis may become a feasible treatment 








Heart diseases are the 2nd most common killer ailments in Singapore, trailing 
closely behind cancer. They also rank 2nd on the list of the top ten conditions for 
hospitalization (Ministry of Health, 2002a). In the National Heart Centre and 
National University Hospital, more than 20% of acute cardiology admissions are for 
heart failures (Singapore National Heart Association, 2002). Major risk factors of 
heart disease include unchangeable factors like age, gender, and heredity. However, 
there are numerous risk factors for heart disease that can be kept under control. These 
include smoking, obesity, and lack of exercise, stress, and diet high in fats, salt and 
cholesterol.  
 
 The most serious medical problem is heart failure  when the heart loses its 
ability to pump blood effectively. Not only does oxygenated blood fail to reach the 
other parts of the body, deoxygenated blood does not return to the heart as well. 
Therefore, heart failure results firstly in general tiredness because of the lack of 
oxygen in the cells for respiration, and secondly, in the congestion of the other 
organs (gathering of large amounts of blood in the organs) because blood fails to 
return to the heart. Heart failure therefore causes a host of other organ diseases as 
well. 
 
 Patients with heart failure are usually given supportive treatment. Medication is 
mainly directed at lightening the hearts workload and alleviating symptoms like the 
swelling of the organs and clotting of the blood vessels. Because some heart failure 
patients develop irregular heartbeat, which may result in heart arrest, the artificial 
device (the pacemaker) is implanted to regulate the heart beats. However, 
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medication only serves to halt or delay the progression of the disease. Once heart 
failure is established, the heart deteriorates with time. The only solution is a heart 
transplant. Even though artificial hearts are technically available and undergoing 
experiments, they are presently used only as bridging devices to maintain the life of 




 Organ transplantation refers to the surgical removal of the impaired organ and its 
replacement by a functioning one. There are three types of transplantation:  
Human-to-human transplantation, autologous transplantation and 
xenotransplantation. Human-to-human transplantation refers to replacing the organs 
of one person with that of another person. autologous transplantation (autografts) 
refers to the transplantation of certain body parts from another site in or on the body 
of the individual receiving it (CancerWeb, 2002) and xenotransplantation refers to a 
transplant across different species (TransWeb.Org, 2002). Kidneys, livers and hearts 
can only be replaced by external sources of organs, while xenotransplantation is still 
in the experimental stage, therefore I will use the word transplantation to refer to 
human-to-human organ transplants only.  
 
 Human-to-human transplants involve either cadaveric or living-donors. 
Cadaveric transplantations refer to transplants with organs that come from dead 
people and living-donor transplantations refer to that which comes from those who 
are still alive. Living-donor transplants can be done between people who are not 
related by blood, or between living-related donors and recipients. Both cadaveric and 
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living-donor transplant surgeries face a similar problem, which is the rejection of the 
donor organ by the recipients body. This problem is dealt with by the matching of 
the Human Leukocyte Antigens (HLA) between the donor and the recipient of the 
organs and the administering of immunosuppressive medication.  
 
 Antigens are anything that induces immune system responses in the body. 
Antigens can be in the forms of toxins, foreign proteins, bacteria, etc. and when the 
body recognizes these antigens as alien particles, the bodys immune system is 
summoned to neutralize these antigens. The agents that function as the neutralizers 
are called antibodies. They are protein molecules that are produced by the leukocyte 
or in laymans terms, white-blood cells. The human leukocyte antigen thus refers to 
proteins present on the surfaces of almost all cells in the body, which when in contact 
with antigens which are different from themselves, induce the leukocytes to produce 
antibodies to fight off the sources of the foreign antigens (CancerWeb, 2002).  
 
 It is therefore an advantage that the donors antigens resemble those of the 
recipient. However, it is almost impossible to get a perfect match of the antigens 
between the donor and the recipient (unless the donor and recipient are identical 
twins). Higher possibilities of matches can be found between people related by 
blood. This is because everyone inherits six antigens that never change throughout 
ones life  three from the mother and three from the father. Therefore, theoretically, 





Currently, the World Health Organization (iKidney.com, 2002) has identified 
and numbered 118 different known HLAs (there may be more that have not been 
discovered). However, the six antigens mentioned above are usually those that 
require identification and matching because they are the strongest antigens 
expressed by tissues (Kimball, 2002). Research has also shown that:  
 
1. Having no mismatches provides a clear, but modest, advantage over 
mismatched kidneys. (This advantage is cumulative: at 17 years, 50% 
of the kidneys with no mismatches are still functioning while 50% of 
those with one or more mismatches have been lost after 8 years.)  
 
2. However, the incremental disadvantage of additional mismatches is 
small. In fact, the procedures to prevent rejection are now sufficiently 
good that 80% of all kidneys  even those with all loci mismatched  
can be expected to be functioning at the end of the first year. 
 
The above two observations were gathered from research conducted on several 
thousand kidney patients (Kimball, 2002). The table below presents the results from 






















 (Source: Kimball, 2002) 
 
 Around the world, the matching of the six antigens is widely used as the main 
criterion for the selection of patients (especially that of kidney transplant patients) 
even though HLA matching is not an absolute medical prerequisite for successful 
organ transplants. All organ recipients are treated with immuno-suppressant drugs 
like Cyclosporin. Such drugs target the immune systems reaction towards the new 
organ, reducing the effects of rejection by lowering the sensitivity of the immune 
system. However, a disadvantage of such treatments is that the overall immune 
system is weakened, subjecting the patient to the dangers of infection. The 
advancement of immunosuppressive therapy raises the question of why HLA 
matching is still being used to exclude patients from getting new organs. This 
question will be dealt with in details later.  
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  There are certain types of patients who have rare antigen patterns, and there are 
those who are much more sensitive towards foreign antigens. Patients who have 
received numerous blood transfusions tend to become more sensitized, increasing the 
likelihood of rejecting a transplanted organ. Besides the recipients, the donors attract 
a certain amount of attention as well, primarily in the definition of death and the 
ways of procuring organs. Organs have to be kept fresh for a certain period of time 
before they are used for transplantation, and the cadaveric donors heart has to be 
kept working, either naturally or artificially prior to transplantation. This makes the 
definition of death a sticky issue to handle. This is even more problematic in 
Singapore because 14 percent of the population are Muslims who define death as the 
death of the whole body and not just the brain stem. In many countries, for the 
purpose of organ transplantation, death has been defined as that of the brain stem 
rather than that of the heart. This means that the law covering organ transplantations 
must make certain provisions for Muslims, and it indeed does so in Singapore. The 
legal stipulations relevant to transplant medicine will be elaborated in Chapter Three.  
 
 
The Demand and Supply Problem 
 In this section, I present the seriousness of the organ shortage problem in order 
to highlight just how much rationing the decision-makers have to undertake. Table 2a 














 K L H K L H   K L H 
    Live Cadaver        
1991 NA NA NA 12 36 2 5 63 11 NA NA NA 
1992 NA NA NA 15 60 1 1 107 33 NA NA NA 
1993 NA NA NA 15 32 NA 2 81 17 NA NA NA 
1994 NA NA NA 12 84 0 3 112 46 NA NA NA 
1995 NA NA NA 8 53 1 0 84 27 NA NA NA 
1996 528 17 NA 18 44 9 0 74 18 5 13 NA 










9 34 54 18 5 99 28 6 21 NA 
2000 636 4 
 





5 46 46 10 2 138 28 5 8 1 
2002 666 20 7 44 30 12 2 107 16 5 14 3 
 
Key: K  Kidneys, L  Livers, H  Hearts, NA  Not Available 
Table 2a presents data on the following:  
1) Patients on the waiting list for transplants 
2) Number of transplants performed  
3) Number of deaths 
 
Note:  
● The number of patients on the waiting list for transplants is compared with 
the actual number of transplants performed, and also with the number of 




Table 2b: Referred and Actualized donors  
 
Year Referred Donors Actualized Donors 
1991 63 11 
1992 107 33 
1993 81 17 
1994 112 46 
1995 84 27 
1996 74 18 
1997 NA NA 
1998 101 22 
1999 99 28 
2000 100 NA 
2001 138 28 
2002 107 16 
(Sources: The Gift, 2002; Ministry of Health, 2003) 
 
Table 2b presents the following data:  
1) Number of referred donors 
2) Number of actual donors 
Note: 
● The number of referred donors versus the number of actual donors show the 
percentage of potential donors (accident victims who have or have not 
pledged their organs) in comparison to that of suitable donors. This set of 
numbers reflects the result of applying criteria (medical or otherwise) to 
 
13
selecting donors, and of getting approvals from relatives of the deceased for 
the donation of the body parts.  
 
 The slots with NA in the tables refer to data which could not be retrieved from 
the relevant institutions holding those data, or which are not recorded at all. One can 
see clearly from the table above that the rate of transplantation has never caught up 
with the rate at which patients are put onto the list. The best representation of this 
problem is for kidney transplantation. For example, in the year 2002, only 74 out of 
the 666 patients on the waiting list were transplanted. That is less than 12% of the 
total number of patients on the list. By looking at the differences between the number 
of referred donors and that of actualized donors, one can also see that less than a 
quarter of the donor organs were actually used for transplantation. At this rate, as 
lamented by a kidney transplant surgeon, the backlog of patients alone will take us 
10 years to clear (The Straits Times, 04/08/97). However, the above figures still 
under-represent the real magnitude of the problem because many medically suitable 
patients are never admitted to the waiting list, a problem that will be addressed in the 
substantive chapters.  
 
  
 The Moral Problem 
 
A moral problem is one that considers the provision of welfare to a party at 
the expense of another. In organ transplantation, giving a patient a new heart also 
means denying another patient that very heart. To the decision-maker, this can be a 





Medical and non-medical criteria 
 
 Before I can actually start talking about moral problems, it will be necessary to 
distinguish them from medical ones. It is thus important at this stage to make some 
clarifications about the usage of various terms, primarily about the difference 
between medical and non-medical criteria. It is not always easy to draw the line 
between medical and non-medical criteria, because medical reasons are often used to 
justify the application of non-medical criteria, and even when medical criteria are 
applied, they do not always guarantee the intended results. For example, it has been 
shown that patients with HIV do not necessarily fare worse than normal patients 
(Gow, 2001; Halpern, 2002; Kuo, 2001; Prachalias, 2001; Stock, 2001; Neff, 2002), 
yet in many centres, patients with HIV are excluded from the waiting list. The same 
applies to alcoholics who are excluded from some centres, even though they fare as 
well as non-alcoholics (Cohen, 1991; Glannon, 1998; MacMaster 2000). Alcoholism 
is the cause of 60% of all liver cirrhosis in Germany (Schmidt, 1998: 71) but very 
few alcoholics are actually transplanted there and 13% of surgeons participating in a 
US survey support the exclusion of alcoholics from transplants (Evans and 
Manninen, 1987: 4). It is therefore likely that many alcoholics are rejected for other 
non-medical reasons. Despite the above problems with making the distinction, it is 




Medical practitioners and ethicists agree that candidates for transplants 
should be evaluated according to the medical criteria of the need for and the 
potential benefit from treatment (Rescher, 1969: 173-186; Childress, 1970: 339-355; 
Caplan, 1987: 10-19); therefore, all patients who need and who could benefit should 
receive the respective treatment. However, medical knowledge does not tell one how 
to choose which patients to treat and which not to if there are more medically eligible 
patients than resources available to treat them. Medical knowledge is above all 
technical knowledge, meaning that it can be used only to predict outcomes of 
applying particular procedures for matters of diagnosis and prognosis. For example, 
in organ transplantation, medical knowledge can tell the physician how long a patient 
with liver failure can survive on medication, and how long the patient will likely live 
if he were to receive a new liver. It does not tell the doctor how to select between two 
patients who are both suffering from liver failures and who could both benefit from 
treatment. Medical rationality tells the doctor to provide the best possible treatment 
for any patient regardless of the costs of treatments or the plight of the other patients. 
 
Decisions like the above must therefore rely on more than medical 
knowledge. Between, for example, a soldier and a commoner, a utilitarian might 
select the former. This is because utilitarianism is concerned with the maximization 
of general welfare; anyone who can contribute to more happiness of more people 
should be prioritized. Given that the soldier is responsible for protecting the lives of 
many others, the importance of his well-being may surpass that of a commoner from 
a utilitarian viewpoint. On the other hand, a deontologist will treat both as having 
equal value, for humans, to the deontologist, should never be used as means to the 
well-being of other human beings. But utilitarianism and deontology are no medical 
 
16
conceptions; they are ethical positions. If a decision-maker were to decide between 
the two, he would be exercising his power from an ethical standpoint rather than a 
medical one. Often, the decision-maker does have to exercise such powers. This is 
because many patients are medically indicated and hence likely to benefit from new 
organs. The fact that there are more patients on the waiting list for organ transplant 
than there are organs available shows that selection decisions are inevitable.  
 
 Generally, medical concerns can be classified into two types: firstly, patients 
must be at the final stages of their disease, where transplantation is the best (at times 
the only) treatment available. Kidney failure patients however, are indicated for a 
transplant the moment they are on dialysis. They need not be transplanted 
immediately, for they can survive almost indefinitely on dialysis, but transplantation 
can significantly enhance their quality of life. The second medical concern is the 
prognosis of the patients, which weighs the individual cost and the benefit of being 
transplanted. Some patients are considered medically unsuitable because they suffer 
from cancer, diabetes or ischemic heart diseases, which make the long-term results of 
surgery much worse than for a normal patient. However, after filtering off the 
unsuitable candidates, the number of patients on the waiting list still exceeds the 
number of organs available. Therefore, many other selection criteria are implemented 
to compare patients with one another in the prioritization of recipients on the waiting 
list. And often, non-medical considerations like social worth or quality of life 
slips in at this stage to aid in the decisions.  
 
Various non-medical principles are utilized to assist such decisions. These 
non-medical values often reflect everyday moral conceptions2. Decisions can also be 
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made on economic grounds -- whether the individual is able to pay for the healthcare 
resource. Other reasons could be political or religious. They vary in substance and 
also in their operationalization. Even though different non-medical principles are 
used in the decision making process, the decision is an ethical one. The distribution 
of scarce resources is a moral or ethical problem, more specifically, a problem of 





Issues of distributive justice are bounded by the question who decides who 
gets what, how and why. The reality is that some organ failure patients will not 
receive a transplant. The consequences are serious. Being denied a new organ can 
mean death for liver and heart patients or years on the dialysis machine for kidney 
patients. Decision makers will therefore need to make painful decisions. However, it 
should be noted that this thesis is not concerned with judging the appropriateness of 
these decisions from an ethical viewpoint. Instead, it will restrict itself to a 










The Sociological Problem 
  
The thesis presents an empirical study of distributive justice in practice. 
Organ failure is a problem happening all around the globe, and many countries are 
already using transplantation as a viable treatment procedure. However, the fact that 
even within a single locality, this problem is often dealt with very differently from 
one transplant center to the next (see Schmidt, 1998, for examples from Germany) 
suggests that non-medical factors are usually involved with various social, political 
and economic powers at play.  
 
The investigation into practices of distributive justice includes the question: 
who decides who gets what, how and why. This thesis is concerned with laying bare 
the different methods, criteria, and justifications of allocating organs to specific 
people, where these methods, criteria and justifications are used and applied by 
specific decision-makers within specific localities.  
 
This means that the thesis will deal with questions regarding:  
1. The identities of the decision makers 
2. The different stages for the selection of recipients 
3. The criteria for selection 
4. The reasons for making certain selections 
 
The area of study will then, in a nutshell, be that of the medical triage in organ 
transplant medicine. The term medical triage refers to the sorting out and 
classification of patients or casualties to determine priority of need and proper place 
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of treatment (CancerWeb, 2002), and it is generally split into three stages: referral, 
admission and selection. The referral stage is beyond the scope of this thesis, for 
referrals are usually done by general practitioners operating as small-scale 
enterprises. To date, there are more than 1,900 private general practitioners in 
Singapore. Not much is known about referrals except that transplant surgeons have 
complained about widespread lack of knowledge and sympathy for the importance of 
referring patients for transplants among general practitioners. Therefore, my 





















Literature Review and Methods 
 
 This chapter presents a review of past research done on a similar topic. The 
purpose is to show how my thesis attempts to fill in the gaps in the knowledge about 
organ allocation and what I have drawn upon from past research in the construction 
of my own approach. This chapter will also include the methodological approach I 
utilize which is informed by those used by the past researchers.  
 
 For my purpose, I draw mostly upon Schmidt (1998, 1998a, 2002) and Elster 
(1992) for two main arguments. Firstly, the issue of organ allocation involves both 
medical and non-medical principles. However, decision-makers often claim to be 
using medical criteria when in fact, they are not. Secondly, criteria that are used in 
one transplant centre differ from those used by other transplant centres. This implies 
that the decision-makers in a given transplant centre wields a lot of power in 
selecting which criteria to use and which not to. The substantive parts of the thesis 
will attempt to show how these two arguments apply in my documentation of the 
organ allocation processes. The following sections will present the literature 




The most relevant works on the allocation of human organs were conducted 
in America and Germany, respectively by Elster (1992) and Schmidt (1998). Both 
focused on the different criteria and principles used to allocate organs at the local 
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rather than global level. Elster started off investigating three arenas of distributive 
justice in America: health, education and work, and ended up focusing on organ 
allocation, college admission and job layoffs. Schmidt based his investigation in 
Germany on how patients were selected in different transplant centres. Little 
sociological research was done on issues of organ transplantation in Asia, except for 
the work done on Japan which was more concerned with the issue of brain death (see 
Lock, 2002). Besides Schmidt and Elster, Kilner (1990) and Walzer (1983) 
contributed to the relevant literature on ethical and procedural issues of scarce goods 
allocation.  
 
Elster (1992) devoted a significant amount of attention to the allocation of 
kidneys. In the U.S., recipients and donors are matched through an integrated 
database managed by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) that 
coordinates organ sharing between the federal states. It uses a point system to 
allocate kidneys, constrained primarily by three medical criteria: blood-group typing, 
HLA matching, and sensitization. By having one single databank that matches 
donors and recipients throughout the country, it allows for higher chances of organ 
failure patients in getting good matches for available organs3. The point system 
allocates merit points to firstly, the amount of time patients clock on the waiting list, 
secondly, the number of HLA matches, and finally the degree of sensitization 
(UNOS, 1989). The allocation of merit points given to sensitization and waiting time 
offsets what Elster calls bad medical luck, a trade-off between equity (sensitization 




Elsters main contribution was more conceptual than empirical. Drawing on 
Walzer (1983), he argues that goods or burdens come attached with different social 
meanings, which elicit different principles through which they are allocated. And 
given that those meanings are defined socially, goods and burdens are then perceived 
differently in different localities, and principles used to allocate such goods and 
burdens vary across localities.  
 
Elster classifies organ allocation into admission and selection stages. 
Admission procedures compare individuals against an absolute threshold, and offer 
the good only to those who exceed the threshold. Medical criteria are mostly applied 
at the admissions stage. Selection processes compare admitted individuals with one 
another, usually by producing a ranking list, and accept them by starting at the top 
and going down the list until the good is exhausted. The transplant centres 
concerned, in this thesis, apply a similar differentiation of the allocation process, 
placing patients on a waiting list at the admission stage, and then selecting them from 
the waiting list.  
 
Schmidts work on organ allocation in Germany puts forward the argument 
that decision-makers often claim to be using medical criteria when in fact, 
non-medical ones were used. The selection of patients is essentially a non-medical 
issue, according to Schmidt. The number of patients who are medically indicated for 
organ transplants far exceeds the supply of organs. Therefore, a prioritization of 
patients on the waiting list must be done, and often, non-medical criteria are evoked 
in deciding between patients on the waiting list. The usage of medical knowledge to 
justify the decisions helps in dealing with the great discrepancy between supply and 
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demand of organs, and it also shields the decision makers from criticism from 
ethicists and the public (Schmidt, 1998: 58). 
 
Kilners (1990) Who Lives, Who Dies? is an investigation into the 
allocation of scarce medical resources in the U.S. He showed that different 
decision-makers apply different principles and henceforth, different criteria in the 
distribution of these scarce resources. The author provides a list for the commonly 
used criteria, and the different types of justifications given for them. Percentages of 
which criteria and principles were the most popular were also provided. Kilners 
work supports Elters argument about the plurality of allocative principles within 
localities.   
 
The substantive findings of the above three authors will be mentioned in the 
later chapters, as I make comparisons between the case in Singapore and those of the 
West. Besides the above three pieces, other research was conducted on the issue of 
organ transplantation as well, but with a wider scope than the mere allocation of the 
organs. Fox and Swazey conducted research on the field of transplant medicine as a 
whole, and published two books drawing on this research: Courage to Fail and 
Spare Parts. Both Courage to Fail and Spare Parts are empirical investigations of 
the activities and other aspects of the personnel involved with transplant medicine in 
the United States. Therefore, neither is limited to the study of allocations. They 
include themes like the experiences of the physicians, the relationships between the 
physician and the patient, and the patients post-transplantation experiences (Fox and 
Swazey, 1974). Spare Parts is a sequel to Courage to Fail, where old issues are 
explored against a background of new treatments and healthcare policies since the 
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1980s (Fox and Swazey, 1992). The guiding theoretical framework of both books 
comes from Marcel Mauss The Gift (1967).  Gifts, according to Mauss, come 
necessarily with obligations. Given that organs are considered gifts, they are usually 
donated. This has implications for the laws governing organ procurement. For 
example, the Human Organ Transplant Act in Singapore outlaws any form of 
commercialization of human organs and blood. The difference between Mauss 
studies and those of Fox and Swazey lies in the role of the medical worker as a 
mediator between the gift giver and the recipient. The insertion of these personnel 
also makes gift giving an issue of distributive justice when the medical worker 
becomes the one who allocates those gifts. 
 
Both Elsters and Walzers work are methodologically relevant because they 
recognize the existence of plurality of goods and principles, and therefore, the need 
for the empirical documentation of such pluralities. This serves to remind one of the 
necessities of empirical investigation when one tries to deal with the real life 
plurality in distributive justice. Schmidts contribution to the research methods 
comes from raising ones awareness that decision-makers tend to involve medicine 
in justifying local decision-making processes, which allowed the data collection 
process to be a lot more focused. Therefore, the questionnaire in this paper, which 
was formulated with the help of Schmidt, was aimed at uncovering what lies 
underneath medical language. Besides the input into the questionnaire, Schmidts 
previous research on the topic also revealed what the popular criteria were and 
justifications used by decision makers in the allocation of organs. This allows one to 
be more prepared during the actual interviews, and to ask relevant questions should 
the discussion deviate from the focus of the research. Finally Kilners work serves as 
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an additional (to Schmidts) pool of information on the possible criteria that decision 
makers can use. This feeds into both the formulation of the questionnaire and the 
necessary background knowledge that one needs during the interviews. Knowing the 
possible justifications for and weaknesses of possible allocative criteria that can be 
used, is helpful especially in dealing with the decision makers who are specialists 
adept at using technical jargon. Without any awareness of those criteria, one could 
easily be drawn over to participate in the medicalization process. Besides the input 
into the questionnaire, Kilners work also directs the data collection process in a 
more focused manner. The interviews with the decision makers were the most 
important part of data collection, and Kilners work was also primarily built up from 





Methods and Methodology 
 This chapter on methods and methodology follows from that of literature review 
section because much of the methods I am using come from the experiences of prior 
researchers doing work on the same issue. In this section, I will talk about the two 
types of data to be collected, epistemological issues, and finally issues having to do 
with the interviewing of the informants.  
  
Type of data: 
 
 There are two types of data that are used in this thesis, namely, the background 
surrounding transplant medicine, and the ways in which organs are allocated. The 
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background knowledge consists of the medical, supply-demand, moral and 
sociological problems concerning organ transplantation, and the legal and 
institutional aspects of organ transplantation.  
 
 
The information about the medical problems comes mainly from scientific 
journals, publications by the restructured hospitals/specialist centres, voluntary 
welfare organizations (VWOs) in Singapore, and foreign medical organizations. The 
centres and VWOs that supplied such information are those that are concerned with 
organ diseases and treatments. The main institutions in Singapore include the 
Ministry of Health (MOH), the National Kidney Foundation (NKF), the National 
Heart Centre (NHC), the Singapore National Heart Association, the Singapore 
General Hospital (SGH) centre for renal medicine and the National University 
Hospital (NUH) liver transplant programme. The sources are mostly publications that 
are written with laymen as target readers. These sources include user-friendly 
websites introducing readers to problems of organ failures and transplantations.  
 
The supply-demand problem is highlighted primarily through information 
supplied by the national newspaper, The Straits Times Singapore, and data released 
by the local institutions. Problems of shortage of particular organs are the concern of 
different institutions dealing with those respective organs. However, NKFs wing of 
the Multi-Organ Donation Development (MODD) keeps track of the general organ 
shortage in Singapore, including lungs and corneas as well. The Singapore Renal 
Registry (SRR), as the name implies, collects data related to renal diseases. The 
Ministry of Health releases statistics on different types of diseases, which includes 
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the rates of organ failures in the population. Finally, the moral and sociological 
problems highlighted have been widely discussed in various studies done on the 
same issue, but in different settings.  
 
The materials for the legal and institutional aspects of organ transplantation were 
found through browsing all the local news reports related to medicine in Singapore, 
primarily that of The Straits Times Singapore. Other sources include statements and 
publications by the MOH and VWOs. No complete documentation of organ 
transplantation as a whole has been done as yet, and this explains why I have relied 
heavily on newspaper clippings in order to formulate a coherent account.  
 
The allocation of organs involves two main stages: admission and selection. The 
criteria used at the admission stage are not always made public, and they are also not 
always strictly adhered to. Therefore, besides looking for official statements about 
such criteria, the interviewing of the medical personnel is necessary as well. The 
specific ways in which the criteria are applied can only be known through 
interviewing the decision makers.  
 
 The identification of the decision makers comes from knowing exactly who 
conducts transplants surgeries. This information is obtained through the MOH, which 
released a list of transplant programmes available in Singapore, where they are 
situated, and what kinds of transplantation surgeries they perform. The second stage 
is to direct enquiries towards these specific transplant programmes, and finally trying 
to fix appointments with the directors of these transplant programmes. The contact 
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with the directors further informs one of any other source of information that might 





Sampling, validity and reliability 
 
 This research is concerned with the admission and selection criteria, therefore 
the most important respondents are the decision-makers. Even though at the 
admissions stage, many absolute criteria are used, the choice of which allocative 
model to use or even which part of the allocative models to use still depends on 
human decisions. Medical models include the ones used by UNOS (United 
Network for Organ Sharing), or other models like MELD (Model for End Stage 
Liver Disease) to allocate livers. Therefore, the decision makers do not only choose 
between the patients by applying different criteria, but they also determine who gets 
onto the waiting list through their choice of allocative models.  
 
The main difficulty in sampling was basically to identify the decision makers 
in the organ allocation process. This was dealt with through direct conversation with 
directors of transplant programmes who serve as references for any other sources of 
data. It was subsequently found out that they are the ones who have the holistic 
picture of how the whole transplant programme works, from who makes the 
decisions, right down to the justifications for the decisions made and even how the 
programme will work in the future. It was also found out later that they yield 




This research is not meant to be representative; it is an exploratory study to 
get a feel for the field and to make some preliminary comparison with similar cases 
in other countries.  This is due to the difficulty in getting interviews with the 
relevant respondents, who are usually on tight schedules and who sometimes tend to 
be suspicious of the intentions of a social scientist. I had, with much difficulty but 
fortune, managed to fix appointments with the three important respondents after 
approximately six months of negotiation. As mentioned earlier, the number of 
transplant programmes in Singapore is small, and therefore, few decision makers are 
involved. There are altogether six transplant programmes in Singapore: a 
state-sponsored heart transplant programme, one state-sponsored and one private 
liver transplant programme, two state-sponsored and one private kidney transplant 
programme. The three primary respondents (there are others who acted more as 
referees to these respondents) were the respective directors of the state-sponsored 
heart, liver and kidney transplant programmes. Therefore, the term decision-makers 
refers to these three main respondents from this point onwards. The research design 
has already been employed in other countries and other previous research (e.g. Elster, 
Kilner and Schmidt), and the questionnaire is designed with the guidance of Schmidt 




The questionnaire was used only as a rough guide during the interviews, to 
remind oneself to cover all the possible criteria that could possibly be considered by 
the decision makers. This section will discuss the procedures of formulating this 
questionnaire, and how it was used in the actual interviews.  
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  I used Kilners list of possible criteria that are used by American decision 
makers to draw up a list for the questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted generally 
of a list of questions asking about the possible criteria that decision-makers use. I 
selected only the criteria that are used to allocate organs. Secondly, the questionnaire 
was further fine-tuned by Schmidt whose experience was valuable in adding the final 
touch to the questionnaire. Though the questionnaire might appear rather structured 
and biased, this is due to the argument of the thesis, which draws heavily upon 
Schmidt and Elster. The purpose is to tease out the actual non-medical reasons 
behind the application of medical criteria.  
 
 The questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for the complete version) consisted of two 
sections: those that enquire about the mechanisms at the admission stage, and those 
used at the selection stage. The criteria that are included in the admission section of 




3) Social worth 
4) Personal responsibility for illness 
5) Alcoholism 






 The section of the questionnaire on the selection of patients was less structured. It 
was not composed of a list of questions that enquired about a list of possible criteria. 
Rather, the questions were more concerned with, for example, how a decision is 
made when two or more patients were equally weighted in absolute terms (medical 
or otherwise). Examples of the types of questions that were asked included:  
 
1) What role do you give to waiting time?  
2) Is the quality of organs taken into account? 
3) Do you make special provision for sensitized patients?  
 
As can be seen from the above list of possible admission criteria, they are not 
necessarily exclusively medical or non-medical in nature. For example, alcoholism 
can be seen as a social/moral or medical criterion, depending on how one defines it. 
Though those are the criteria that I have categorized under the admissions section, it 
does not necessarily mean that the respondents consider them as absolute criteria. 
They can be used very differently in different programmes. If they had been used in 
exactly the same way, then my investigations would have been unnecessary and 
meaningless.  
 
 The questionnaire was not adhered to rigidly because one needs to be able to 
follow up on particular points brought up by the respondents during the interviews. 
Some of these points can be new and particular only to a certain transplant centre. It 
is therefore important to find out how these points relate to the research question than 
merely trying to find out if selection criteria are applied differently. Secondly, it is 
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also critical to allow the respondent to elaborate as they deem fit. Strictly following 
the questionnaire undermines the respondents authority as medical experts and 
gatekeepers. This would not be a wise move considering the small number of 
























Background of Organ Transplant Medicine in 
Singapore 
 
 This chapter will present some relevant background knowledge regarding organ 
transplantation in Singapore, primarily the laws regulating organ donation/reception 
and the institutions that deal with the problem of organ failures. These two aspects 
are important to the thesis firstly because the legal stipulations regarding organ 
donation have their implications on the prioritization of patients for reception of 
organs, and secondly, the division of labor between institutions that deal with organ 
failures have their consequences on who makes the decisions regarding the selection 
of patients and how the decisions are made. 
 
The main source of these historical materials is The Straits Times Singapore, the 
main national newspaper. It would make the presentation of the data messy if 
references were given for every piece, therefore I would only cite the sources for the 
more important ones. The main source is The Straits Times, therefore I would 
display the day, month and year of the specific report in the form day/month/year. 











The primary legal bills 
  
This section deals with the legal stipulations governing organ transplantation. 
The three main bills governing organ transplantation are: 
 
1) The Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act (1972) 
2) The Human Organ Transplant Act (1987) 
3) The Interpretation (Amendment) Bill (1988) 
 
1) The Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act (1972) makes 
provision for the volunteered donation of body parts for the purpose of 
therapy, education and research. The donor must be of sound mind and 
over 18 years of age, and the donated organ/organs would take the form 
of gifts effective upon death. The gift can be directed towards any 
specified donee or recipient, or be left unspecified, with the written 
approval of the donor or done orally in the presence of at least two 
witnesses. Once the intention of the donor has been registered, relatives 
cannot override it (Lawnet, 2002b). See Appendix 4 for the complete 
stipulation.  
 
2) The Human Organ Transplant Act makes provision for the implied 
consent to donating the kidneys by an individual who is involved in an 
accident and who has died in a hospital. The person affected must be a 
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Singapore citizen or a permanent resident, between the ages of 21 and 60 
years, a non-Muslim and of sound mind. The implied consent law 
requires individuals to formally object to donating his/her kidneys, where 
the Director of Medical Services will keep a register of such individuals 
who have opted out. If this was not done, the individual would be taken to 
have consented to donate his/her kidneys.  
 
This law does not apply to Muslims who, on the other hand, would have 
to opt in. The main reason why the law applies differently to Muslims is 
due to the Islamic definition of death. The concept of death, to the 
Muslims, includes the death of all parts of the body. This means that the 
potential donor could not be kept on artificial respiration (keeping the 
heart beating artificially) in order to remove the organ for donation, for 
this would be equal to removing the organ while the person is still alive. 
To take into consideration this difference between Muslims and others, 
the law has different provisions for Islamic practitioners.  
 
The law also covers the prioritization of recipients of the donated organs. 
Anyone who has registered objection would have less priority than one 
who has not, and Muslims who have not opted in would have less priority 
than non-Muslims who have not opted out. And non-Muslims who have 
opted out would have the same status than Muslims who have not opted 
in. However, non-Muslims who have withdrawn their objections would 
have the same priority as those who have not objected or Muslims who 
have opted in. Non-pledgers are penalized with demerit points of minus 
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60, making it extremely difficult or even impossible to get a new kidney 
given that they need at least 40-50 points to move to the top of the list. In 
addition, the law prohibits the trading, selling and advertisements relating 
to trading or selling of organs or blood. It also makes illegal the 
disclosure of the identity of the donor (Lawnet, 2002a)). See Appendix 5 
for the complete stipulation. 
 
3)  The Interpretation Bill (see appendix 6 for the complete version) is part of 
the Interpretation Act, which the latter is responsible for the 
definition/interpretation of terms used within the law in Singapore. The 
Interpretation Bill deals with the definition of death, critical in transplant 
medicine where the body has to be kept alive for the purpose of 
preserving the organs to be transplanted. Therefore, the interpretation of 
death in instances where the dying patient is a potential organ donor, 






Institutions that deal with organ failures 
 
Throughout the past two decades, many medical facilities/institutions have been 
established in order to deal with diseases that affect the organs. The institutions that 
are dedicated to coping with organ illnesses (kidney, liver and heart) are categorized 
according to the function they serve: Assessment of Patients, Surgery, Dialysis, and 




1) Assessments of patients: 
i) Kidney:  
• Renal Unit at Singapore General Hospital  
• Kidney Transplant Programme at National University 
Hospital 
• Mount Elizabeth hospital 
ii) Liver:  
• Liver Transplant Programme at the National University 
Hospital   (NUH) 
• Gleneagles Hospital 
iii) Heart:  
• National Heart Centre  
2) Surgery 
i) Kidney:  
• SGH  
• NUH 
• Mount Elizabeth Hospital 
ii) Liver:  
• NUH 
• Gleneagles Hospital  
iii) Heart:  
• National Heart Centre  
 
3) Dialysis 
i) Restructured hospitals:  
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• Singapore General Hospital 
• Alexandra Hospital 
ii) Voluntary Welfare Organizations: 
• National Kidney Foundation 
• Kidney Dialysis Foundation 
• Peoples Dialysis Centre 
iii) Private Centres (nine in total) 
 
4) Related Functions: 
i) Asian Transplantation Society 
ii) Liver Transplant Support Programme (NUH) 
iii) National Heart Centre 
iv) Singapore National Heart Association 
v) The Society for Transplantation (Singapore)  
vi) Singapore Renal Registry  SGH 
vii) The upcoming organ transplant unit proposed by the MOH.  
 
 
The Renal Unit, Kidney Transplant Programme, Liver Transplant Programme 
and NHC are the referral centres for the respective types of organ diseases they deal 
with. In addition to referring patients for transplantation, the Renal Unit and the 
Kidney Transplant Programme assess the patients suitability for the different types 
of dialysis and drugs, and the patients level of need for financial subsidies from the 
VWOs as well (Kidney Dialysis Foundation, 2002). Kidney transplant surgery is 
done at two public hospitals, SGH and NUH, and one other private hospital, Mount 
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Elizabeth Hospital. Kidney transplants include both cadaveric and living-donor 
transplant surgery. All three hospitals provide these two types of transplantation. The 
Liver transplant programme at NUH provides both assessment and transplant 
services for patients. The same services are provided by Gleneagles hospital as well. 
However, Gleneagles hospital only provides living-related donor liver 
transplantations while NUH provides both cadaveric and living-related. The NHC is 
the only centre for heart transplantation and assessment of patients. It coordinates 
activities including fund raising campaigns and educational programmes as well.  
 
 Renal dialysis is provided by restructured hospitals, VWOs and private dialysis 
centres. The NKF operates 20 dialysis centres in Singapore (National Kidney 
Foundation, 2002b). It is the main provider of dialysis service in Singapore and it is 
the worlds largest not-for-profit provider of dialysis care (National Kidney 
Foundation, 2002d). It coordinates many other activities like fund raising, 
educational campaigns and job placements for rehabilitated patients.  
 
The final list of institutions shows those that are involved in various activities 
related to organ transplantation. These activities include  
 
• Fund raising 
• Education 
• Rehabilitation 
• Research forums 
• Data storage 
• Support group 
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• Coordination of Activities 
 
Those institutions given in the list are examples of organizations that are involved in 
organ transplant related matters. Because many issues can indeed be related to organ 
transplantation, for example, matters on healthy lifestyle, diet, medical technology, 
etc. it would not be practical to lay out each and every organization and the activities 
that they are concerned with. The most important institution in the list given above is 
the final MOH-proposed organ transplant unit, which has yet to be established 
formally. According to the MOH, the unit will act as a clearinghouse for transplant 
operations in Singapore (The Straits Times, 18/02/01), where its area of duties 
includes:  
 
• Taking over Organ Donor Registry, maintaining registers of those who 
have pledged or opted out of the Human Organ Transplant Act. 
• Being the single body to coordinate procurement of organs  
• Taking charge of public education to encourage organ donation 
















This chapter introduces the reader to the different criteria that 
decision-makers may use in the allocation of organs, how they may be used, and the 
justifications (or principles) behind their application. These three issues are based on 
previous research, which shows that decision makers often claim that they use only 
medical criteria for this purpose, but in practice, things are much more complex. 
Many a times, decisions to exclude patients are based as much on non-medical 
criteria than on medical ones, because of the need to control the level of demand for 
organs (Fox and Swazey, 1974; Aaron and Schwartz, 1984; Schmidt, 1998). This 
chapter helps the reader to better understand why certain criteria are preferred over 
others, which can be explained by the principles that are valued by the decision 
makers. This concrete list is drawn from the types of criteria usually used by 
transplant centers in Singapore: 
  
 
Medical criteria:  
 
1. Imminent death (or urgency) 
2. Blood-group typing 
3. Prognosis (both short and long-term) 




6. HLA matching  
7. Quality of organs 
 
Non-medical criteria:  
 
1. Nationality/residency 
2. Personal responsibility for illness 




1. Age  
2. Alcoholism 
3. Socio-psychological well-being 
4. Availability of social/emotional/financial support 
5. Compliance 
6. Retransplants 
7. Waiting time 
 
 
The list above comprises three groups of criteria. Firstly, medical criteria 
used to determine a patients need for a transplant and prospects if transplanted. 
Secondly, non-medical criteria like moral worth and finally, criteria that fall 
somewhere in-between medical and non-medical criteria. 
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 Application of criteria 
 
 Medical criteria are generally used for the sake of saving or prolonging the lives 
of patients with organ failures. For example, HLA matching is said to provide better 
long-term prognosis for the transplanted patient.  
 
 Residency or citizenship is a non-medical criterion; it has got nothing to do with 
the patients prognosis. Personal responsibility for illness (or self-infliction) reflects 
an emphasis placed on retribution. For example, new hearts may not be given to 
smokers because this group of patients is treated as those who had destroyed their 
own hearts. If the rejection of smokers is used as a medical criterion, then smokers 
should be required to quit this habit rather than be rejected outright. This then 
becomes a question of compliance and not retribution. Social worth refers to the 
potential of the patient to bring welfare to other people while moral worth refers to 
the very moral value of the identity of the person. For example, a drug-addict with 
dependents can be seen as having higher social worth, but seen as having lower 
moral worth. Application of both criteria does not provide better post-transplant 
prospects at all, but are nevertheless used in some cases.  
 
Lastly, many criteria fall somewhere in-between medical and non-medical 
ones because of their somewhat ambiguous nature. Age, for example, is often 
claimed to ensure better long-term prognoses by denying older patients access to 
transplants. However, they can also reflect the value placed on social worth or moral 
worth if younger patients are seen to have more potential to contribute to social 
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welfare, or that older people are simply viewed with discrimination. Alcoholism too 
is ambiguous in that it can either reflect an emphasis on the requirement for 
compliance (they need to practice abstinence) with post-transplant treatment or on 
retributive justice (they are rejected outright). In the U.S., government funding was 
easier to obtain should the patients under treatments be innocent victims of their 
illness (Caplan, 1987: 7). This can very well be another reason why alcoholics are 
rejected but medicalized as an issue of compliance. Socio-psychological criteria 
include examples like mental illness or low IQ. Mentally ill patients may be rejected 
for various reasons, for example, as is for those with low IQ, they are rejected for not 
being able to comply with medical treatment. They can also be rejected based on 
principles of social or moral worth as well. Availability of social/emotional/financial 
support often reflects concerns with compliance, but may also be used for the sake of 
ensuring a higher quality of life.  
 
 It can thus be seen that the criteria in the above paragraph can often be used to 
ensure compliance. Compliance is also an ambiguous criterion primarily because of 
the difficulty of measurements. It is difficult to predict if certain behavioral patterns 
of patients actually do provide better prognoses. The requirement of compliance may 
reflect other concerns like retributive justice, as is illustrated earlier by the example 
of smoking.  
 
 Retransplants are done when patients reject previously transplanted organs. 
These patients are usually more sensitized than normal patients and henceforth, more 
likely to reject newer organs. Finally, some patients who have been on the waiting 
list for a longer period of time are given higher priority than others. This can reflect a 
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medical concern in that patients conditions may deteriorate the longer they stay on 
the waiting list. Waiting time can also reflect a concern with equity: those who have 
waited longer should get the organs first.  
  
 
The underlying principles of criteria and mechanisms 
 
There are many vague terms that are constantly used in the justification of 
applying particular criteria. These terms include need, success, benefit, and outcome. 
Take for example, the concept of need. Because of its vagueness it can be used 
regularly as an overarching legitimation for the usage of particular 
criteria/mechanisms in selecting patients. Underlying non-medical reasons can be 
implied within the usage of the word need or success. For example, a patient 
might need an organ more than another because he/she has a family to support (a 
social worth criterion), likewise, success can mean improving the quality of life of a 
patient or lengthening his/her life. The terms meaning is often ambiguous.  
 
This section attempts to present the principles behind the usage of particular 
criteria. These principles come in many various forms, and therefore are hard to 
categorize systematically. However, I will attempt to classify the above list of criteria 







Desert or Retribution:  
The majority of non-medical criteria operate on the philosophy of desert, that 
medicine is applied for the sake of providing dues to or withholding them from 
people who deserve/do not deserve medical goods. For example, a father deserves 
an organ because he is more socially worthy (social worth) in that he is useful to 
his wife and children. Or a homosexual does not deserve a new organ because he is 
seen as morally contemptible (moral worth). Also, a patient might be seen as not 
deserving of a new organ because he/she was responsible for spoiling it in the first 
place (self-infliction). And finally, a citizen is prioritized over a foreigner because 
the citizen deserves the organ more because he contributes more for the countrys 
well being. It is possible to argue that since the aged do not have long to live anyway, 
the younger patient deserves the good more than the former. The mechanism of 
waiting time can also be based on desert, in that the effort and time spent on the 
waiting list should be rewarded with a new organ.  
 
Duty:  
Some patients are selected over others because surgeons feel that they have a 
duty towards these particular categories of people (Beauchamp and Childress, 1979: 
174). This can be illustrated by how some centres prioritize retransplant patients over 
others or that children are prioritized over adults. Prioritizing retransplant patients is 
done so because doctors feel that they have a commitment to fulfill once they start 







There are two main ways in which the notion of success is used in transplant 
medicine (Schmidt, 1998: 56). Firstly, success refers to the cost-benefit ratio for a 
given patient, and secondly, to the number of years the organ or the transplanted 
patient survives. Socio-psychological criteria are generally used to ensure success 
through getting the patients to comply with medical treatments. The main problem 
with using this criterion is that it is difficult to measure things like compliance, 
emotional resilience, etc. In fact, such difficulties result in a lot of ambiguity, which 
allows various non-medical preferences to get involved. For example, a mentally ill 
patient could be rejected because of discrimination, but is justified on grounds of the 
requirement for compliance (Lefebvre, 1980: 182; Young, 1975: 443; Ramsey, 1970: 
249).  
 
Medical criteria, like socio-psychological criteria, are based on the idea of 
success as well; that medicine must grant success in its application. However, 
decision-makers drawing on the same notion of success can end up with very 
different conclusions when applying it to individual cases. This means that the 
selection criteria derived from the notion of success can be quite diverse. If success 
means both the lifespan of the organ/patient or the cost/benefit ratio, younger patients 
will be of higher priority than older ones. However, this is justified by the argument 
that older patients do not fare as well as younger, though no medical evidence can be 
used to support this argument (Neuberger, 1999; Lamping, 2000; Cimato 2002; 
Hesse et al, 1995). In fact, some physicians in Britain had admitted to deceiving the 
aged about the latters poorer prognoses, just to make rationing decisions easier 
(Aaron and Schwartz, 1984: 35).  Medical criteria can be based on need as well, in 
 
48
that medical goods should go to those who are the sickest. Age, if used to indicate 
need, favor the old because they will probably be sicker.  
 
Though the application of age criteria serves more of a utilitarian concern 
than a medical one, it is still widely applied in many western countries4. Other 
criteria like HIV infection, blood group typing, sensitization, etc. are all concerned 
with success rather than need, because all these criteria ensure that the patient will 
enjoy long-term outcome after the transplant. However, how these criteria are judged 
can be quite different. For example, in the UNOS system, sensitized patients are 
given merit points for the sake of fairness. However, doing this will compromise on 




Problems with criteria and justifications 
 
There are three main types of problems that decision-makers face when they 
attempt to come up with criteria. Firstly, a definitional problem; how do they define 
dues, benefits and need? Secondly, how can they be certain that the application 
of certain means will yield desired outcomes? And finally, how do they justify using 
those criteria and having those outcomes?   
 
 Definitional problems are not just about placing priorities on certain goals so that 
one can choose between them. They also cause the problem of resolving 
contradictions between those goals. For example, the emphasis on obtaining success 
often contradicts that of fulfilling need (Schmidt, 1998: 71; Kilner, 1990: 116, 126). 
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If multiple goals are desired and yet they contradict one another, how does one make 
a choice? For example, patients who spend too much time on the dialysis machines 
tend to deteriorate, yet if they are transplanted early, it will not be fair to others who 
have waited for long. Therefore, the selection of an optimum timing is a kind of 
compromise between success and fairness. And different surgeons have different 
measurements for determining the best time for a transplant (Patient, 1969).  
 
 A highly deserving individual might not necessarily need a new organ. Someone 
who has been on the waiting list for 10 years might not necessarily be as sick as 
another who has been waiting for just a year. An urgent case might not necessarily be 
a successful one. A person who needs a new organ urgently because he is very sick 
will have a worse prognosis than one who is less sick. Finally, an elderly patient who 
has contributed much to society might be seen as deserving a new organ, but the 
prognosis will be worse than that of a younger patient. Such complexities in 
transplant medicine cannot be resolved by medical means, because medicine 
provides no guidance in dealing with them.  
 
General definitional problems faced by the decision makers also include, as 
discussed earlier, clear-cut differentiations between medical and non-medical criteria. 
A good example is the criterion of age. The usage of age as a medical or non-medical 
criterion also defines whether it is to be used as an absolute or relative 
contraindication. Absolute contraindications are strict thresholds that patients are 
compared against, and those who do not meet the standards are immediately 
excluded. Relative contraindications are based on variables that might add to the 
overall unfitness of the patient for transplantation. They affect, to different degrees, 
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the prognosis of the patient if he were to undergo a liver transplant. These variables 
are called relative because they can affect one another and henceforth produce 
additional medical problems that can, as a result, become contraindications. A 
second example of ambiguities between medical and non-medical criteria will be the 
usage of psychological criteria. Psychological fitness depends a lot on social factors 
(e.g. emotional support from kin) while psychological illnesses are treated with 
medicine therefore, it is not always easy to tell if it is a medical or a social criteria 






























The Selection of Patients for Liver Transplants 
 
 This chapter discusses the allocative issues concerning liver transplantations. 
The nature of the problems encountered in liver transplantation fall in-between those 
of heart and kidney transplantations. This is primarily due to the availability of 
split-liver transplant procedure and liver dialysis. Split-liver transplantation makes 
liver transplants resemble kidney transplants in a certain sense because of the 
possibility of having living-donor transplantation. However, liver failures differ from 
kidney failures because liver dialysis is still experimental5; liver patients cannot be 
kept alive for a long time on dialysis the way that kidney patients can.  
 
 To protect the identities of the respondents, I shall name the liver transplant 
progamme Programme L, the heart transplant programme Programme H, and the 
kidney transplant programme Programme K. Likewise, the liver transplant decision 
maker who was interviewed will be referred to as TxL, that of heart transplant TxH, 
and kidney transplant, TxK.  
 
Introduction to programme L:  
 
The waiting list (year 2001) at the programme is 21, with the likelihood that 
only about 50% of these patients will receive new livers. Till the year 2000 since the 
first liver transplant in 1990, the programme has done 82 transplants, but 116 deaths 
have occurred due to organ shortage. The liver transplant programme is small with 
donor organs becoming available at a slow rate. To alleviate this problem, the 
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programme procures organs from Malaysia. This is not a formal organ-sharing 
programme between countries, but between hospitals. And this is only done between 
Singapore and Malaysia because amongst the countries within the region, Malaysias 
medical standard is considered high enough to ensure that organs are healthy 
enough. So far, five livers have been imported from Malaysia.  
 
 The programme currently has four surgeons, and TxL claimed that the 
availability of any two surgeons is enough to deal with any emergencies. Besides the 
transplant surgeons, other medical personnel and patients together make up a 
tight-knitted community. A liver transplant means a life-long dedication to the 
medical scrutiny of the patient, therefore this community or network provides the 
necessary medical and social support for the patient.  
 
  
I. Admission onto the waiting list 
 
 Programme L has a full list of indications and contraindications that are used to 
admit patients into the waiting list. This list is made publicly known (on a website), 
and the criteria are mostly expressed in very technical language (see Appendix 2 for 
the complete list). Besides the indications for liver transplants, the list consists of 
contraindications that are divided into absolute and relative. I present below, the 
simplified list of indications and contraindications for liver transplant as released 





Indications for liver transplant  
• Cirrhosis  
• Biliary Disease  
• Primary Metabolic Disease  
• Fulminant Liver Failure  
• Hepatocellular Carcinoma  
Absolute Contraindications  
• Malignancy outside the liver  
• Severe cardio-pulmonary disease or major medical illness  
• Systemic Sepsis  
• Medically or Psychologically unfit patient  
• HIV infection 
Relative Contraindications  
• Age greater than 70 years  
• Persistent Hepatitis B Infection (HBV DNA positive)  
• Alcohol Dependence - at least 6 months voluntary abstinence  
As mentioned earlier, the primary medical indicator for a transplant is that 
patients must be at the final stage of organ disease. The programme uses an imminent 
death criterion, where patients are admitted onto the list if they have a 90% chance of 
dying within a year. This definition of imminent death is not applied universally, but 
death may be considered imminent when it is expected to happen within days or 
weeks in competent medical judgements (Meyers, 1977: 328; Jackson and Annas, 
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1986: 119; Jonsen et al, 1982: 32) or it can be measured in terms of probabilities as 
done at Programme H. As Elster argued, transplant centres do exercise some freedom 
in the criteria they implement and as Kilner pointed out, the medical criterion of 
success has been loosened in Britain as resources became more plentiful, so can the 
definition of imminent death itself (Aaron and Schwartz, 1984: 101-102). Even a 
commonly taken-for-granted medical criterion like imminent death can be defined 
differently according to the discretion of the transplant centre.  
 
TxL claimed that the indications for liver transplant are all medical in nature, 
and that patients are admitted onto the waiting list only if they fulfill the criteria. 
Contraindications, on the other hand, are used to exclude patients from the list. 
However, not all criteria used by the Programme L at the admission stage are 
absolute. Included in the above list are relative contraindications as well. The 
contraindications are a mixture of medical, socio-psychological and non-medical 
criteria.  
 
 Different transplant programmes categorize different conditions differently into 
absolute or relative contraindications. Although the list of indications and 
contraindications provided by Programme L states clearly the way they differentiate 
between the two, the interviews with the decision makers reveal a significant level of 
flexibility in implementing them. This will be elaborated in greater detail later.  
 
The contraindications used by the programme are more sociologically 
interesting because of the high level of flexibility with which they are applied. The 
applications of those contraindications have been topics of debate in transplant 
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medicine because of the various contradicting evidence that support their 
applications and in addition, due to the fact that different transplant programmes 
apply different standards. For example, some reports show that alcoholics experience 
lower survival probabilities (Scharschmidt, 1984) while others show that alcoholics 





A patient is not only assessed by transplant surgeons alone. Hepatologists, 
anesthesiologists, histopathologist, medical social worker, dietitians, psychiatrists 
and transplant coordinators are involved as well. The members of the committee 
define the nature of what constitutes a medically and psychologically fit patient. The 
fact that psychological fitness is considered an absolute contraindication highlights 
the importance of the role of the social worker and the psychiatrist in the decisions to 
admit patients onto the waiting list. The notion of fitness lends itself to various 
interpretations and levels of strictness. Studies in the West (Fox and Swazey, 1978; 
Schmidt, 1998; Aaron and Schwartz, 1984) have shown that under conditions of 
organ scarcity, allocations of organs are rarely based on medical considerations 
alone. The strictness of the allocative criteria changes in accordance to the number of 
organs available; criteria are largely a function of the relation between demand and 
supply (Schmidt and Lim, 2004).  
 
Besides the explicit rejection of potential recipients with HIV infection, 
medical fitness is defined ad hoc. Medical and psychological unfitness are used as 
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absolute contraindications, but if the members of the committee can negotiate the 
notion of fitness, it is less than absolute. During the interviews, TxL argued that all 
patients on the list are competing on 99% medical criteria. However, things are more 
complicated than that. Besides the doctors looking at medical criteria, the 
psychiatrists and social workers evaluate socio-psychological factors of the patients. 
These factors are articulated as: 
 
 “Working environment, social support...if we see a guy who doesn’t 
keep a schedule for the tests, then he cannot be taken seriously. We 
will talk to them, send them to the psychiatrist. We don’t want them to 
lose the liver. It is better to measure it now than after the transplant. 
It’s a big tedious process, takes about 1-2 months. He has to satisfy so 
many people” 
 
As shown above, psychological fitness depends on social and environmental 
conditions as well. The main difficulty with including such variables lies in their 
measurements. How does one determine what degree or quality of social support is 
necessary for a transplant to be successful? Psychological fitness is actually used to 
secure compliance. Though one report claimed that it is taken less seriously in 
non-western cultures (Perkins, 1986), TxK claimed that compliance is taken very 
seriously at programme L. Research in America has also shown that 90% of 
premature graft losses are due to non-compliance, hence avoidable rejection of the 




Besides psychological and social criteria, alcoholism is also a criterion that is 
used to indicate the likelihood of compliance as well. Rejection of alcoholic patients 
is justified on the grounds of poor long-term prognoses.  However, it takes at least 
10 years for a liver to be destroyed through alcoholism, but new livers do not, on 
average, last that long in the first place anyway (Schmidt, 1998). This indicates that 
alcoholics are rejected for other reasons.  
 
TxL admitted that most of the time, the measurements used to predict 
compliance are not very accurate: we are often wrong…we have lost patients 
because they are not compliant. German physicians faced this problem as well, and 
most transplant surgeons readily admit that sometimes, they thoroughly misjudge a 
case (Schmidt, 1998: 54). Still, such failures have not made Programme L more 
hesitant about applying the measurements. In fact, TxL believes that with experience 
and better resources, the measurements can be further fine-tuned. 
 
Given that transplanters are well aware of the difficulties in measuring 
fitness, one can hypothesize about the forces driving their usage. Singapores 
healthcare philosophy is essentially non-welfarist (Chua, 1995: 9-40; Rodan, 1996: 
20-45; Clammer, 1993: 34-52) and meritocratic (Quah, 1981: 149-156; 1989: 
122-160); perhaps the emphasis on compliance is an attempt to medicalize concerns 
about whether the patient actually deserves the treatment. As argued by Perkins 
(Perkins, 1986), compliance or the willingness to take treatment is less important in 
non-western cultures. In its place, desert or retribution might take precedence. 
Non-welfarism as an ideology does not only underlie the healthcare system, a form 
of compulsory savings system exists in Singapore that ensures that citizens 
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contribute part of their salaries to a fund (Central Provident Fund) that is eventually 
used for future expenditures. Decision-makers values are likely influenced by the 
systems underlying ethos, which is reflected in the non-medical criteria (desert) 
used in the allocation of organs in transplant programmes. As articulated by TxK, 
Singapore finds it hard to forgive… Given that Singapore, as an Asian country, 
tends to be more collectivist in its morality than western societies (Schmidt and Lim, 
2004), utilitarianism tends to fit better in the society and an organization dealing 
with distributive issues existing within it.  
 
 Even if indeed, the objective of using psychological fitness is to secure 
compliance, it still reflects a weak form of utilitarianism, and not genuine medical 
concerns. Medical rationality and ethics only tell the doctor to do his/her best to 
provide a patient with the best possible treatment; whether the organ should survive 
as long as possible is not a question that can be answered medically.  Utilitarianism 
is also reflected in the application of the age criterion. Age is defined in two ways: 
chronological and physiological. Chronological age automatically excludes patients 
who exceed the maximum limit (hence rendering it into an absolute contraindication) 
while physiological age excludes those who are medically unfit because of their 
age (hence a relative contraindication). The relationship between chronological age 
and medical fitness is an ambiguous one. Medical research concludes that no strict 
causal relationship exists between chronological age and medical fitness for 
transplant (Neuberger, 1999; Lamping, 2000; Cimato 2002; Hesse et al, 1995). 
Therefore, exclusion of the elderly from transplantation must be due to other 




 The age limit for liver transplants is set at 70 years. This number is higher 
than that for kidney transplants (60 years) even though liver transplants are more 
complex, thus requiring a younger body for prognoses to be good. Although the 
liver transplant programme explicitly uses the age of 70 years as a relative 
contraindication, TxL revealed that physiological age is used in practice. As 
articulated by TxL, A guy who is 58 might look better than a guy who is 50…it is 
not fixed. Long-term outcome is an important factor behind using age as a 
contraindication. A 58-year-old man who looks better’ has a better prognosis than 
one who might be younger, but who may not live long after the transplantation. Just 
as compliance, the use of physiological age as a criterion reflects the utilitarian 
concern with maximizing the functioning years for the new liver. Regardless of 
whether the prognosis refers to the functioning years of the new liver or expected life 
expectancy for the transplanted patient, younger patients will always be of higher 
priority than the aged under this criterion.  
 
The age criterion has been widely applied under conditions of extreme 
scarcity in many western countries (Kilner, 1990: 77-78). It directs many patient 
selection decisions in the U.S. and Britain (Hendee, 1986: 8; Meissner, 1986:6), and 
public support for its the usage is strong (Evans and Manninen, 1987: 4). Kilner 
points out that age-related criteria are particularly prominent when resources are 
limited, using the example of Britains renal dialysis services during the days before 
they became federally funded. Policies that filter off the aged even affect decisions at 
the stage of referrals (Berlyn, 1982:189). Physicians in the West, knowing that the 
elderly will not be able to access medical resources even if they are referred for it, 
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provide merciful lies (Schmidt, 1998: 56) to these patients to prevent dashing their 
expectations. It is unknown whether physicians in Singapore do the same, but TxL 
pointed out that the small number of referrals makes the waiting list much shorter 
than it potentially could be.  
 
Though prognoses play an important utilitarian role in the transplant 
programme, TxL later emphasized that it is the need of the patient and not the 
success of the transplantation that ultimately decides if someone will be admitted. 
The typical patient to be admitted is decompensated, one who  
 
Looks yellow, has a big tummy, losing weight… one could get liver 
disease without being decompensated…we choose from this 
decompensated group 
 
As a relative contraindication, the age criterion is used rather flexibly and can be 
compromised under certain circumstances. An elderly person might be presented as 
either a case of need or success. This shows an inconsistency in the principles 
that are emphasized and possible contradictions between the principles. In this case, 
the principles at clash are need and success, where need refers to imminent 
death and success to long-term prognosis. This shows that even the twin medical 
goals of fulfilling need and providing benefit contradict one another at times 
(Schmidt, 1998; Neff, 2002).  
 
It was revealed that a stronger version of utilitarianism, primarily social 
worth, was one of the principles that underlie the application of the age criterion. 
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TxL pointed out that because the younger individual would likely have a family to 
support, he would need to come back to a more economically viable sort of 
situation. The liver does not, then, benefit just the recipient, but his dependents as 
well. This reflects a communitarian/collectivist tradition of prioritizing the family 
and the community over the individual. An individuals worth is closely tied to 
his/her social networks and his/her responsibilities to other people. The social worth 
criterion used to be more popular in the West, but with ongoing modernization and 
individualization of morality, this criterion has been relaxed recently (Schmidt and 
Lim, 2004). One can perhaps, make the hypothesis that Singapore might follow the 
footsteps of the West, as can be seen in the case of the allocation of kidneys at 
programme K (see chapter 7).  With rapid modernization, Singapores morality 
might become more liberal and move towards a less collectivist and punishing 
mode (Inglehart, 1995: 379-403).  
 
As mentioned above, alcoholics are sometimes seen to be non-compliant; 
therefore, a six-month abstinence from alcohol is expected from those who want to 
be admitted into the waiting list. It was claimed by TxL that such requirements serve 
two main purposes: 
 
1. Abstinence from alcohol might give the liver a moment for recuperation, and 
if the liver does recover to a certain extent, a liver transplant is not needed at 
all.  





Research has shown that statistically, the prognoses for alcoholics are as good 
as those for non-alcoholics (Cohen, 1991; Glannen, 1998; MacMaster 2000). Still, 
TxL believes otherwise. He argued that it is not alcohol per se that destroys the liver, 
but rather, alcoholism can cause the patient to mix up his medication with alcohol 
while being treated with immunosuppressive drugs. It is the total picture that 
destroys the liver, he claimed. The real value of the donor liver here is defined as 
the livers usual lifespan (around 10 years). TxL believes that the lack of abstinence 
from alcohol would undermine this real value that the transplant could offer by 
destroying it prematurely.  
 
Though alcoholism is one of the most frequent causes of liver cirrhosis, 
Programme L has not seen many such cases. It was not revealed by TxL whether 
self-infliction could be or is being used as a contraindication to being admitted to the 
list or to being prioritized once on the list. But as argued earlier, the non-welfarist 
ideology governing the distribution of resources in Singapore suggests that 
self-infliction can deprioritize a potential liver recipient. Such forms of non-medical 
criteria are left to the panel, primarily the psychiatrist. It is not a blanket rule…we 
cannot be the expert…we might seek a 2nd opinion, was what TxL said.  
Nonetheless, alcoholism is medicalized as an issue of compliance, which is not easily 
measured (Simmons and Simmons, 1979: 369; Davidson and Scribner, 1967: 8), 
even with the help of social workers and psychiatrists.  
 
 Medical research has shown that patients with HIV infection do not necessarily 
fare worse than others. In fact, cases of worse prognoses for HIV patients having 
undergone transplants are labeled as statistically insignificant (Gow, 2001). 
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Although the rejection of HIV infected patients from transplantation is theoretically 
grounded, empirical experience does not validate using it as a medical 
contraindication. HIV infected individuals suffer from a weakened immune system, 
making them more susceptible to infection, and experience more difficulties in 
recovering from infections. So if they were to receive a new organ, it would be 
introducing foreign bodies into the already weakened immune system. Together with 
additional immunosuppressive therapy thereafter, the prognosis of the patient is 
expected to be worse than that of a normal patient. All these predictions however are 
not verified by the actual experiences with actual transplanted HIV patients (Gow, 
2001; Halpern, 2002; Kuo, 2001; Prachalias, 2001; Stock, 2001; Neff, 2002).  
 
 The justification for using HIV infection as an absolute contraindication at 
Programme L is that the scale of the programme is small. According to TxL, only 
large transplant programmes conduct transplantations for HIV infected patients. This 
shows that the rejection of HIV patients is not strictly medically based. Given the 
smaller size of the programme, it would be considered too risky to try a transplant on 
a HIV infected patient for it can mean wasting an organ. This reflects the concern 
with maximizing the lifespan of the liver. So far, the programme has not seen a HIV 
infected patient yet.   
 
 
Other admission criteria 
 
Children and adult patients are put on different waiting lists because it is now 
possible to conduct split liver transplantations for children. Split liver 
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transplantations for children come from living related donors, where the donor is 
usually an adult closely related (parents or siblings) to the patient. At the moment, 
the pediatric list is nearly totally done through living related transplantations. This 
reduces competition between children and adults for the same pool of livers. Perhaps, 
like Programme K, this is done for deontological reasons, where special groups of 
people (children) are given special attention. It can also be done to maximize the 
benefits generated by a limited pool of livers, tapping into living-related adult donors 





II. Selection from the waiting list 
 
 Programme L is currently trying out the MELD (Model for End Stage Liver 
Disease) system implemented by UNOS in the United States in February 2002. This 
new system potentially replaces the old system that pays more attention to the 
waiting time.  
 
The Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) is a numerical 
scale, ranging from 6 (less ill) to 40 (gravely ill), that will be used for 
adult liver transplant. (UNOS, 2003a)  a new system for 
prioritizing patients waiting for liver transplants. This system is based 
on statistical formulas that are very accurate for predicting which 
individuals are most likely to die soon from liver disease (ibid, 
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2003b)uses a mathematical formula based on serum creatinine, 
bilirubin, and INR. MELD scores can range from 6 to 40 (MELD 
scores greater than 40 are all grouped together and receive a score of 
40).    
 
This means that the MELD system allocates livers based on the urgency of cases, 
using the following three criteria in ranking patients on the waiting list (ibid, 2003a):  
• Bilirubin, which measures how effectively the liver excretes bile; 
• INR (prothrombin time), which measures the livers ability to make blood 
clotting factors 
• Creatinine, which measures kidney function.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the twin goals of need and success often contradict one 
another. The MELD system that measures the urgency of cases, henceforth the need 
for a transplant, does not ensure the patients prognosis. This particular contradiction 
can be resolved by either choosing to place emphasis on need or success, or to find 
some middle path between the two. The application of the MELD system at 
Programme L is indeed some sort of a middle-path option. But instead of trying to 
maintain the level of success of the patient while fulfilling the need of that patient, 
attention is given to the overall mortality rate of all the patients on the list. What the 
MELD does is to give organs to those who are the sickest, and this is supposed to 
decrease the overall mortality rate of the group of patients on the list. Therefore, the 
need of a single patient is satisfied by transplanting the organ for him/her if his/her 
case is much more urgent, while success is achieved when a group of patients in need 
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are transplanted and prevented from death. Need is thus fulfilled at an individual 
level while success is provided at a group level.  
 
Because the MELD system being tried out at Programme L is quite new (it 
was started in the year 2001), this trend (of decreasing mortality) still needs to be 
further verified. Therefore, MELD is still in the trial period. The previous system 
used by UNOS allocates organs based largely on waiting time, which resulted in 
higher overall mortality rate. Therefore, the switch from the old system to MELD is 
basically a move from the emphasis on the principles of desert/equality to that of 
need and success. One wonders if the shift to the emphasis on success has to do with 
other political or economic reasons. It is not difficult to hypothesize that the 
programme or the surgeons would look good if they could decrease the overall 
mortality rate.  
 
Programme L is currently trying out MELD while it continues to apply its 
traditional criteria in selecting patients from the list. TxL is tight-lipped about how 
the trial is carried out. The traditional criteria are: 
1) Medical fitness 
2) Citizenship 
3) Waiting time 
4) Commitment 
 
Medical fitness at the selection stage can be defined in an ad hoc manner. For 
example, a general infection would de-prioritize a patient from receiving a possible 
transplant. In fact, TxL said that a patient on the list who is recovering from a 
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recent illness would be excluded from the list. This means that if a patient were to 
suffer from a bout of cold, he/she might have to be passed over even if he/she was at 
the top of the waiting list. This is what TxK called the physician factor, for it 
depends a lot on the physician on duty to determine if a patient is medically suitable 
for a transplant when a liver becomes available.  
 
 Although a non-citizen or non-permanent resident of Singapore is not left out of 
the waiting list, such individuals are given second priority. The general rule is that if 
an organ is not suitable for any of the Singaporeans or permanent residents on the 
list, the foreigner will get it. One can argue that such a general exclusion of 
foreigners is grounded in desert, that special privileges are accorded to Singaporeans 
because of their contributions to the nation. Some might also argue that it is the right 
of the citizen to have priority simply because he/she is a citizen of the state. 
 
 Waiting time is a mechanism and not a criterion for selecting patients because it 
does not take into account any substantive characteristic of the individual patient. It 
does not matter who the patient is; one just needs to tabulate how much time has 
been spent on the waiting list in order to accord priority to whoever has the longest 
wait. The waiting time mechanism can either be grounded in desert (that those who 
have been waiting the longest deserve to get the organ) or equality (where an 
objective indicator like time is used to prioritize patients). Waiting time is accorded 
less importance than medical criteria though it is used as one of the tiebreakers. TxL 
claims once you are on the list, you are competing on 99% pure medical grounds. 
However, when asked to choose between one patient who has a 70% success 
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probability because he has long been on the list and one who has a better prognosis, 
TxL was quite prompt in choosing the one who has had a longer wait.  
 
Livers generally become more dysfunctional as time passes, which also 
means that the patient becomes gradually sicker and thus needs the transplant even 
more. To allocate livers based on waiting time means that one is trading success for 
need. And as mentioned earlier in the section on MELD, this apparent dilemma is 
being tackled through taking a middle-path between need and success. It seems that 
desert is not an important factor anymore. A second problem, which is both an 
ethical and a technical one, that decision makers have to make, is to find out exactly 
what the optimal time for a transplant is. Given that livers deteriorate with time and 
transplanting sicker patients yields worse success rates, the surgeon would have to 
settle on the right time to give a patient a transplant. It is a difficult decision to make, 
and as articulated by TxL:  
 
How do you predict whether when it is the best time to have a 
transplant… that is almost impossible in an average situation. The 
scoring system is a continuous process. The criteria constantly 
change. It is not an easy process, because we have to… if we have 21 
patients its ok but when we have 100 patients then it will be a full time 
job for a number of people to continuously assess the patient. 
 
 Even though the main guiding principle of the transplant programme is 
utilitarian in nature, there were other principles (in addition to considering the need 
of urgent patients) that were adhered to. The importance of commitment to the 
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patient was revealed through the discussions about re-transplantation. Programme L 
has done a few re-transplants, and it was claimed that the re-transplant rate at any 
given transplant programme is usually between 10-15%. Organ shortage is a serious 
problem in Singapore, and the liver transplant programme is quite small, therefore, 
the re-transplants are usually done with livers from living related donors. This 
removes competition between re-transplant candidates and first-time recipients, 
much like the rationale underlying the creation of a different waiting list for children.  
 
TxL pointed out that the medical problem associated with re-transplantation 
is that the patient will generally have grown sicker and more sensitized, the 
likelihood of rejection is higher, and the second transplanted liver will have 
approximately half the life span of the first. He added that a transplant patient who is 
a candidate for a retransplant is one who would die in one month if he/she does not 
get a second organ. This means that the potential re-transplant patient will score 
quite high on need but low on success. However, these two medical objectives are 
partially overridden by the commitment that TxL has towards the retransplant 
patient.  
 
 Priority is given to a patient who has had a transplant. TxL argued that it is 
because the patient is facing imminent death, and once we have promised the guy 
we make a commitment. This is clearly a deontological position to adopt towards 
patients. Elster calls this attitude the norm of thoroughness, and he argued that 
doctors tend to favor patients they have treated because of biased sampling, ignoring 
the possibility that other patients might benefit as much or even more from similar 
treatments (Elster, 1992: 149). Therefore, the main ethical debate revolves around 
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the possibility that if doctors devote their attention to other patients rather than the 
retransplant candidate, those other patients could have a better chance of success 
(Matthieu, 1988: 44-45). However, it was noted by TxL that if the patient has a 
recurrent disease (e.g. cancer), then the retransplant would not be done. This is 
grounded on the value placed on success, because a recurrent disease will mean that 
the patient probably will not live long even after being given a second organ.  
 
 The question of how one compromises the demands from both the value of 
success and commitment to the patient is not easily answered. The process becomes 
more complicated as one considers the imminent death of the patient as another 
variable. As Schmidt has argued (1998a), medical practitioners usually have some 
idea of how such problems are to be resolved, independent from what ethicists or 
technicians suggest. Patients must be treated, and physicians do not often have the 
luxury of engaging in theoretical musings under the confines of scarce resources. 
Nevertheless, they are also aware, through their experiences, of the various 
contradictions between their values. Besides medicalizing distributive problems to 
make justifications of the decisions easier, habits and routines are formed and a 
reality is eventually constructed to deal with the ethical problems faced in their 
work. This does not, however, mean that this reality is fixed as policies or 
regulations; it is always negotiable but influenced heavily by both the values of the 
decision-makers themselves, and the overall circumstances (like the non-welfarist 
ideology, or the speed of modernization).  
 
However the distributive issues are resolved, what one can see here is that the 
programme (or even selected decision-makers) has a great deal of discretion in 
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deciding what to do without interference from some objective scientific imperatives. 
The overarching ethical position the centre takes is still utilitarianism. In the 
programme, a patient with recurrent diseases will generally be given livers which are 
of lower quality (marginal livers).  
 
 Not only can a liver be split for split-liver living related transplantation, livers 
come in a variety of qualities as well. A liver is defined in the programme as being 
marginal when it comes from a donor who is above 40 years of age. A marginal liver 
will not be split, and it will be given to a patient who is relatively sicker. In other 
words, marginal livers are matched with marginal patients. The blood group of the 
liver can be considered as a component of grades, henceforth requiring specific 
placement of organs with less than optimal qualities.  
 
 Blood group matching is a medical criterion because transplanting organs from a 
donor with a blood group different from that of the recipient can result in serious 
complications and even death. Therefore, the programme groups all who are on the 
waiting list into their respective blood types, and they will receive only organs that 
come from blood groups suitable with theirs. The current waiting list (year 2003) 
contains about 20 patients, and after splitting them into their respective blood groups 
(A, B, AB, and O) each group would consist of 4-5 patients. This means that any 
other selection criterion that is to be applied would be used to select between 4-5 
patients only, as the blood matching is an absolute medical criterion.  
 
 A special category of marginal patients exists within the pool of patients on the 
waiting list. These patients are considered marginal because their liver failures are 
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caused by cancer. Cancer is a recurrent disease, which not only destroys the liver, 
but can spread to other parts of the body as well. This means that getting a liver 
transplant will not necessarily cure the patients illness, the cancer might recur and 
the patient can die of other illnesses as well.  
 
 It was explained that giving marginal livers to marginal patients is due to the 
small size of the liver transplant programme. It would be risky (similar to not 
giving a HIV patient a transplant) to give an optimal liver to a marginal patient 
because the liver might not last as long as it should. It would then, be wasting a 
good liver (similar to giving a liver to a non-compliant patient). This sort of attitude 
expresses the value placed on maximizing both the functioning years for a normal 
liver, and the utility of one that is marginal. Given the low procurement rate of the 
organs in Singapore, even marginal livers are not wasted. Transplanting marginal 
patients with marginal livers allows one to prolong the lives of these patients, yet it 
does not reduce the maximum functioning years of normal livers.  
 
As Elster had pointed out (1992: 50), British medicine has a more utilitarian 
orientation than the Americans and it is because the former has a greater scarcity of 
resources. This results in the reduction of the scope for the norms of compassion and 
thoroughness. Doctors are then forced to think in terms of incremental benefits and 
to spread themselves thinly over more patients (Elster, 1992: 50). This scenario is 
replicated in the Singapores case, not only for Programme L, but also for both the 
heart and kidney transplant programmes. As shown earlier, the rate of organ 
donation in Singapore is much lower than that of the West, to find utilitarianism as 
the main allocative principle is not surprising. In addition, Singapores healthcare 
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system does not rely as heavily on third party provider like in the U.S., which means 
that the healthcare budget in Singapore (also keeping in mind the non-welfarist 
philosophy) is tighter than in the U.S. This similarity with the British National 
Health Service accounts for both localities utilitarian attitude6.  
 
 Cancer patients are given marginal livers. Besides the quality of the liver being 
determined by the age of the donor, diseased livers can be considered as lower 
quality ones. In fact, in some transplant centres, HIV patients are transplanted with 
organs from HIV donors (Gow, 2001: 178). Besides matching for quality, an 
age-matching system used to be applied at Programme L. This system matched older 
livers with older patients, as articulated by TxL: we don’t like to give a 60 year old 
organ to a 2 year old kid. But ever since the children are placed on the living 





 Programme L, not unlike other transplant programmes, follow the medical triage 
model of admitting referred patients into the waiting list based on a certain set of 
indications and contraindications, followed by selecting them from the list. It is 
currently trying out the MELD system where the total implementation of MELD 
would imply a huge shift in ethical paradigm. However, as noted by surgeon TxL, 
the MELD system is just a guide, and therefore not a form of mechanism that is 
strictly adhered to. Looking at the current selection criteria that are used, the greatest 
compromise will be on the usage of waiting time. Just like in the U.S., the urgency 
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of the case and the successes of the cases would then override the traditional 
allocation of dues/needs that is done through looking at the waiting time. One can 
see very clearly that the implementation of certain models of selection is not a 
medical issue, but about making choices between certain non-medical principles.  
 
Although it was expressed that the transplant programme is 90% outcome 
oriented, it can be seen that the emphases on outcome are regularly being overridden 
by the concern with need, understood as imminent death. In addition, utilitarian 
concerns are also expressed in favoring the young over the old and deontological 
morality bounds the surgeons to the retransplant patient. However, due to the 
inflated problem of liver scarcity, it can be seen that utilitarianism is still the major 
ethical position that is favored. Medical criteria only deal with predicting the 
outcome of offering health to everyone who could have it, but they do not inform 
one about the definition of things like need, success or benefit. Neither does it 
inform one which of these is more important than the others, or who should receive 
those medical goods. One can see the numerous inconsistencies, dilemmas and 
compromises that have to be made in both the implementation of certain selection 
models, or the favoring of certain patients over others. Medicine cannot do much in 
tackling these inconsistencies, dilemmas and compromises at all. Issues like need, 









The Selection of Patients for Heart Transplants 
 
Heart transplants are different from that of kidneys primarily because any 
patient with heart failure who does not get a heart transplant will die soon. This is 
because, there has yet to be a good enough artificial replacement for the heart. Also, 
split-heart transplantation is not a possibility unlike that for livers. In addition, hearts 
are extremely scarce in Singapore. Every year, on average, the National Heart Centre 
(NHC) receives about 25-30 referrals. Out of these referrals, only 8-10 are medically 
suitable, and out of these suitable ones, only 1-2 gets used for transplants because 
most of the relatives do not consent to the donation. Some of the potential donors 
include foreign laborers who were killed in industrial accidents, and convicts on 
death row.  
 
Just like livers, hearts are heterogeneous goods as well, meaning that they 
come in different qualities. According to TxH, a heart transplant surgeon, good 
hearts are those that come from men younger than 40 years old and women younger 
than 45. He argued that, due to the unhealthy lifestyle of Singaporeans, older donors 
tend to already have some degree of heart defects, with men more susceptible than 
women. The ideal hearts come from patients who are less than 30 years old and 
who have died in accidents. But according to TxH, don’t dream about them, for 
they are that rare. Most donors are more than 55 years old, with a history of heart 
problems, who are on constant medication, with high-blood pressure and who smoke 
and drink.  
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I. Admission onto the waiting list 
 
The NHC has a full list of indications and contraindications that are used to 
admit patients onto the waiting list. This list is clearly formalized, but not widely 
distributed to the public. The NHCs list of contraindications is not separated into 
absolute and relative categories. Instead, it lists out on the document the finer details 
of the admission and selection process. The admission indications and 




1. Age 13 to 60 years or older depending on the general condition of the patient.  
2. Irreversible end-stage cardiac disease with global left ventricular dysfunction 
3. New York Heart Association FC III with low likelihood of survival for more 
than one year 
4. Left ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF) should be less than 25% 
5. Normal function or reversible dysfunction of Liver and Kidney 




1. Active infection (e.g. HIV, Hepatitis, PTB) 
2. Recent Pulmonary Infarction 
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3. Insulin dependent diabetes mellitus 
4. Pulmonary vascular resistance over eight unit 
5. Chronic gastrointestinal diseases, e.g. peptic ulcer and colitis 
6. Cancer 
7. Chronic bronchitis, emphysema 
8. Alcoholism 
9. Irreversible dysfunction of liver and kidney 
 
 
Just like the criteria used for the selection of liver transplant patients, those used for 
heart patients are framed in very specialized medical terms as well. Comparing the 
criteria used at NHC and that at Programme L, one can see that contraindications like 
age and psychological fitness used at the latter are classified as indications within the 
NHC. Regardless of how these two criteria are classified, their applications raise 
similar sociological issues. Although the NHC does not explicitly and formally 
differentiate between absolute and relative contraindications, such differences were 









Selection committee is responsible for identifying who should be put 
on the register of potential recipients, and for selecting the most 
appropriate recipient, on the list when a donor heart is available.   
 
The selection committee consists of not only the surgeons, but also other personnel 
involved in the heart transplant programme. These personnel include both 
psychiatrists and medical social workers. The psychiatrist will  
 
Examine the patient to exclude any psychological or psychiatric 
problems that may have adverse effects on post-transplant recovery.  
 
The above statement shows that the psychiatrists main role is to ensure the 
recipients compliance with the post-transplant treatment. Compliance is described as 
fundamental to Anglo-American law (Kilner, 1990: 163), and there are indications 
that its usage will increase in the West in the future (Robertson, 1987: 81; Task 
Force, 1986: 90). As mentioned in the previous chapter, compliance plays a less 
important role in non-western societies. Indeed, the interviews revealed that in many 
selection cases, it is usually more than an issue of compliance, but a general problem 
of personality trait. This concept of personality trait includes other issues like 
personal responsibility for ones own illness, social-emotional independence, etc. I 
will devote one section to personality trait later on.  
 
During the early days of heart transplant operations in Singapore, the age 
limit was between 18 and 55 years old, but it has been altered to 13 and 60 since 
1997. Even though the limit was set at 55, the first heart transplant patient in 
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Singapore was chronologically, 59 years old (The Straits Times, 10/07/90). Age is 
defined physiologically and not chronologically. In fact, it was eventually revealed 
that age is not, in practice, an absolute contraindication, but a relative one. Besides 
taking into consideration the difference between the two, TxH also revealed that such 
age limits apply differently to Caucasians and Asians as well.  
 
Asians look older than our age, and if you are 60 or 62 years old 
but look like you’re 55, we will still consider you.  
 
It is hard to establish the medical nature of the external appearances of 
individuals. However, it is still claimed that there are some medical concerns, 
primarily with that of the long-term outcome of the operation. Many centres in the 
West used to apply the cut-off age of 50 or 55 (Debakey and Debakey, 1983: 9, 
Thompson, 1983: 66), with 50 as a relative contraindication, and 55 as an absolute 
(Devries et al, 1984: 278; Friedrich, 1984: 73). The first two artificial heart recipients 
Clark and Schroeder received the implantation precisely because they could not meet 
the age criterion. Perhaps one can even argue that the NHC is already being more 
accommodating in increasing the age limit.  
 
 It was revealed later, however, that there is a non-medical usage of age 
within the selection stage. This has got a lot to do with the issue of quality of life. I 








Like liver transplants, the presence of HIV (including other infections as well) is 
used as an absolute contraindication for heart transplants. TxH emphasized that in all 
organ transplantations, two medical problems are pertinent: infection and rejection. 
Active infection is used as a contraindication because of the high possibility of the 
reactivation of the infection, given that immunosuppressive therapy has to be 
administered after the operation. This makes other infections like Tuberculosis and 
Hepatitis B absolute contraindications as well. All these, as mentioned earlier, 
though theoretically plausible are not exactly empirically verified but NHC still uses 
them primarily for the sake of establishing better long-term outcome. In view of the 
expected worse long-term outcome projected for a patient with active infection than 
a normal patient, the latter would be preferred over the former. This makes the NHC 
appear very much utilitarian.  
 
Alcoholism as a contraindication tends more towards being an absolute rather 
than a relative one. This is because the programme is very strict in excluding 
alcoholics from the waiting list. Alcoholism is taken to be an indicator of many other 
criteria as well, primarily that of personality trait. When asked if a patient would 
be considered if he/she pledges abstinence from alcohol both before and after 
transplant, TxH revealed that this would be an arbitrary demand on the patient, but 
the psychological and the social workers assessment will be of greater priority than 
this arbitrary demand. Ultimately, an alcoholic, or drug addict who is also an 
ex-convict would be excluded because of the problem of personality trait. Besides 
the above list of indications and contraindications, patients who are 
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non-Singaporeans would be of secondary priority than Singapore citizens. Foreigners 
will only be considered if there is no Singaporean on the waiting list.  
 
 
Personality Trait  
 
 The indications of psychological fitness and alcoholism point to the emphasis on 
personality trait. It is used primarily as an admission criterion at NHC. TxH revealed 
that sometimes, they could be wrong about a patients personality, especially in cases 
of alcoholism (just as what TxL said about the programmes analysis of a patients 
degree of compliance). This is not surprising given that surgeons interviewed by 
Schmidt (1998: 54) lamented about the difficulty of measuring and predicting 
compliance as well. In fact, TxK pointed out that a patient might exhibit better 
compliance after getting a new kidney even though he/she had not been compliant 
while on dialysis. How then does one predict a patients willingness to accept 
treatment, and how does one justify using compliance (psychological fitness as 
NHC) as an absolute indication? These are not easy questions to answer.  
 
TxH had admitted that there were times when the transplanters were  
 
Caught by those alcoholics who say they have not been 
drinking…sometimes they are so sick they will say anything they want 




This means that at times, even after the patient has been admitted onto the 
waiting list, they might be assessed to be unsuitable for receiving the new heart. 
Personality trait then also becomes a selection instead of merely an admission 
criterion. This means, just as it is practiced at Programme L, the assessment of the 
patient continues even after he/she has cleared the admission stage. It is hard to see 
how the personality trait of an individual (as shown later), medicalized as 
psychological fitness at the admission stage, is related to medicine. However, the 
difference between NHC and Programme L is that TxH does not make as many 
claims as TxL about the implementation of medical criteria only. Given that 
personality trait embodies many different subjective qualities a patient should 
have, it reveals how much power a single centre (or even a decision-maker) have 
over how it distributes its goods. So far, from the investigations conducted for livers 
and heart transplants, one can conclude that just like in Germany and America in the 
past (Schmidt, 1998: 70), local allocative decisions play an important role in the 
fortunes of patients. 
 
Personality trait embodies different sub-criteria. The primary ones are that 
of compliance, personal responsibility, and emotional independence.  
 
1)  Compliance is given great emphasis because, according to TxH, the 
post-transplant part of ones life would mean a lifestyle change”. The programme 
pays a lot of attention to post-transplant care. It has a patient support group that 
offers not only advice to the patients, but serves as a feedback system for the medical 
workers to know about the patients lifestyle as well. One can perhaps call this a sort 
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of surveillance body.  Alcoholism, drug abuse, smoking and criminal records are all 
possible indicators of personality traits. TxH pointed out that  
 
A lot of alcoholics are non-trustable…not compliant with 
medication…the fact that you succumb to all the, you know, drug 
abuse…it’s a personality trait.  
 
It was not revealed if the psychologists or TxH undertook such assessments, but what 
is important is that these are not purely medical considerations. It also reminds one of 
the possibility that this category of people (ex-convicts and drug addicts) are 
assessed on the basis of moral or social worth. The social worth criterion is used 
widely in the world. An international study involving 30 countries has concluded that 
social worth plays a significant role in the selection process (Evans et al, 1984: 6), 
primarily in western countries (Carter-Jones, 1983; Parsons and Lock, 1980: 74). It 
would thus be no surprise that it is applied at NHC as well.  
 
Smokers are also given lower priorities partially because of the lack of 
compliance as well. In fact, if the smoker does not stop smoking for at least 6 months 
(pre-transplantation), they will not be considered at all. All these are articulated in 
the belief that smoking, alcoholism, drug abuse are all causes of heart problems (and 
other related medical problems) and that they interfere with recovery after 
transplants. However, it was revealed later that smokers are also denied treatment 





2)  Secondly, personality trait includes personal responsibility for ones own illness 
(self-infliction) as well. The major problem with this selection criterion is that 
everyone is responsible for his/her own illness in some way or another, therefore, it 
is difficult to justify penalizing some and not others. In fact, besides smoking, 
alcoholism and drug abuse, unhealthy lifestyle including the lack of exercise were 
pointed out to be the cause of chronic heart diseases. How then does one decide to 
pay attention to some causes and not others?  
 
It took some probing for TxH to explicitly break down the criteria of 
personality trait into compliance and personal responsibility. He pointed out that it’s 
all related…to me it’s all a personality trait…I think both are important. It was only 
through narrating the story about a particular patient that the difference between the 
two was revealed:  
 
We had one patient whom we transplanted. She had bone cancer so 
she went through chemotherapy and eventually that damaged her 
heart muscle. It’s not due to her own fault. Whereas for alcohol its 
not, it’s self inflict. So we have to differentiate between these things. If 
you have certain unhealthy habit resulting in you having liver 
cirrhosis, then…especially in an era whereby we are very short of 
donor organs, one has to use the donor organs more cautiously. To 
give them the benefit, the best benefit so to speak. This is how I look 
at it; unfortunately we have to be realistic in life. We would like to 
help everybody but sometimes you see this is what we have, we have 
to work within our limit. 
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  The above extract clearly reflects TxHs ethical position about alcoholics. They 
are not rejected merely on the grounds of the requirement for compliance; it is also 
based on the principle of retributive justice, an ethical rather than a medical 
requirement.  
 
3)  Thirdly, emotional independence was the third most important factor within the 
criterion of personality trait. It is more than being compliant with the post-transplant 
medication, but also being willing to look after oneself. A patient can be compliant 
through the strict scrutiny of family members and the medical workers, or he/she can 
be compliant because he/she is emotionally independent enough to be able to and 
willing to take good care of him/herself. Emotional independence was also raised as 
one of the four aspects of the quality of life criteria; it was referred to as self-care.  
 
Some patients are not interested in looking after themselves. They go 
on to lead an unhealthy lifestyle…to have a heart transplant is like to 
sign a contract. The contract is to look after yourself…help us look 
after yourself.  
 
Assessing the overall psychological suitability of the patient is not only a job for the 
psychiatrist, but that of the surgeons and the social workers. And this is done at NHC 
not only at the pre-transplant stage, but also at the post-transplant in the form of the 
patient support group. The NHC does this because it is believed that such criteria will 




 Finally, personality trait could be taken as a whole, in-itself, without the 
evaluator even bothering to break it down into the components. Personality trait then 
becomes an eclectic product of collapsing things like social and moral worth; it 
resembles an implicit form of discrimination. Simply put, and articulated by TxH:  
 
“…But if the patient is a drug addict and an ex-convict, most of the 
time we are concerned with the personality trait of the person. We 
reject them because of that, not because of other reasons (I had 
earlier asked if social worth was the reason). But I think that 
sometimes we must be careful to pay too much attention to these 
things. All these are unwritten biases; we don’t put down in black and 
white. We don’t say that if he’s a soldier he’ll have a better chance. 
But no matter what you say, there is always something in life you look 
at. 
 
 The interview with TxH informs one that many of decisions are actually based 
on ethical judgments. Even though the NHC is a medical organization, the way it 
allocates hearts requires more than medical guidelines; medical rationality alone 
simply cannot tell the physician how best to select patients for a new heart.  
 
 The criterion of personality trait is not a formal one that is made public, yet it 
plays a very important role here. It can be understood as a rather holistic notion that 
encompasses many values held by the decision-makers. One can also detect an 
element of moral worth within the criteria; perhaps ex-convicts are discriminated 
while drug addicts are seen as a burden to society. What is sociologically interesting 
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here is that a national organization like the NHC, with its small numbers of 
decision-makers has the freedom to create its own admission and selection criteria 
based on its own ethical or political value. The NHC does not appear to be as 
utilitarian as Programme L. From the way NHC utilizes and justifies the admission 
criteria, it expresses a much more deontological commitment towards specific groups 
of patients. This is contrasted to the situation in the U.S., where the favoring of 
specific groups of people is not a widely supported criteria; it is used by only 27% of 
medical directors in the study conducted by Kilner (1990: 42).  
 
 
II. Selection from the waiting list 
 
  
The selection of patients from the waiting list would include many of what 
TxH called soft points. These criteria include:  
 
1. Personality trait 
2. Social support 
3. Waiting time 
4. Quality of life  
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, personality trait can also be used at the selection stage, 
given that some patients manage to slip past the admission stage. However, this 
criterion is more or less bundled into that of the Quality of Life (QOL), which also 
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includes the notion of social support. However, the QOL, unlike personality trait, has 
got nothing to do with personal responsibility for the illness. The presence of social 
support is used as an indicator of how much post-transplant care the patient can 
possibly get. And indirectly, the overall QOL score for the patient can also increase 
with the presence of social support.  
 
 Unlike the way it is done at UNOS, waiting time is not one of the formalized 
criteria in the system of ranking used in prioritizing patients on the waiting list (See 
Appendix 3). Waiting time will always be secondary to the need of the patient; it is 
not an absolute indication. As TxH put it,  
 
If you are getting sicker and sicker, you might be waiting for just one 
month, we’ll transplant you. Unless everything else is equal, then we 
transplant the guy who has waited quite long.  
 
The prioritizing of a sicker patient over one who has waited for a long time reveals 
the greater importance of urgency rather than equality or desert to the programme. 
Just like the liver transplant programme, need still overrides other considerations. 
Waiting time is only used as tiebreaker when everything else is equal, which is a 
rather rare instance. The issue of waiting time raises another question; that of an 
optimal time for operating on the patient. In the words of TxH:  
 
“The most difficult thing in heart transplant is to decide the optimum 
time to do it. We don’t want to transplant the patient when they are 
very sick, when they are getting into end-stage organ failure where 
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we are faced with that uphill task trying to combat all those 
dysfunctions after transplant. We also don’t want to transplant them 
too early, because doing a transplant is actually replacing a diseased 
organ with another diseased organ. So it’s very important to find an 
optimum time.” 
 
In the case of the NHC, the optimum timing problem reveals a contradiction that 
exists between trying to increase the lifespan of the patient, and saving the life of the 
patient; i.e. between success and need. In addition, it is difficult to predict just how 
long a patient can survive after the transplant. In fact, in a study in the West on 
physicians assessment of a patients post-transplant prognoses, physicians came up 
with huge variances of the length of benefit the patient could possibly gain 
(Pearlman et al, 1989: 425). The dilemmas that physicians face in the particular case 
of determining optimum timing will be elaborated later.  
 
 
Quality of Life  
 
 The QOL is understood by the NHC as being synonymous with the meaning of 
life. The significance of the QOL criteria is that it is more important than the 
quantity of life. In the words of TxH:  
 
“To be honest, now in operations, we don’t look at the success or 
failure. Life and death are long gone as the arbiter that we use to 
gauge something. Eventually the important thing we want to look at is 
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the quality of life. Like if you have a good quality of life then 
obviously it is worth taking the risk. Organ transplant, no matter what 
it is still a very risky operation. The older you get the sicker you are 
the higher the risk. You know eventually you can have a healthy 
organ but if you do not have a meaningful life, then that’s also no 
point. I think that is important. So what we eventually want to look for 
is the quality of life.” 
 
 QOL was mentioned when the interview got to the issue of the benefit to the 
patient. The concept of success was often associated with long-term prognosis. 
Because of this emphasis, it had been assumed that benefit meant long-term 
prognosis, which had also been assumed to refer to the post-transplant lifespan. The 
emphasis on QOL was only revealed when TxH was asked for a definition of the 
concept of benefit.  
 
 According to TxH, the QOL has four aspects, each of which has some 
implications for the types of indicators that the decision-makers look for in selecting 
patients:  
1) Ability to contribute to society 
2) Ability to enjoy leisure 
3) Ability to maintain normal human relationships 
4) Ability to look after oneself 
 
If patients were to be selected based on the ability to contribute to society (a social 
worth criteria), then the older patients would be excluded. In fact, it was explicitly 
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admitted that the younger patient would be preferred in many cases. The other 
aspects of QOL would also imply that if one were to be an inactive person, he/she 
would not get a new heart because he/she would not be participating in a lot of 
meaningful activities. Thirdly, just like the social support criterion, the preferred 
patient would be one who has a good social support system, not only for the sake of 
post-transplant care or to maintain compliance, but simply because humans are 
societal, that humans, in the eye of TxH, are necessarily social animals. Finally, the 
ability to look after oneself, as was mentioned in the section of personality trait, 
would exclude those who are not interested or disciplined enough to engage in 
self-care. I have below, the exact words of TxH in his description of what QOL 
constitutes:  
 
“First of all we would want to try to get them back to contribute to 
the society. So it’s the younger patient that we would hope to 
transplant. You know when we look at a person actually there are 
only four aspects. One is to be independent. To be able to work and 
earn a living, supporting myself and my family. The other aspect is 
your leisure. You want to be able to enjoy your life, and not work 
your whole life. Life is more than just work. The third aspect is to 
maintain a normal good relationship…if you’re married, with your 
spouse with your children, I think it’s important. Establish a normal 
relationship with people, I mean we are societal. fourth aspect is, no 
matter whether you are married or not, you must be able to look after 
yourself. Self-care is very important. I think if you ask what the 
purpose of living is, it’s like that. I believe there is 
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more…psychological, religion. I think the psychological part is also 
very important. Often we only concentrate on these four aspects, a lot 
of time we forget about our psychological requirement. That’s the 
reason why we have this patient support group. I think this is life. 
When a patient is sick and one of these aspects is interrupted, so 
when we say we want to get them back to work, have meaningful 
relationship with wife, play with children…” 
 
 In the U.S., the quality of benefit criterion is the most broadly supported 
amongst all the criteria (Kilner, 1990: 152) in the allocation of scarce medical 
resources. In fact, 97% of medical directors consider it relevant to the selection of 
patients. This criterion receives support in many countries in the world as well 
(United Nations, 1975: 31; Schwartz and Grubb, 1985: 24), and for organ 
transplants, a qualitative nature of post-transplant prognoses is taken seriously too 
(Task Force, 1986: 87; Jackson and Annas, 1986: 119). Besides the quality of life of 
the patient, 72% of the U.S. public have argued that a higher quality of life of 
patients increases their social worth, allowing them to make greater contributions to 
society (Evans and Manninen, 1987: 3). The main debate surrounding the usage of 
quality of life rather than quantity of life is the issue of whether the value of lives is 
different because they are experienced differently. The proponents of the QOL 
criterion argues for a qualification of life in terms of the happiness and meanings 
derived from it, while the opponents (usually those in support of the criterion of the 
lifespan of patients) argue that one should not make a distinction as all humans 
should be treated alike (Kilner, 1990: 153-156). As one can see, this is an ethical 
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debate, and therefore, the NHCs decision to pay that much attention to the criterion 
is an ethical decision.  
 
  
Other selection criteria 
 
 Besides the above different ways in which one selects patients from the waiting 
list, there are other miscellaneous issues that have implications on the selection 
processes as well. They are firstly, the issue of retransplantation, and secondly, the 
prestige of the surgeons involved. 
 
 The problem with retransplantation is two-fold. Firstly, it is a medical problem 
as explained in the previous chapter. The second problem is an ethical one, and it has 
to do with fairness. Given that a patient already has a first transplant, should not a 
new organ go to someone else who has not gotten one? This is another dilemma that 
the decision makers have to face (I have also discussed this issue in the chapter on 
liver transplants). I shall talk about dilemmas in a later section.  
 
 The second possible issue that might have implications on the selection criteria 
is the effect of transplant statistics on the prestige of the surgeons or the programme. 
Although the NHC did not mention that this is something that they would consider 
as a possible principle for allocation, TxH did mention the existence of this 




“Sometimes for certain transplant hospitals, you see hey their results 
are all very good. If I pick and choose all my patients and don’t 
operate on sicker patients of course I’ll have very good results. And 
so people look at it and say hey how come your patients are all very 
good patients. Like the cases that we do, people do not want. Those 
are the patients who are half dead…there is always a certain amount 
of risk, we must risk stratify. What kind of patients are we doing? So 
looking at the survival figures, by itself it means nothing. Sometimes 
we see that the mortality rate is higher, it doesn’t mean that you’re a 
bad doctor…these are the issues one has to consider.” 
 
The above paragraph shows that besides medical and ethical considerations, political 
or economic considerations are possible principles used in organ allocation as well. 
Though allocation of organs is an ethical issue, it does not necessarily mean that the 
criteria or considerations are ethical ones only.  
 
 Hearts, like livers, come in a variety of quality. The heterogeneous nature of 
donor hearts means that a matching system between particular hearts and particular 
patients exists. Matching uses primarily two medical criteria, they are:  
 
1. Blood group typing 
2. Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) matching 
 
 Research has shown that HLA matching is not a strong guarantor of good 
prognoses for organ transplants (Sutherland, 1992; Ferguson, 1988; Terasaki, 1995; 
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DAlessandro, 1995). This is due partially to the advancements in 
immunosuppressive medicine, which means that rejection of new organs can be well 
managed even with HLA mismatches. The conventional HLA matching process 
usually looks at the six main antigens, the NHC, however, only look at four antigens.  
 
 What is important here is that even though a potential recipient has an HLA 
mismatch with the organ, they are not always rejected; it is not an absolute 
contraindication. However, HLA matching has a primary function in finding out if 
the recipient has already pre-formed antibodies against the donor organ. The centre 
believes that if that is the case, the organ will encounter intense rejection. For cases 
where pre-formed antibodies are not detected, the NHC finds it acceptable that there 
are two mismatches amongst the four. Though immunosuppressive medicine is 
effective at present times, TxH argued that the body adapts to such treatment, and 
thus requires less of it. This also means that the body starts to tolerate the foreign 
organ after some time as well. TxH believes that HLA matching serves to better 
ensure long-term outcome because the more matches there are, the better the body 
tolerates the organ. This emphasis on long-term outcome would however, contradict 
the issue of the need of the patient. I shall devote the last section in this chapter to the 
conflict between need and success. 
 
 
Other matching methods 
 
 Unlike that which is done at the liver transplant programme, an age-matching 
system does not exist. TxH pointed out that since 1999, UNOS has adopted the 
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age-matching system, where younger organs are given to younger patients (age 
below 18 years old). Given that younger organs are healthier, younger patients are 
actually favoured in the UNOS system. At the NHC, age matching will be difficult 
to administer because of the small number of organs procured. In its place, organs of 
lower quality are matched with sicker patients. Sicker patients who are given such 
organs are usually those, according to TxH, who we know are not going to make it 
anyway. Giving marginal organs to these patients  
 
Gives them a chance, at least there is slight hope…a little hope is 
better than no hope.  
  
This shows the utilitarian leaning in dealing with matching organs, utility not in 
terms of the number of years the organ or the patient survives, but rather, the number 
of lives that can be saved. This is because, if the marginal hearts are not used, they 
will go to waste. However, lack of age-matching might be due to the small number 
of organs procured each year, and not because the centre is not concerned with 
maximizing the lifespan of the new hearts or the patients.  
 
 Comparing the heart transplant programme with that of the liver transplant 
programme, one can see that the former tends to be less concerned with maximizing 
the utility that the organ can bring, than fulfilling certain ethical demands. The NHC 
does not attempt to medicalize its patient selection criteria as much as Programme L. 
Given the many different ethical and idiosyncratic judgments it makes of patients, 
the NHC does represent a very good example of what Elster (1992) talks about in his 
Local Justice, that local centres to have a lot of autonomy in their decisions about 
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how goods should be allocated. A similar situation is found in Germany, where 
allocative decisions are highly discretionary. Every centre has the power to develop 
their own policies or that physicians are simply left alone to make their own 
decisions. In addition, the process of organ allocation are not made immediately 
known to the public (Schmidt, 1998). From comparing the list of admission criteria 
that NHC provided during the interview and what was found out during the 
interview, one could see the lack of publicity about how hearts are allocated in 
Singapore as well. The NHC is virtually left alone to decide how it is done.  
 
 
III. Inconsistencies and Dilemmas: ambiguities in organ allocation 
 
  All the above documentation shows us the many ambiguities within the organ 
allocation process. These ambiguities are expressed in the various inconsistencies, 
dilemmas and compromises that are encountered in the decision-making processes. 
The previous sections have shown that there are four important phrases in NHC 
patient selection criteria that are used quite differently. They are:  
1) Success: saving the patients life in view of certain possible risks 
2) Long-term prognosis: quantity of life 
3) Benefit: quality of life 
4) Need: imminent death 
All these four are not totally compatible with one another. As mentioned earlier, a 
common moral conflict exists between the general conceptions (not only as 
understood by NHC) of need and success. In this case, the conventional conception 
of need would refer to, at NHC, the imminent death of the patient, while the 
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From the interview with TxH, there was a constant emphasis on the 
long-term outcome of the transplantation. In the initial stages of the interview, it 
seemed as if the contraindications used at the admission stage were intended towards 
lengthening the patients life. Yet, it was later pointed out that the need of the patient 
would always be prioritized over the long-term outcome. This was again 
contradicted when it was admitted that it is the QOL that is the arbiter of patient 





Besides the inconsistencies, a prominent dilemma exists between the 
principle of need and that of success. This dilemma was evident in three practices 
which I had mentioned earlier: HLA matching, retransplantation and optimal timing.  
 
1)  HLA matching was done for the sake of the long-term outcome of the transplant. 
This means that success as long term prognosis is emphasized here. However, since 
HLA mismatched patients are not rejected, this only means that the emphasis on 
long-term outcome can be compromised by the emphasis on the need of the patient. 
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If a patient with HLA mismatches (not pre-formed antibodies) is dying, the patient 
will probably be given a new heart.  
 
2)  The issue of retransplants reveals the dilemma between emphasizing need as 
imminent death or success as risk-benefit ratio. One of the most common 
justifications given for retransplants is the commitment to the patient, as exhibited by 
Programme L and one particular example from Pittsburgh where a single patient was 
given five different organs (Elster, 1992: 148). For the NHC, which has done one 
retransplant, retransplants are not favoured over first transplants because of the 
higher risk involved. A patient who has rejected the first graft would be significantly 
weaker and sicker, and therefore would probably need (the patient is more likely to 
die) the second graft more than another. Deprioritization of retransplant patients 
therefore contradicts an earlier emphasis on need, where  
 
Most important is the need, not the success. I mean we all like to 
have a good success rate, but we are constrained by our 
environments. It’s not up to you to choose. You just have to do what is 
necessary for the patient, eventually; it’s the patient that counts.” 
 
3)  The clearest indicator of this need-success dilemma lies in the determination of 
the optimal timing for a transplant operation for a particular patient. If a patient is 
transplanted when he becomes sicker, one is doing it based on the principle of need. 
However, the sicker patient would probably have a worse prognosis than a healthier 
one, and this compromises the length of benefit. On the other hand, if a patient is 
transplanted early, the length of benefit would not be optimum either because the 
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patient could be kept alive for longer periods with medication. In other words, if, for 
example, a patient has been on the waiting list for one year, and that he can survive 
for another five years with a new heart, his extended life would have been a total of 
six years. However, if he is transplanted with a new heart after being on the list for 
one month, and he can survive for another 5 years with the new heart, his extended 




Matching marginal organs with sicker patients is a form of compromise made 
between the principle of need and that of success. By giving these patients marginal 
organs, one manages to save them from imminent death, but will not prolong their 
lives by much. If one were to give sicker patients healthier organs, the patients might 
not last as long as those healthy organs could offer, and this could deprive healthier 
patients of good organs as well. Therefore, in order to make full use of those healthy 
organs, and to give healthier patients better prognoses, healthier patients are given 
healthier organs. Success then becomes the guiding principle here. In other words, 
matching marginal organs with marginal patients fulfils the principle of need, 











The question is, how then, does one choose between the principle of need and 
the principle of success? How does one actually establish the optimal timing for an 
operation? Given that it is not just a matter of extending ones life, but also includes 
the QOL, how does one make the decision as to when and who to operate on? 
Whatever is done and however it is done, one can see that medical criteria have a 
very limited role to play here. All the inconsistencies and dilemmas show that such 
decisions are based on anything but clear-cut medical technical criteria. Principles 
like need, success, benefit, and public relations are hard to be reconciled. Moral, 
political, economic and other valuations all come into the picture. As one surgeon 

















The Selection of Patients for Kidney Transplants 
 
 This chapter presents the allocative issues within kidney transplantations. 
Kidney transplantations differ from that of both livers and hearts because of the 
availability of dialysis as an alternative treatment for ESRD. Unlike liver dialysis, 
kidney dialysis allows the patients to survive almost indefinitely. Kidneys differ from 
hearts because only one kidney is necessary for survival, therefore, like livers, 
living-donor kidney transplants are possible.  
 
 
Introduction to Programme K: 
 
 The kidney transplant programme at SGH is linked through a computerized 
point allocation system to the NUH kidney transplant programme. The point 
allocation system is based partially on the UNOS system, but to what extent it differs 
I have not been able to ascertain because how points are allocated to patients on the 
waiting list is classified information withheld by the MOH. The waiting list operates 
at a national level while the more specific selection and surgical procedures are done 
at the local level (i.e. the transplant centres). There were 666 patients on the waiting 
list for kidney transplants by the end of year 2003. Each year, SGH gets 
approximately 80-100 live donors and 100 cadaveric donors while NUH gets only 
40-60 live donors. From these pools of donors, only about 25% result in successful 
transplantations. This means that most of the patients stay on the list and compete 
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with new patients being added on each year. Of those on the waiting list, five of them 
pass away each year (The Gift, 2002).  
 
It was claimed by TxK, a kidney transplant surgeon, that Programme K has a 
relatively high success rate (though TxK did not supply the exact statistics). 
Measured in terms of half-lives (the time needed for 50% of transplanted organs to 
cease functioning), the half-life for cadaveric transplants is 20 years in Singapore, 
while in the United States, it is about 12 years and as for the world average, about 7.5 
years. In addition, Programme K has a good funding system, where patients are 
subsidized for life for their treatments while in the U.S., they are only funded for 4 
years. Finally, the average age for transplantation is from 40-45 years old. 
 
 The unique mechanism used in Programme K is the computerized point 
allocation system that is applied nationwide. The system allocates points to patients 
in accordance to various criteria like age, waiting time (usually about 6-8 years), 
HLA matches, etc. and according to TxK, that after running the patients through the 
computer, they are usually left with about 30 patients. This means that the selection 
process compares this group of patients against one another, using again, the point 









Patient selection philosophy 
 
Programme K is based upon a set of what TxK calls philosophies. The 
programme approaches the issue of the admission and selection of patients with three 
main attitudes:  
1. Best survival (success) 
2. Justice 
3. Sympathy 
And all these three are incorporated (we try to combine them together) into the 
computerized point system, which, according to TxK, gives objectification to the 
whole system…it will weigh and look at all these [medical] and the social criteria. 
Therefore, the computer does not only apply the medical criteria, but other social 
criteria as well. According to TxK, the most important criteria are the medical ones, 
for they provide the best survival. This either reflects a medicalization attempt or a 
utilitarian attitude. An example of a medical criterion would be the contraindication 
of having ischemic heart disease, which is seen to shorten the lifespan of the new 
kidney. This means that best survival or success is measured in terms of the quantity 
of life of the kidney and not the patient. However, there are numerous other caveats 
that stem from this set of philosophies; I will elaborate on them further in the 








I. Admission into the waiting list 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the waiting list for kidney patients operates at a national 
level. Below is the list of the criteria that are used:  
 
Criteria to be on the transplant list (NKF, 2002e) 
• Be below 60 years of age  
• No cancer or history of cancer  
• Not Hepatitis B antigen E positive  
• No active or chronic infections  
• No active auto-immune disease (SLE)  
• No heart disease  
• No long-term mental illness  
• No history of stroke  
• No untreated urinary reflux or bladder problems  
 
Programme K, like the NHC, does not make its patient selection criteria 
immediately available to the public. The above list of criteria was obtained from the 
NKF rather than the transplant programmes.  Just like the admission procedures 
used for liver and kidney transplants, the criteria used at this stage can be 
differentiated into either absolute or relative contraindications. But this is only done 
in practice, not on paper.  
 
 As seen above, the admission criteria focus on contraindications rather than 
indications. This means that patients are filtered off from getting a new organ rather 
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than being let onto the waiting list. This makes the selection process much more 
exclusivist, which is not surprising given the long waiting list and the low 
procurement rate. The greater the discrepancy between demand and supply, the 
stricter the criteria tend to be. According to Kilner, one solution to the scarcity 
problem is to tighten the criterion of medical need until the number of patients who 
qualify for the resource match the resources available (Kilner, 1990: 14). As 
admitted by 85% of US kidney dialysis directors, an age criterion would be 
employed under conditions of greater resource limitations (ibid: 78) while only 10% 
use the criterion at the time of the survey. This serves as an example of how a more 
exclusivist contraindication is employed to deal with the scarcity problem.  
 
The only clear indication for kidney transplant is that the patient must be 
suffering from ESRD. Another possible reason why the emphasis falls on 
contraindications rather than that of indications is because even patients suffering 
from ESRD can be left on dialysis for a long period of time, they are probably not 
considered urgent cases unless as TxK puts it, the patient can’t dialyze 
anymore…he has no more blood vessels’. According to TxK7,  
 
“… with only transplanting 30 people out of the 100 we get every year, 
and if you allow 130 onto the waiting list but still do 30 every year, 
your backlog goes up too. So there must be a practical approach and 
balance, since the numbers of kidneys are not increasing… it’s 




 Just like the NHC, Programme K does not formally differentiate between 
absolute and relative contraindications. It was only done in actual practice. To make 
things clearer, I shall classify the above criteria into absolute and relative 
contraindications as applied by the programme:  
 
Absolute contraindications:  
1. Age 
2. Cancer 
3. Heart disease 
4. Auto-immune disease (HIV infection) 
5. History of having stroke 
 
Relative contraindications:  
1. Hepatitis B infection 
2. Chronic infections 
3. Mental illnesses 
4. Urinary or bladder problems 
 
Besides the above, TxK added that for those who have opted out from the 
Human Organ Transplant Act (and for Muslims, those who have not opted in), they 
will get 60 debit points8. Though this means that patients who have objected to organ 
donation will not definitely be denied a new organ, the law is strictly adhered to and 
henceforth rather absolute in its application. Besides the provision being legally 
mandatory, TxK sees it as a form of retributive justice, as one who gives shall 






Programme K differentiates between physiological and chronological age as 
well, but only applies the chronological age limit of 60 because it is a concrete thing 
that is easy to manage. The age limit of 60 is strictly adhered to, since the computer 
excludes those who are beyond this age. Though the application of the age criterion 
is very strict, TxK acknowledges the various different ethical arguments for and 
against the rationing of organs using the age criterion. Age, like any other criterion, 
is recognized as being imperfect, but applied as an indicator of success and for the 
sake of practicality. It is imperfect, for example, when used to allocate goods based 
on desert, which is described as an emotive principle. As pointed out by TxK,  
 
“What makes us say that a 51 year old should not get a kidney isn’t 
that wrong as well? Aren’t they the elderly who have contributed 
more to our nation? Isn’t it equally justified? More justified than the 
20 year old who has not done anything? Isn’t that an emotive issue 
too?” 
 
TxK was frank in admitting the many caveats that surround the application of age 
as an absolute criterion, illustrating the point by pointing out that  there have been 
diabetics at 50 who have aged a lot more than one who is 65. Unlike the 
medicalization practiced by the other decision-makers, TxK seems a lot more 
reflexive and aware of the principles behind the justifications for various criteria. 
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And for using chronological age rather than physiological, it was admitted that it was 
done for the sake of success and ease of management.  
 
 In line with the criteria used by the other two programmes, Programme K uses 
the presence of auto-immune infection as an absolute contraindication. The example 
of an auto-immune infection that was highlighted was HIV infection. As mentioned 
earlier, research show that HIV infected patients do as well as those without, but it is 
nevertheless used in the kidney transplant programme to guarantee success.  
 
 Mental retardation used to be an absolute contraindication, but according to 
TxK, they have never managed to quantify mental retardation. It is indeed an 
exclusion criterion on paper, but it is not practiced. It was suggested during the 
earlier days of the programme, that the cut off point for admitting mentally retarded 
patients into the waiting list be set at the IQ of 80. However, TxK pointed out that 
there was a patient who had managed to preserve a functioning new kidney for 12 
years even though she had an IQ of 80. Ultimately, mental retardation is only 
relevant as an indicator of compliance, if they can be compliant, if they can bring up 
their children... that is the key issue…all the other issues pale in comparison. TxK 
believes that if one is able to stay on dialysis, one would have enough intellect to 
stay alive and survive the post-transplant treatment. As mentioned earlier, using 
compliance as a criterion faces the problem of measurement. TxK had pointed out 
that compliance could not be measured by ones level of IQ. Instead, compliance to 
TxK, is a very controversial yet important criterion in the programme. I will pay 




Besides the usage of certain objective criterion like IQ to determine 
compliance, the role of the physician who happens to be in charge of the patient 
plays an important role as well, for the physician would have to judge and advise 
whether the patient could be sufficiently compliant to undergo the transplant. This 
aspect of the admission stage is what TxK calls physician advocacy.  
 
 Finally, just like the other two transplant programmes, the kidney transplant 
programme prioritizes Singaporeans and Permanent Residents over foreigners. The 
organs that are procured locally are not meant for foreigners, who will only be 
operated on should they provide their own live donors. Between Singaporeans and 




II. Selection from the waiting list 
 
The role of the committee and physicians 
 
 According to TxK, the selection of recipients from the waiting list is undertaken 
by a committee (even though it was claimed that there is always a point difference 
between any two patient) that comprises of one nephrologist, non-kidney specialists 
and lay men. The Ministry of Health appoints all these people, and they rarely get 
called upon to exercise their duties. In fact, TxK pointed out that the committee had 
actually assessed only two patients, and both of them received new kidneys. The 
committee thus essentially deals with ties between cases.  
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  TxK pointed out that the computer does most of the work of selection. TxKs 
role is to suggest selection criteria that will be allocated points and fed into the 
computer. Besides having the back-up system like the selection committee, the 
choice of who gets a new kidney depends on the physician who happens to be on 
duty as well. This is the physician advocacy aspect. He/she has the authority to judge 
if the patient next in line to receive the new organ is suitable there and then to be 
operated on. For example, a patient running a fever might be seen to be unsuitable 
and henceforth have to have the opportunity forgone and be replaced by another 
patient  regardless of which centre (SGH or NUH) he/she is from. In addition, a 
committee called the Advisory Committee on Transplantation and Dialysis is 
responsible for analyzing patient selection decisions after the transplant has been 
conducted. The committee is made up of mostly lay people and few doctors, and 
they are responsible for judging the soundness of the decisions that had been made, 




The selection criteria:  
 
 There are several criteria that are applied in the selection process, they are:  
1. Compliance 
2. Waiting Time 
3. Urgency 





As mentioned earlier, the admission criteria are represented by points and fed into 
the computerized system. Some selection criteria operate the same way as well, and 
only a few other criteria are not included in the point system. Those that are not 
included are: compliance, urgency and quality of life. This means that physicians 
and the committees are responsible for dealing with these three criteria on an ad hoc 
basis, for compliance, urgency and quality of life are not easily quantifiable. 
Unfortunately, how much points is allocated and how they are allocated to the above 






 It is claimed that the level of compliance is excellent for patients transplanted 
in the programme because only those who are likely to keep their kidneys the 
longest are transplanted. This means that success is defined as maximizing the 
functioning years of the organ. Compliance, to the programme, is understood in a 
rather complex manner. It is argued by TxK that an excellent degree of compliance 
depends on two factors. Firstly, because the patients understand that they only get 
one chance at getting a new kidney, most of them would take good care of it. 
Secondly, because of the long-term post-transplant funding scheme available 
(patients are funded for life), patients are encouraged and have the resources to 
continue taking care of the new organ9.  
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  Compliance is measured with the help of the psychologists, but it was not 
explained how exactly it was done. It was argued by TxK, however, that those who 
have not been compliant while on dialysis (35% of patients) will not necessarily be 
non-compliant for transplant. This is because kidney failure and dialysis treatment is 
a long-term tough experience that usually lasts 6-8 years till the patient is 
transplanted. Non-compliance while on dialysis is due to dialysis fatigue, and 
therefore, compliance would be greatly improved at the post-transplant stage because 
patients would be grateful to be taken off dialysis. At this point, TxK appeals to the 
principle of justice to justify the argument, that one should transplant a patient before 
he/she becomes so non-compliant (while on dialysis) that he/she is no longer fit to be 
transplanted. The principle of sympathy was also used to support the argument that it 
is too punishing to take a patient off from the waiting list simply because he/she is 
not compliant or to penalize a smoker for having inflicted him/herself with various 
diseases.  
 
 Compliance, therefore, is not just used as a proxy for success; it is also used as a 
justification for not leaving patients on dialysis. This means that the decision makers 
(the psychologists and the committee) would need to define what exactly is the 
function of the compliance criteria in order to decide whether compliant or 
non-compliant patient should be given a new kidney. On the one hand, a compliant 
patient is seen to be able to gain better prognosis, but on the other, a non-compliant 
one should be given an opportunity (based on the principles of justice and sympathy) 




  The issue of compliance is regularly tied to the issue of self-infliction. 
Self-infliction is not an important issue for the kidney transplant programme because 
of the principle of sympathy  one should not punish self-inflicted patients. Yet, 
retribution was actually implied to be a course of nature, because, as pointed out by 
TxK, drug abusers tend not to be compliant on dialysis, and henceforth they will 
weed themselves out. This means that one does not need to reject patients on the 
counts of desert, for self-inflicted patients will naturally weed themselves out. 
However, it was stressed that even if desert was an allocative principle, where 
Singapore finds it hard to forgive [self-inflicted patients]I don’t see that as a 
criteria (TxK).  
 
 One can see from the above the many different variables taken into 
consideration in the application of the compliance criterion. Compliance is not 
included within the point allocation system, therefore, it is not a criterion that can be 
measured and implemented objectively. In fact, TxK seems to imply that compliance 
cannot be judged using an objective criterion like IQ level. Even though it was 
admitted that Singapore, as a non-welfarist state does not forgive self-inflicted 
patients easily, TxK does not see and use that as a criterion in the programme. In 
fact, the programme tends to be more sympathetic compared to the NHC. This 
reveals the discretionary nature of the selection criteria, and the amount of power 








 Waiting time is applied as a criterion for the sake of justice, according to TxK. 
Waiting time is given a major priority because many medical problems have been 
resolved, therefore selection criteria now lean towards issues of fairness (justice). 
This reality is reflected in western countries as well, both in the U.S. and in Europe. 
The UNOS and the Eurotransplant network has moved from a utilitarian emphasis 
towards one more firmly grounded in fairness and it was observed (Scarce Medical 
Resources, 1969; Fox & Swazey, 1974; Schmidt, 1998) that newly established 
transplant programmes tend to be more success-oriented and moralistic because of 
the need to gain acceptance for their methods, or because of the need to protect 
scarce resources. The tendency is for the criteria to become less strict, and types of 
patients who were rejected in the earlier days are now allowed more opportunities to 
get those goods.  
 
The maximum points allocated for waiting time is 10, but it has been 
increased to 20 (equivalent to 10 years on the list) because of active lobbying by 
TxK. This show the influence single physicians have over objective criteria. It is 
claimed that 30 patients are left on the shortlist after having been run through the 
computer, and if there are any two patients with exact point similarities, waiting time 
is evoked as tie-breaker.  
 
 The problem with allocating more points to waiting time is that the longer a 
patient waits, the more points he/she gets but the worse his/her condition becomes. 
TxK points out, however, that dialysis will have weeded out those with worse 
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conditions. This does not really address the contradiction but it does seem to imply 
something about the principle of desert. It appears that patients who are able to 
remain on the waiting list (while on dialysis at the same time) without getting sicker 
are actually rewarded with more points. This averts the contradiction because the 
deterioration of the patients condition while being on dialysis is not entirely within 
the control of the patient, but the reward of waiting time points to those who stay 
alive assumes it is so.  
 
 The contradiction is apparent and it has been admitted to be real. TxK laments 
that if one were to look purely intellectually at patient characteristics, any patient 
could do better…but it is important to have objectifiable criteria…without 
objectifiable criteria, how do you say? The use of objectifiable, i.e. quantifiable 
criteria is then necessarily functional: organs are scarce and therefore they must be 
rationed. Without objectifiable criteria, rationing is impossible. Though it has been 
acknowledged that organ allocation criteria are highly ambiguous (from a purely 
intellectual point of view), the concern here is still the operationalization of any 





 TxK believes that any allocation system must not operate in a punishing mode. 
Patients should not be denied organs because of self-infliction. And if patients are 
urgently in need of organs, they will be prioritized. This means that urgency or need 
always overrides others like success or waiting time. Urgency is defined quite clearly 
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here: patients who are unable to dialyze anymore are deemed to be urgent cases. 
Kidney dialysis requires the insertion of intravenous needles into the upper limbs of 
the patients, and after prolonged use, the veins are almost totally destroyed, so that 
the procedure is no longer possible10. These patients are then transplanted first. 
However, these patients must be medically suitable for transplants. Patients must 
again, pass through the absolute contraindications.  
 
 
Quality of Life 
 
 Unlike the heart transplant programme, the kidney transplant programme 
attempts to and believes in the possibility of quantifying a patients quality of life. 
Perhaps this is because of the large number of ESRD patients waiting for transplants, 
objectifiable criteria are more likely to be used for allocation. This makes the 
allocation system look rather confusing, there are some criteria that are not 
quantified, like compliance, yet there are others equally qualititative in nature but are 
quantified, like quality of life. Though TxK claims that the quality of life can be 
quantified, on closer inspection, quality of life simply refers to the nature of the life 
of any patient who fulfils the medical criteria. In TxKs own words:  
 
If they have no heart disease….how do you decide if somebody has 
no quality of life? Medical criteria: are they able to work? Are they 
able to do everything? If they can do everything then why don’t they 




TxKs definition, compared to the NHCs, is much more encompassing. Between the 
two centres, the latter tends to be rather moralistic and punishing than the former. 
Perhaps, as argued earlier, older centres tend to be more liberal with the criteria. And 
given that kidney transplant has been around much longer, this trend reflects what 
has happened in the West.  
 
Previously, the programme did have some form of quantifiable non-medical 
quality of life indicators. One of them was employment status, which was further 
classified into full or part-time employment or whether the patient is a student or a 
worker. This criterion was removed because of the perceived lack of justice. It was 
argued that patients do not have jobs because they are ill, it would then, not be fair to 
deny them a new organ because of their joblessness. In fact, by getting them off 
dialysis, it would help them get employed. In addition, housewives were not 
considered to be employed, and if the old criterion was still used, housewives would 
be de-prioritized. And that is not considered fair. This again, reflects the 
liberalization of criteria. However, one must not ascribe this to purely structural 
causes, but also take into consideration the influences of individual physicians as 
well. Apparently, many changes seen in the programme were suggested and lobbied 
by TxK as the director of the programme.  
 
 In addition to employment status, social worth criteria appear to collapse into 
the quality of life criteria. The programme used to consider whether a patient has 
dependent family members, but this criterion was removed because it was 
considered too impractical. This is primarily because, as TxK said, of the difficulty 
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of trying to argue for the social worth of an individual. This, to TxK, is an ethical 





 Theoretically speaking, the possibility and intensity of rejection will be higher 
for sensitized patients. This medical factor has its implications on the selection 
criteria as well, depending on whether the criteria are based on success, justice or 
sympathy. If the criterion is based on the principle of success, sensitized patients 
would then be de-prioritized, which is what Programme K does. Sensitized patients 
are given a debit of five points (considered by TxK as not a serious penalty). Once 
transplanted, these patients are given more immunosuppressive treatments, but they 
are seen as having higher chances of experiencing complications. It was pointed out 
that in the United States, sensitized patients are awarded more points rather than less. 
This is seen to be illogical by TxK because as patients stay longer on the waiting list, 
they do not become more sensitized, therefore, there is no need to award them more 
points. In the past, patients need constant blood transfusions while on the waiting 
list, which increases their sensitization. With the new drug Erythropoietin that 
overcomes the need for blood transfusion, the level of sensitivity remains constant.  
 
 The U.S. system of awarding sensitized patients additional points differs in that 
it is not based on success, but rather on justice. Even though both sides know of the 
lower rate of success for sensitized patients, the two sides choose to emphasize on 
different principles of allocation. In the U.S., sensitized patients are awarded more 
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points because they are sensitized against more organs than normal patients, thus 
reducing their chances of receiving a suitable organ, and henceforth, something must 
be done to neutralize this disadvantage. The kidney transplant programme, on the 





 Re-transplanted patients do comparatively worse because of their increased level 
of sensitivity. Programme K neutralizes the effects of higher level of sensitivity by 
making sure that re-transplant patients get perfect tissue matches with the donor. The 
difference between the U.S. and local kidney transplant programme in this case is 
that the former compensates patients for their disadvantages while the latter 
compensates for the patients disadvantages. The U.S. system does it for the sake 
of justice while the local programme does it to ensure success.  
 
 Besides ensuring that re-transplant patients get perfect tissue matches, a couple 
of caveats are included as well. If the rejection of the first transplanted organ was 
due to a technical problem, then the patient is not penalized, and waiting time 
clocked by the patient is considered to have begun prior to the first transplant. If the 
first transplant was a live donor transplant, then according to TxK, logically they 
never had a rejection. Patients are then considered to have lost their organs because 
of other reasons like the lack of compliance. It is thus implied that live donor 
kidneys does not really get rejected. Patients like these are not penalized, because 
everybody repents, we must have a bit of forgiveness. Patients like these will then 
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get a second organ from cadaveric donors. Thirdly, patients whose first donor was a 
cadaver, and that the transplant failed not because of technical reasons, then the 
second one is going to be terrible. This is because, if the first kidney was from a 
cadaver, the tissue would have been less well-matched than that from a live donor, 
the failure of the transplant is then due to rejection. Then the second transplant will 
be less successful for the patient will have become more sensitized.  
 
 The above three cases can be understood in the following manner. For the first 
case, the patient is treated like a first time recipient except that the tissue matching 
criteria becomes more strictly executed. For the second case, the patient would be 
treated like any other first transplant patient because they are not considered to have 
rejected the organ, and therefore, there is no requirement to compensate for 
sensitivity. The third case is just like the first, the only difference is the cause of 
rejection, where the first is technical and the third is non-technical. However, given 
that the programme does not punish patients for self-infliction, it does not really 
make any distinction between the two cases then.  
 
 The principle of success then rules in re-transplantation. Re-transplant patients 
must achieve perfect HLA matches so as to counter the effects of increased 
sensitivity. Those who can keep the kidney the longest will get priority. The current 
expected functioning years for re-transplanted kidneys is around four years. 
However, for patients who are in need (those who cannot dialyze anymore), they will 
be given a new kidney even if the tissue matches are not good. Need always 




 Kidneys are heterogeneous goods too. This means that they come in a variety of 
qualities. Besides blood-group typing, the programme practices HLA and 
age-matching. But programme K does not really allocate organs based on their 






 HLA matching is defined as one of the top medical criteria, as high as the legal 
criteria, yet it was pointed out that tissue mismatches could be overcome by better 
immunosuppressive therapy. HLA matching has been used extensively as a criterion 
in the allocation of organs, both within the UNOS system and in Eurotransplant. 
What Eurotransplant does is not unlike UNOS; it matches the HLA of donors with 
recipients within a central database and allocates kidneys based on the best match 
(see Schmidt, 1998 for other caveats to kidney allocation in Eurotransplant).  As 
mentioned earlier, HLA matches are hard to justify because research shows that they 
do not necessarily guarantee better prognoses, and given the better 
immunosuppressive therapies available, HLA matching criteria probably serves 
other purposes. Compared to the U.S., Singapore has a relatively small pool of 
donors, and given that there is yet to be an organ-sharing network in the region, good 
HLA matches are hard to come by. HLA matching is then used because of its 
quantitative objectifiable nature, which allows its easy application, much like the age 
criteria used in Britain to allocate dialysis treatment to patients before it was funded 






 Age matching is done for a sociological reason, in the words of TxK. 
Programme K maintains two waiting lists: one for adults and one for children. The 
sociological reason is explained rather deontologically as kids shouldn’t be made to 
wait too long. If the pediatric list is not maintained, children would have to compete 
with adults for the kidneys. In addition to the sociological reason, a minor medical 
reason was pointed out as well. Pediatric donors will be matched with pediatric 
recipients because small kidneys with small vessels will not reach adult size if given 
to an adult. But it was also acknowledged that there are counter arguments that 
kidneys do grow bigger (and the local programme has even transplanted a four year 
old kidney into a 40 year old man), so it depends a lot on the capability of the 
surgeon as well. If it happens that no pediatric recipient is waiting, the organ would 




Quality of organs 
 
 The quality of organs is not taken into consideration while selecting patients 
because it’s not practical. This is because, in addition to medical, legal and 
sociological criteria, the inclusion of the quality of organs criteria would make the 
whole system too complex to handle. Once again it is the issue of workability. 
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According to TxK, to make a kidney work, there are three factors: donor, recipient 
and physician. The current system takes into consideration the recipient factor, and 
to consider the quality of organs is to add in the donor factor, which will make the 
working of the programme confusing. However, it is still considered a good idea to 
match marginal kidneys with marginal patients because it will allow patients who 
would normally not be transplanted to be transplanted. 
 
Besides the complexity, there is the issue of informed consent. This demands 
that every time a lousy kidney is procured, one must ask the recipient do you want 
this kidney? Patients have been asked whether they would prefer to receive a 
marginal kidney rather than wait for a good one to come by, and most of them chose 
the former, because they don’t know what’s gonna happen to them if they wait. 
TxK had also explained that another reason why they do not exercise informed 
consent all the time is because the physician factor can possibly modulate the 
outcome of the transplant. Finally, it was also pointed out that it is difficult to predict 
just how long a marginal kidney will last. Therefore, if transplanting a patient with a 





 This chapter has highlighted the many similar and different issues encountered 
in kidney transplantations compared to hearts and livers. The main difference lies in 
the longer waiting list, which resulted in a greater need for having objectifiable 
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criteria in the selection of patients. However, this does not mean that decisions are 
easy, though attempts have been made to make them easier.  
 
 As can be seen above, the programme adheres to three main principles: the 
principles of success, justice and sympathy. And like the liver and heart transplant 
programmes which have their own unspoken principles, these three principles 
contradict one another when they have to be implemented. Given the higher demand 
for kidneys, success becomes a dominant determinant of who gets selected for a 
transplant. However, just like that of the liver transplant programme, need always 
overrides success, but on the contrary, selection procedures for retransplant patients 
are much more complex than that of the liver transplant programme. Finally, the 
very uniqueness of the kidney transplant programme is its way of looking at waiting 
time. Unlike the liver and heart transplant programme that accords little emphasis to 
the principle of fairness, the kidney transplant programme allocates more attention to 
waiting time based on TxKs notion of justice.  
 
 What one can see in this chapter is not unlike that of the previous two, that no 
matter what principles the transplant programmes adhere to, many of the principles 
are firstly, non-medical and secondly, very difficult to be reconciled with one 
another. TxK was much more forthcoming and reflexive about the justifications 
behind the usage of indicators and contraindicators. Henceforth, unlike TxL and 
TxH, many decisions were not really medicalized away, but were acknowledged as 











 This chapter integrates the empirical data with the arguments put forward earlier. 
I will focus on the allocation process rather than the background of the 
transplantation scene in Singapore. My main argument in this paper is that allocative 
problems, which are non-medical ones, are resolved through medicalization, which 
serves functions both at an individual and at the social level. It helps the decision 
maker deal with the many ambiguities in the selection process, and it legitimizes an 
institutions function within the division of labor in society as well.  
 
 The field of organ transplantation is both a sphere of medicine and distributive 
justice. Both spheres possess their own rationalities that are used to solve their own 
problems. However, when both spheres exist within a single field, what rationalities 
are used to solve the problem of organ scarcity? Often, it is claimed by physicians 
that medical criteria are used to select patients for transplant. However, it is much 
more complex than that. This thesis seeks to show how exactly it is done, comparing 
the situation in Singapore with that of the West, and attempts to explain how the 
conditions of Singapore have influenced the decision-making process. 
 
I. Corroboration of Theory with Evidence 
 
 I have argued and shown that after the admission stage, the number of patients 
on the waiting list exceeds the number of organs available. Selecting patients from 
this list would be unavoidable. However, the selection of patients from the waiting 
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list is not a medical problem anymore. This is because the medical goal is to provide 
treatment to anyone who could benefit from and who need the treatment. It therefore 
does not tell one how to choose between patients who could all benefit from the 
treatment. The fact that these patients are allowed onto the waiting list shows that 
they could all benefit from new organs. How then, does one choose whom to get the 
organs first or last? Selection is not a medical problem then. It includes many 
non-medical considerations. However, decision makers often say that they use 
medical criteria to deal with these non-medical problems.  
 
 There are four basic steps that are necessary in putting forward my argument. 
Firstly, I have to show that medical criteria are not necessarily absolute, and that 
there are a lot of ambiguities involved. Secondly, I have to present those criteria that 
are non-medical in nature. This is followed by showing how complex and confusing 
the selection process can get, through revealing the many inconsistencies, dilemmas 
and compromises. Finally, I shall present how the complexities are simplified 
through trying to use medical criteria in selecting patients.  
 
Medical criteria do not always yield consistent results. As I have shown 
earlier in all three chapters in liver, heart and kidney transplantations, that strict 
absolute contraindications, for example, HIV infection, do not always result in better 
prognoses in patients. Other controversial absolute criteria include age, which again, 
have been shown to have no causal relationship with the prognoses of the patient. 
And finally, alcoholics also yield as good prognoses as non-alcoholics. These three 
examples reveal that there is a significant amount of disagreement and controversy 
surrounding the application of such medical criteria, and henceforth, the decision to 
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use them is very much a decision made by the local transplant centres based on their 
own values or preferences rather than an adherence to some objective medical 
knowledge.  
 
As presented in the first chapter, a medical criterion ensures the certainty of 
outcomes, in which these outcomes benefit all who can benefit from them. Given this 
definition of a medical criterion, non-medical criteria are not based on scientifically 
verified probabilities and are concerned with the benefit of some categories of people 
and not all. Medical criteria can usually be used only at the admission stage and not 
the selection stage. The list of non-medical and socio-psychological criteria has been 
shown in all three chapters on livers, hearts and kidney transplantations. I will 
re-present those criteria here again, and also reiterate what the underlying principles 
of these criteria are.  
 
Medical criteria, as agreed by ethicists and medical practitioners, should 
fulfill the need for and provide benefits to patients. However, notions like need, 
success and benefits can be interpreted quite differently. And this allows 
decision-makers much leeway in choosing and justifying what medical criteria to 
use in their transplant programme. Success can mean the expected long-term 
outcome of the operation or a risk-benefit calculation. Benefit can mean quantity of 
life or quality of life. Success also underlies the socio-psychological criteria used, 
where compliance and social/emotional/financial support are seen as important for 
the post-transplant care of the patient. The post-transplant welfare of the patient is 
measured in terms of the concept of benefit, which can also be quantity or quality of 
life. Finally, non-medical criteria are based on a variety of principles. Some are 
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grounded upon desert, like social worth, moral worth, and self-infliction. Others do 
not really have a clear principle, like cases of discrimination against certain types of 
people (older people, drug abusers, etc.). And finally, the more deontologically based 
thoroughness ethos that binds medical professionals to the retransplant patients.  
 
Allocating organs is a difficult and complex process, as can be seen in the 
inconsistencies and dilemmas that are encountered in deciding which patients are to 
be transplanted first. The process includes many different variables of different 
nature: from political, economic to ethical considerations. It would be almost 
impossible to take into consideration all possible variables and make a clear and easy 
decision.  
 
The most common inconsistencies and dilemmas faced revolve around the 
concepts of need, success, benefit and outcome. They can all be defined and used 
differently, and they all depend on the different emphases on particular principles. 
Ultimately certain compromises have to be made, and they are often difficult. The 
most important thing that has been shown is that these dilemmas are not medical 
ones, but are due to the very personal or institutional values that are held. It is these 
values that guide the selection of patients, not objective scientific medical ones.  
 
Finally, the medical rationalities that are used to simplify and solve the many 
non-medical problems can be seen in the numerous examples given on how medical 
justifications are used. This trend is shown in the regular claims made by various 




Medical terms are often evoked to justify non-medical decisions. Because 
organ allocation is in both the sphere of justice and that of medicine, interests and 
types of rationalities collide. However the collision of rationalities is dealt with, both 
the institutions and the individuals benefit from operating within medical rationalities 
because medical rationalities have a seemingly objective nature which allows 
physicians to preserve their authority and to make the solving of the organ scarcity 
problem easier.  
 
Medicine is seen to have a certain objectivity and neutrality to it, not only 
because it is a science, but because of the objectification of criteria that happens in 
institutions as time passes (Schmidt, 2002: 2). The presumed objectivity of criteria 
results in a felt imperativeness in using them, removing responsibilities from the 
user. All problems are then treated with these objectified criteria. Such criteria are 
treated as universal and neutral, in that they apply to all contexts and individuals, and 
they are not influenced by any form of subjectivities. This also means that medical 
practices are claimed to be the mere application of those criteria. This lightens the 
load on the decision makers as being responsible for anything that happens to those 
who have received or have been denied the goods involved, especially when organs 
are life-saving resources.  
 
What I have gathered from this research and previous related ones is that: 
 
1) Because the allocation of organs straddles both the sphere of medicine 
and justice, and because medicine has a seemingly objective nature, 
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medical rationalities are often used to deal with all problems in 
distributing organs 
2) Allocation of organs is not strictly a medical problem. Medical 
rationalities veil the various non-medical values that are the actual 
underlying principles behind the use of criteria. 
3) The range of principles do not vary a lot from one transplant 
programme to another  
4) What is different between one locality and another is the emphasis on 
certain principles rather than others 
 
Like societies in the West, the division of labour in Singapore created 
sprockets of institutions that specialize in dealing with specific problems. The 
problems are alike for both Singapore and the West, where developed countries all 
experience rising numbers of cases of degenerative diseases resulting in organ 
failures. Secondly, the lack of donor organs is prevalent in both Singapore and the 
West as well, with Singapore experiencing a lower donation rate per million 
population. Even though Singapore is an Asian country, even though the decision 
makers are Asians themselves, problems of organ allocation are not resolved very 
differently from what was found in the U.S. and Germany. Decision makers do not 
differ in the range of principles they select from, but only in the different principles 
that they apply. However, even between the transplant centres in Singapore, much 
difference exists in the principles that dominate.  
 
A few reasons account for the difference between the allocative procedures in 
Singapore and in the West. Firstly, Singapore, being an Asian country which began 
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its modernization much later, tends to be much more collectivistic and utilitarian than 
the West (Inglehart, 1995: 379-403). This can be seen in the more success-oriented 
nature of allocative principles. Secondly, transplant programmes in Singapore have 
been established later than that of the West, which also explains its moralistic 
principles (especially the heart and liver transplant programmes, which were 
established in 1990), specifically in their concerns with social worth (Schmidt and 
Lim, 2004: 2181). Finally, the non-welfarist nature of the healthcare system and the 
national ideology accounts for the emphasis on maximizing the value of organs, 
which is a utilitarian concern, and also being less forgiving towards self-inflicted 
patients (the NHC).  
 
If one compares the three programmes, a certain pattern emerges in the 
principles that govern allocative decisions. The NHC which is as new as Programme 
L, deals with least number of organs available, pays a lot of attention to social worth 
and desert. Programme K, the oldest amongst the three, on the other hand, deals with 
a larger pool of organs, tends to be more liberal and concerned with using objective 
workable criteria. Finally, Programme L, falls in-between the other two, and it 
reflects a mixture of concerns with social worth and using objective medical criteria.  
 
 The above three sets of conditions: the Asian context, the age of the transplant 
programmes, and the healthcare philosophy play important roles in the principles and 
consequently, the criteria that are used in allocating organs. In addition, the size of 
the pool of donors/patients and the seriousness of the scarcity problems affects the 
degree of liberty or conservativeness of the principles as well. Decision-makers work 
within these conditions to create their own system of criteria and justifications to deal 
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with the organ scarcity problem they have at hand. And decision-makers do have a 
lot of power in creating those systems. This manner of allocating organs is similar to 
that in Germany (Schmidt, 1998), where every centre has the liberty to develop its 
own policy. And like Germany as well, many of the criteria used are not made 
public, and furthermore, public debates about the allocative procedures were unheard 
of both in Germany and Singapore (ibid, 60).  
 
Perhaps just like the transformation in the U.S. from that of letting local 
centres decide on the criteria towards using more objective un-negotiable 
measurements, Singapores organ allocation system will become less conservative 
and punishing, as exemplified by Programme K. It will be rash to attempt to predict 
what changes might occur to the allocative procedures, given the many possible 
transformations occurring in both medicine and society. For example, therapeutic 
stem cells research might potentially increase the supply of organs through the 
cloning of organs, or the plan to establish an organ-sharing network in Southeast 
Asia will raise many different political issues as well. These and many more 
variables will make further research into this topic in Asia worthwhile. Hopefully, 
this exploratory study undertaken in Singapore can provide a preliminary insight into 
the relationship between medicine, society and ethics. Whatever happens in the 
future, one can be sure that distribution of scarce resources like organs will always be 












                                                 
1 There are two main types of dialysis: Haemodialysis and Peritoneal dialysis. Both of them require 
patients to be connected to an external artificial filter that cleans their blood. Heamodialysis requires 
patients to be attached to a machine three times a week, each time up to three hours, while for 
Peritoneal dialysis, patients they have to lug around a bag of liquid which carries the waste products 
filtered. Dialysis is therefore an unpleasant experience, and there are both medical side effects and 
disruptions to normal lifestyles as well.  
 
2 These moral conceptions can be classified into utilitarianism, deontology, retributive justice, and 
individual rights theory. Utilitarianism promotes the maximization of general welfare. Deontology or 
Kantian morality emphasizes the commitment to duties to other people. Retributive models of 
morality argues for equity (an Aristotelian concept), where certain acts deserve certain returns. Finally 
individual rights theory argues for equality, where all humans have the same rights to healthcare 
resources.  
 
3 A similar system exists in Europe, named Eurotransplant and based in the Netherlands which 
handles an integrated lists of patients and matches their HLA with any available donor. Eurotransplant 
combines the waiting list of Austria, Belgium, The Czech Republic, The Netherlands, and Germany.  
 
4 Kilners study (1990) showed that 88% of his respondents from renal dialysis centres consider age 
as legitimate consideration and 92% of European renal transplant centers employ the age criterion.  
 
5 According to Programme L, the mortality rate for the first year for those on liver dialysis was 
100%. One wonders how mortality rate is actually defined here. Other sources have pointed out that 
patients can survive approximately a month on liver dialysis.  
 
6 Elster (1992: 50) even pointed out that classical English moral philosophers like Mill and Bentham 
were the main pioneers of utilitarianism, and this could possibly account for the tradition of British 
utilitarianism in healthcare distribution. However, I find it to be stretching too far to apply this 
particular argument to Singapores case, though the country used to be a British colony.  
 
7 This concern was also voiced by a German surgeon (Schmidt, 1998: 56), who complained about 
giving too much hopes to patients were they to be admitted onto the waiting list while having slim 
chances of ever getting an organ.  
 
8 Muslims who have not opted into the implied consent system are also given demerit points of -60. 
Rothman and Rothman (2003, 49) had pointed out that this is a discrimination against Muslims and 
that in no other transplant programmes in the world has this been practiced. However, others like 
Kliemt (2003) has argued otherwise for a club-model system of organ allocation, where priorities are 
given to those who have beforehand, contributed to the club and have therefore secured membership 
and privileges. This paper does not attempt to say which is a better system, the question is left open 
for the reader to decide.  
 
9 TxK pointed out that in the United States, post-transplant funding is only good for 4 years. This 
results in a lower level of compliance for American patients.  
 
10 Sometimes in order to continue with dialysis, needles have to be inserted into other places like the 
back of the hand or even other parts of the body. The needles are quite formidable and hence the 











                                                                                                                                          
Appendix 1: The questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire is separated into two sections, namely the concerns with admission 
and selection criteria, which can be referred to as absolute and relative criteria 
respectively. The questions would largely ask for the indications and 





1) Age:  
1. Do you have fixed age limits or do you take age into consideration 
in your decisions? 
2. Are you aware that elderly patients fare quite well as shown in 
many instances? 
3. If they are not considered on medical grounds, what other 
considerations are considered? 
 
 
2) Nationality/residency:  
1. Are these factors that are considered in the admission process, if yes, 
does it mean that foreigners who have lived in Singapore for a long 
time, but who are not PR, will not be considered even if they are in 
need. If so, why?  
 
 
3) Social value:  
1. Do you take the social worth of potential recipients into account? In 
other words, is the usefulness of the individual to society an important 




4) Personal responsibility for illness:  
a) Kidney failures are caused often caused by abuse of 
painkillers 
b) Heart failures are caused by excessive smoking 
c) Liver failures are caused by alcohol abuse 
1. Do you consider such factors in the admission process?  
2. Would you consider treatment for people with self inflicted illnesses? If 
yes, why, and if no, why not? 
 
 
5) Alcoholism:  
1. Are you aware that there are successful cases of liver transplantations 
for alcoholics who continue drinking after the surgery?  
2. So is alcoholism a necessary contraindication for admitting the patient 




                                                                                                                                          
 
6) Imminent death: 
1. Do you include people who face imminent death?  
2. Do you consider their state of urgencies?  
3. Do you have specific ways to measure the levels of urgencies? 
 
 
7) Socio-psychological:  
1. Do you make socio-psychological evaluation? In other words, are 
characteristics like mental illness, emotional support from family and 
friends, or emotional resilience of the patient important 
considerations? 
2. Do you have fixed measurements for these? 
 
 
8) Compliance:  
1. What significance do you ascribe to this criterion?  
2. How do you measure compliance?  
3. Arent there significant uncertainties in determining these indicators 
for compliance?  
 
 
9) HIV:  
1. Would you consider them as candidates? If not why?  










1) Do you have a fixed set of criteria which you apply consistently? For 
example, a point system, or do you decide on a case-by-case basis?  
 
2) What are the criteria which you use in selecting recipients for specific organs, 
and how much weight do you attach to the various criteria?  
 
3) What do you do when you get equal matching for HLA? What do you use as 
a tiebreaker?  
 
4) What role do you give to waiting time?  
1. What is the range of waiting time for patients?  
2. What about those who have rare antigen patterns, what do you do with 
them? Do you have provisions in place for patients with preformed 




                                                                                                                                          
5) Do you make special provision for sensitized patients? 
 
6) What other considerations do you take into account if you have 2 or more 
patients who are equal or almost equal in medical criteria? Would factors 
such as social responsibilities be taken into account? E.g. parents over 
non-parents, mothers over fathers, single mothers over mothers.  
 
7) Is the quality of organs procured ever considered in the selection of 
recipients? In other words, do you try to channel better quality organ to 
younger patients and the more marginal ones to the elderly?  
 
8) Is there a limitation to the age of the donor?  
 
9) Re-transplantation:  
1. Do you conduct retransplantation, or do you give all patients only one 
chance. If yes, why, and if no, why not? 
2. If you are willing to conduct retransplantation, wouldnt this be unfair 
for those who have never gotten one before?  
3. Conversely, would not the abandonment of the patient who rejected the 
new organ undermine the trust between physician and patients?  
 
10) How much weight do you place on patients survival prognosis, both long 
and short term? Do you give priority to those with long term survival 















                                                                                                                                          
Appendix 2: Criteria for admission into the waiting list for liver transplants 
The use of hepatic segments from living related donors is confined to a select group of 
patients who are in urgent need of liver transplantation. These include: 
• Patients who would otherwise die on the waiting list  
• Acute fulminant liver failure  
• Foreign patients who are on the waiting list and are unlikely to obtain a cadavaric 
liver  
Indications for liver transplant  
• Cirrhosis  
o Cryptogenic  
o Auto-Immune  
o Hepatitis C  
o Hepatitis B, non-replicator (HBV DNA negative)  
• Biliary Disease  
o Primary Biliary Cirrhosis  
o Secondary Biliary Cirrhosis  
o Sclerosing Cholangitis  
o Biliary Atresia  
o Hypoplastic Ducts  
• Primary Metabolic Disease  
o Alpha 1 Antitrypsin Defiency  
o Wilson's Disease  
o Tyrosinaemia  
o Glycogen Storage Diseases  
• Fulminant Liver Failure  
• Hepatocellular Carcinoma  
o i. 3 lesions or fewer & pre-treatment diameter < 8cm before embolisation  
o ii. Single lesion size < 6 cm before embolisation  
Absolute Contraindications  
• Malignancy outside the liver  
• Severe cardio-pulmonary disease or major medical illness  
• Systemic Sepsis  
• Medically or Psychologically unfit patient  
• HIV infection 
Relative Contraindications  
• Age greater than 70 years  
• Persistent Hepatitis B Infection (HBV DNA positive)  






                                                                                                                                          
Appendix 3: United Network for Organ Transplants (UNOS) criteria for 
selection of heart patients 
 
 
3.0 ORGAN DISTRIBUTION 
 
The following policies apply to the allocation of organs for transplantation. 
 
3.7 . This policy describes how thoracic organs 
(hearts, heart-lung combinations, single and double lungs) are to be allocated to 
patients awaiting a thoracic organ transplant.   
ALLOCATION OF THORACIC ORGANS
 
3.7.1 . Unless otherwise approved according to Policies 3.1.7 (Local and Alternative Local 
Unit), 3.1.8 (Sharing Arrangement and Sharing Agreement), 3.1.9 (Alternate Point Assignments 
(Variances)), and 3.4.6 (Application, Review, Dissolution and Modification Processes for Alternative 
Organ Distribution or Allocation Systems), or specifically allowed by the exceptions described in this 
Policy 3.7.1, all thoracic organs must be allocated in accordance with Policy 3.7. 
 Exceptions
 
3.7.1.1  The transplant surgeon or physician for a patient awaiting 
thoracic organ transplantation may determine that the patient is "sensitized" such that the patient's 
antibodies would react adversely to certain donor cell antigens.  It is permissible not to use the 
allocation policies set forth in Policy 3.7 for allocation of a particular thoracic organ when all thoracic 
organ transplant centers within an OPO and the OPO agree to allocate the thoracic organ to a 
sensitized patient because results of a crossmatch between the blood serum of that patient and cells of 
the thoracic organ donor are negative (i.e., the patient and thoracic organ donor are compatible).  The 
level of sensitization at which a patient may qualify for this exception is left to the discretion of the 
listing transplant center, and subject to agreement among all thoracic organ transplant centers within 
an OPO and the OPO.  Sensitization is not a qualifying criterion for assigning a patient to a heart 
status category as described in UNOS Policies 3.7.3 (Adult Patient Status) and 3.7.4 (Pediatric Patient 
Status). 
Exception for Sensitized Patients.
 
3.7.2 .  Thoracic organs are to be allocated 
locally first, then within the following zones in the sequence described in Policy 3.7.10.  Three zones 
will be delineated by concentric circles of 500 and 1,000 nautical mile radii with the donor hospital at 
the center.  Zone A will extend to all transplant centers which are within 500 miles from the donor 
hospital but which are not in the local area of the donor hospital. Zone B will extend to all transplant 
centers that are at least 500 miles from the donor hospital but not more than 1,000 miles from the 
donor hospital.  Zone C will extend to all transplant centers that are located beyond 1,000 miles from 
the donor hospital. 
 Geographic Sequence of Thoracic Organ Allocation
 
3.7.3   Adult Patient Status.   
Each patient awaiting heart transplantation is assigned a status code which corresponds to how 
medically urgent it is that the patient receive a transplant.  Medical urgency is assigned to a heart 
transplant patient who is greater than or equal to 18 years of age at the time of listing as follows: 
 
Status Definition 
1A A patient listed as Status 1A is admitted to the listing transplant center hospital and has at 
least one of the following devices or therapies in place: 
  
(a) Mechanical circulatory support for acute hemodynamic decompensation that includes at 
least one of the following: 
 
(i) left and/or right ventricular assist device implanted; Patients listed under this 
criterion, may be listed for 30 days at any point after being implanted as Status 1A once 
the treating physician determines that they are clinically stable. Admittance to the listing 
transplant center hospital is not required. 
(ii) total artificial heart; 
(iii) intra-aortic balloon pump; or 
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(iv) extracorporeal membrane oxygenator (ECMO). 
 
Qualification for Status 1A under criterion 1A(a)(ii), (iii) or (iv) is valid for 14 days and 
must be recertified by an attending physician every 14 days from the date of the patient's 
initial listing as Status 1A to extend the Status 1A listing. 
 
(b) Mechanical circulatory support with objective medical evidence of significant 
device-related complications such as thromboembolism, device infection, mechanical 
failure and/or life-threatening ventricular arrhythmias (Patient sensitization is not an 
appropriate device-related complication for qualification as Status 1A under this 
criterion.  The applicability of sensitization to thoracic organ allocation is specified by 
UNOS Policy 3.7.1.1 (Exception for Sensitized Patients).  Qualification for Status 1A 
under this criterion is valid for 14 days and must be recertified by an attending physician 
every 14 days from the date of the patient's initial listing as Status 1A to extend the 
Status 1A listing.  
 
(c) Mechanical ventilation.  Qualification for Status 1A under this criterion is valid 
for 14 days and must be recertified by an attending physician every 14 days from the 
date of the patient's initial listing as Status 1A to extend the Status 1A listing.  
 
(d) Continuous infusion of a single high-dose intravenous inotrope (e.g., dobutamine 
>/= 7.5 mcg/kg/min, or milrinone >/= .50 mcg/kg/min), or multiple intravenous 
inotropes, in addition to continuous hemodynamic monitoring of left ventricular filling 
pressures; Qualification for Status 1A under this criterion is valid for 7 days and may be 
renewed for an additional 7 days for each occurrence of a Status 1A listing under this 
criterion for the same patient. 
 
(e) A patient who does not meet the criteria specified in (a), (b), (c) or (d) may be listed 
as Status 1A if the patient is admitted to the listing transplant center hospital and has a 
life expectancy without a heart transplant of less than 7 days.  Qualification for Status 
1A under this criterion is valid for 7 days and may be recertified by an attending 
physician for one additional 7-day period.  Any further extension of the Status 1A 
listing under this criterion requires a conference with the applicable UNOS Regional 
Review Board  
 
prospective review and approval by a majority of the Regional Review 
Board Members.  If Regional Review Board approval is not given, the patients 
transplant physician may list the patient as Status 1A, subject to automatic referral to the 
Thoracic Organ Transplantation and Membership and Professional Standards 
Committees.
 
For all adult patients listed as Status 1A, a completed Heart Status 1A Justification Form 
must be received by UNOS on UNet  in order to list a patient as Status 1A, or extend 
their listing as Status 1A in accordance with the criteria listed above in Policy 3.7.3.  
Patients listed as Status 1A will automatically revert back to Status 1B unless they are 
re-listed on UNet  by an attending physician within the time frames described in the 




1B A patient listed as Status 1B has at least one of the following devices or therapies in 
place: 
 
(aa) left and/or right ventricular assist device implanted; or 
(bb)        continuous infusion of intravenous inotropes. 
 
For all adult patients listed as Status 1B, a completed Heart Status 1B Justification Form must 
be received by UNOS on UNet  in order to list a patient within one working day of a patients 
listing as Status 1B. A patient who does not meet the criteria for Status 1B may nevertheless be 
assigned to such status upon application by his/her transplant physician(s) and justification to 
the applicable Regional Review Board that the patient is considered, using accepted medical 
criteria, to have an urgency and potential for benefit comparable to that of other patients in this 




                                                                                                                                          
exceptional case as part of the status criteria.  A report of the decision of the Regional Review 
Board and the basis for it shall be forwarded to UNOS for review by the Thoracic Organ 
Transplantation and Membership and Professional Standards Committees to determine 
consistency in application among and within Regions and continued appropriateness of the 
patient status criteria. 
 
2 A patient who does not meet the criteria for Status 1A or 1B is listed as Status 2.  
 
7 A patient listed as Status 7 is considered temporarily unsuitable to receive a thoracic 
organ transplant.  
 
  Prior to downgrading any patients upon expiration of any limited term for any 
listing category, UNOS shall notify a responsible member of the relevant transplant 
team. 
 
NOTE: Amendments to Policy 3.7.3 (Adult Patient Status) shall be implemented pending 
programming on the UNOS Computer System. 
 
 3.7.4    Pediatric Patient Status.
Each patient awaiting heart transplantation is assigned a status code which 
corresponds to how medically urgent it is that the patient receive a transplant. 
Medical urgency is assigned to a heart transplant patient who is less than 18 years of 
age at the time of listing as follows:  Pediatric heart transplant patients who remain 
on the waiting list at the time of their 18  birthday without receiving a transplant, 
shall continue to qualify for medical urgency status based upon the criteria set forth 
in Policy 3.7.4. 
th
 
Status    Definition 
 
1A A patient listed as Status 1A meets at least one of the following criteria: 
 
(a) Requires assistance with a ventilator; 
 
 (b) Requires assistance with a mechanical assist device (e.g., ECMO); 
   
 (c) Requires assistance with a balloon pump; 
 
(d) A patient less than six months old with congenital or acquired heart disease exhibiting 
reactive pulmonary hypertension at greater than 50% of systemic level.  Such a patient may 
be treated with prostaglandin E (PGE) to maintain patency of the ductus arteriosus;  
 
(e) Requires infusion of high dose (e.g., dobutamine > 7.5 mcg/kg/min or milrinone > .50 
mcg/kg/min) or multiple inotropes (e.g., addition of dopamine at > 5 mcg/kg/min); or 
 
(f) A patient who does not meet the criteria specified in (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) may be listed as 
Status 1A if the patient has a life expectancy without a heart transplant of less than 14 days, 
such as due to refractory arrhythmia.  Qualification for Status 1A under this criterion is 
valid for 14 days and may be recertified by an attending physician for one additional 14-day
period. Any further extension of the Status 1A listing under this criterion requires a 
conference with the applicable UNOS Regional Review Board.  
 
 
Qualification for Status 1A under criteria (a) through (e) is valid for 14 days and must be recertified 
by an attending physician every 14 days from the date of the patient's initial listing as Status 1A to 
extend the Status 1A listing. 
For all pediatric patients listed as Status 1A, a completed Heart Status 1A Justification Form must be 
received by UNOS on UNet  in order to list a patient as Status 1A, or extend their listing as Status 




                                                                                                                                          
will automatically revert back to Status 1B after 14 days unless these patients are re-listed on UNet  




1B A patient listed as Status 1B meets at least one of the following criteria: 
 
(a) Requires infusion of low dose single inotropes (e.g., dobutamine or dopamine < 7.5 
mcg/kg/min); 
 
(b) Less than six months old and does not meet the criteria for Status 1A; or 
 
(c) Growth failure i.e., + 5  percentile for weight and/or height, or loss of 1.5 standard 
deviations of expected growth (height or weight) based on the National Center for Health 




Note:  This criterion defines growth failure as either < 5  percentile for weight and/or height, or 
loss of 1.5 standard deviation score of expected growth (height or weight).  The first 
measure looks at relative growth as of a single point in time.  The second alternative 
accounts for cases in which a substantial loss in growth occurs between two points in time.   
Assessment of growth failure using the standard deviation score decrease can be derived by, 
first, measuring (or using a measure of) the patients growth at two different times, second, 
calculating the patients growth velocity between these times, and, third, using the growth 
velocity to calculate the standard deviation score (i.e., (patients growth rate - mean growth 
rate for age and sex) divided by standard deviation of growth rate for age and sex). 
th
 
For all pediatric patients listed as Status 1B, a completed Heart Status 1B Justification Form 
must be received by UNOS on UNet  in order to list a patient as Status 1B.  A patient who 
does not meet the criteria for Status 1B may nevertheless be assigned to such status upon 
application by his/her transplant physician(s) and justification to the applicable Regional 
Review Board that the patient is considered, using accepted medical criteria, to have an 
urgency and potential for benefit comparable to that of other patients in this status as defined 
above.  The justification must include a rationale for incorporating the exceptional case as 
part of the status criteria.  A report of the decision of the Regional Review Board and the 
basis for it shall be forwarded to UNOS for review by the Thoracic Organ Transplantation 
and Membership and Professional Standards Committees to determine consistency in 




2 A patient who does not meet the criteria for Status 1A or 1B is listed as Status 2. 
 
7  A patient listed as Status 7 is considered temporarily unsuitable to receive a thoracic organ 
transplant. 
 
 Prior to downgrading any patients upon expiration of any limited term for any listing 
category, UNOS shall notify a responsible member of the relevant transplant team. 
 
3.7.5  . Within each heart 
status, a heart retrieved from an adolescent organ donor shall be allocated to a pediatric heart 
candidate (i.e., less than 18 years old at the time of listing) before the heart is allocated to an 
adult candidate.  For the purpose of Policy 3.7, an adolescent organ donor is defined as an 
individual who is 11 years of age or older, but less than 18 years of age. 
Allocation of Adolescent Donor Hearts to Pediatric Heart Candidates
 
3.7.6   All patients awaiting isolated lung 
transplantation are considered to be the same urgency status for the purposes of thoracic organ 
allocation. 
Status of Patients Awaiting Lung Transplantation
 
3.7.7   Candidates for a heart-lung 
transplant shall be registered on the individual UNOS Patient Waiting list for each organ. When 
Allocation of Thoracic Organs to Heart-Lung Candidates.
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the patient is eligible to receive a heart in accordance with Policy 3.7, or an approved variance 
to this policy, the lung shall be allocated to the heart-lung candidate from the same donor. 
When the patient is eligible to receive a lung in accordance with Policy 3.7, or an approved 
variance to this policy, the heart shall be allocated to the heart-lung candidate from the same 
donor if no suitable Status 1A isolated heart candidates are eligible to receive the heart. 
 
3.7.8 ABO  Typing for Heart Allocation.  Within each heart status category, hearts will be 
allocated to patients according to the following ABO matching requirements: 
 
(i) Blood type O donor hearts shall only be allocated to blood type O or blood type B patients; 
 
(ii) Blood type A donor hearts shall only be allocated to blood type A or blood type AB patients; 
 
(iii) Blood type B donor hearts shall only be allocated to blood type B or blood type AB patients; 
 
(iv) Blood type AB donor hearts shall only be allocated to blood type AB patients. 
 
(v) If there is no patient available who meets these matching requirements, donor hearts shall be 
allocated first to patients who have a blood type that is compatible with the donors blood type.   
 
Following allocation for all transplant candidates who have blood types that are compatible with 
donors, hearts will be allocated locally first and then within zones in the sequence described in 
Policy 3.7.10, by heart status category to pediatric heart candidates less than one year of age 
who have a blood type that is incompatible with the donors blood type if the candidate is listed 
with the blood type Z designation.  Following allocation for incompatible pediatric heart 
candidates less than one year of age, hearts will be allocated, locally first and then within zones 
in the sequence described in Policy 3.7.10, to patients listed in utero.    
 
3.7.8.1 Heart Allocation to Pediatric Candidates Registered Under Blood Type “Z.”  
For pediatric candidates who will accept a heart from a donor of any blood type, the blood type Z 
designation may be added as a suffix to the actual blood type (e.g., AZ) of a pediatric 
candidate less than one year of age, or used alone if actual blood type is not known for in utero 
candidates.   
 
3.7.8.2 ABO Typing for Lung Allocation. Patients who have the identical blood type as the 
donor and are awaiting an isolated lung transplant will be allocated thoracic organs before 
patients who have a compatible (but not identical) blood type with that of the donor and are 
awaiting an isolated lung transplant 
 
3.7.9   Calculation of the time a patient has been 
waiting for a thoracic organ transplant begins with the date and time the patient is first 
registered as active on the UNOS Patient Waiting List.  Waiting time will not be accrued by 
patients awaiting a thoracic organ transplant while they are registered on the UNOS Patient 
Waiting List as inactive.  When time waiting is used for thoracic organ allocation  a patient 
will receive a preference over other patients who have accumulated less waiting time within the 
same status category.  Waiting time accrued by a patient for a single thoracic organ transplant 
(heart or single lung) while waiting on the UNOS Patient Waiting List also may be accrued for 
a second thoracic organ, when it is determined that the patient requires a multiple thoracic 
organ (heart-lung or double lung) transplant.  In addition, waiting time accrued by a patient for 
a multiple thoracic organ transplant while waiting on the UNOS Patient Waiting List may be 
transferred to the waiting list for a single thoracic organ transplant. 
Time Waiting for Thoracic Organ Candidates.
,
 
3.7.9.1 Patients listed as a Status 1A, 1B, or 2 will 
accrue waiting time within each heart status; however, waiting time accrued while listed at a 
lower status will not be counted toward heart allocation if the patient is upgraded to a higher 
status.  For example, a patient who is listed as a Status 2 for 3 months and then is upgraded to 
a Status 1A for one week will accrue one week of waiting time as a Status 1A.  If the patient is 
downgraded to a Status 2 for another 3 weeks, then the patient will have 4 months of total 
Waiting Time Accrual for Heart Candidates.   
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accrued time. If the patient subsequently is upgraded for another week as a Status 1A, then the 
patient's Status 1A waiting time will be 2 weeks. 
 
3.7.9.2  A 
lung transplant candidate diagnosed with IPF shall be assigned 90 days of additional waiting 
time upon the candidate's registration on the UNOS Patient Waiting List. 
Waiting Time Accrual for Lung Candidates with Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis (IPF).
 
3.7.10   Donor hearts shall be allocated in the following sequence in 
accordance with Policies 3.7.3, 3.7.4, 3.7.5, 3.7.7, 3.7.8, and 3.7.9:   




   1. Status 1A patients 
   2. Status 1B patients 
   3. Status 2 patients 
 
Zone A 
   4. Status 1A patients 
   5. Status 1B patients 
 
Zone B 
   6. Status 1A patients 
   7. Status 1B patients 
 
Zone A 
   8. Status 2 patients 
 
Zone B 
   9. Status 2 patients 
 
Zone C 
   10. Status 1A patients 
   11. Status 1B patients 
   12. Status 2 patients 
 
3.7.11 Al  Patients awaiting a lung transplant whether it is a single lung transplant 
or a double lung transplant will be grouped together for allocation purposes.  If one lung is 
allocated to a patient needing a single lung transplant, the other lung will be then allocated to 
another patient waiting for a single lung transplant. 
location of Lungs.
 
Lungs will be allocated locally first, then to patients in Zone A, then to patients in Zone B, and finally 
to patients in Zone C.  In each of those four geographic areas, patients will be grouped so that 
patients who have an ABO blood type that is identical to that of the donor are ranked according 
to time waiting; the lungs will be allocated in descending order to patients in that ABO 
identical type.  If the lungs are not allocated to patients in that ABO identical type, they will 
be allocated in descending order according to time waiting to the remaining patients in that 
geographic area who have a blood type that is compatible (but not identical) with that of the 
donor.  In summary, the allocation sequence for lungs  is as follows: 
 
(i) First locally to ABO identical patients according to length of time waiting; 
(ii) Next, locally to ABO compatible patients according to length of time waiting; 
(iii) Next, to ABO identical patients in Zone A according to length of time waiting;  
(iv) Next, to ABO compatible patients in Zone A according to length of time waiting; 
(v) Next, to ABO identical patients in Zone B according to length of time waiting;  
(vi) Next, to ABO compatible patients in Zone B according to length of time waiting; 
(vii) Next, to ABO identical patients in Zone C according to length of time waiting; and 
(viii) Next, to ABO compatible patients in Zone C according to length of time waiting. 
 
3.7.12  Minimum Information for Thoracic Organ Offers.
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3.7.12.1 Essential Information.  The Host OPO or donor center must provide the following donor 
information to the recipient center with each thoracic organ offer: 
 
 (i) The cause of brain death; 
 (ii) The details of any documented cardiac arrest or hypotensive episodes; 
 (iii) Vital signs including blood pressure, heart rate and temperature; 
 (iv) Cardiopulmonary, social, and drug  activity histories; 
 (v) Serologies for HIV, hepatitis B and C, and CMV; 
 (vi) Accurate height, weight, age and sex; 
 (vii) ABO type; 
 (viii) Interpreted electrocardiogram and chest radiograph; 
 (ix) History of treatment in hospital including vasopressors and  hydration; 
 (x) Arterial blood gas results and ventilator settings; and 
 (xi) Echocardiogram, if the donor hospital has the facilities. 
 
 The thoracic organ procurement team must have the opportunity to speak directly with 
responsible ICU personnel or the on-site donor coordinator in order to obtain current first-hand 
information about the donor physiology. 
 
3.7.12.2   With each heart offer, the donor center is 
encouraged to provide the recipient center with the following information: 
Desirable Information for Heart Offers.
 
 (i) Coronary angiography for male donors over the age of 40 and female donors over the age of 
45; 
 (ii) CVP or Swan Ganz instrumentation ; 
 (iii) Cardiology consult; and 
 (iv) Cardiac enzymes including CPK isoenzymes. 
 
 3.7.12.3 .  In addition to the essential information 
specified above for a thoracic organ offer, the Host OPO or donor center shall provide the 
following specific information with each lung offer: 
Essential Information for Lung Offers
 
 (i) Arterial blood gases on 5 cm/H20/PEEP including PO2/FiO2 ratio and preferably 100% FiO2 
within 2 hours prior to the offer; 
 (ii) Measurement of chest circumference in inches or centimeters at the level of the nipples and 
x-ray measurement vertically from the apex of the chest to the apex of the diaphragm and 
transverse at the level of the diaphragm; 
 (iii) Chest radiograph interpreted by a radiologist or qualified physician within 3 hours prior to 
the offer;  
 (iv) Sputum gram stain with a description of the sputum character; 
 (v) Smoking history. 
 
 
3.7.12.4 .  With each lung offer, the Host OPO or donor center 
is encouraged to provide the recipient center with the following information: 
Desirable Information for Lung Offers
 
 (i) Bronchoscopy results.  Bronchoscopy of a lung donor is recognized as an important 
element of donor evaluation, and should be arranged at the discretion of the Host OPO or donor 
center.  Confirmatory bronchoscopy may be performed by the lung retrieval team provided 
unreasonable delays are avoided. A lung transplant program may not insist upon performing its 
own bronchoscopy before being subject to the 60 minute response time limit as specified in 
Policy 3.4.1; 
 (ii) Mycology smear. 
 
3.7.13 .  A transplant center which has demonstrated noncompliance 
with the Status 1 criteria specified in UNOS Policy 3.7.3 (Primary Allocation Criteria) for heart 
candidate registration shall be audited on a random basis and any recurrence of noncompliance 
will result in a recommendation to the Membership and Professional Standards Committee and 
Status 1 Listing Verification
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Executive Committee that further Status 1 heart candidate registrations from that center shall be 
subject to verification by UNOS of the candidates' medical status prior to their Status 1 
placement on the UNOS waiting list for a period of one year. 
 
3.7.14 
.  If a heart, lung, or heart-lung transplant candidate on the 
UNOS Patient Waiting List has received a transplant from a cadaveric or living donor, or has 
died while awaiting a transplant, the listing center, or centers if the patient is multiple listed, 
shall immediately remove that patient from all thoracic organ waiting lists for that transplanted 
organ and shall notify UNOS within 24 hours of the event.  If the thoracic organ recipient is 
again added to a thoracic organ waiting list, waiting time shall begin as of the date and time the 
patient is relisted. 
Removal of Thoracic Organ Transplant Candidates from Thoracic Organ Waiting Lists 
When Transplanted or Deceased
 
3.7.15   Regarding allocation of hearts, 
lungs and heart-lung combinations, locally unresolvable inequities or conflicts that arise from 
prevailing OPO policies may be submitted by any interested local member for review and 
adjudication to the UNOS Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee and the UNOS Board of 
Directors.   
Local Conflicts Involving Thoracic Organ Allocation.
 
3.7.16  A domino heart transplant occurs when the native 
heart of a combined heart-lung transplant recipient is procured and transplanted into a patient 
who requires an isolated heart transplant.  First consideration for donor hearts procured for 
this purpose will be given to the patients of the participating transplant program from which the 
native heart was procured.  If the program elects not to use the heart, then the heart will be 
allocated according to UNOS Policy 3.7, or an approved variance to this policy.  For the 
purpose of Policy 3.7.16, the Local Unit of allocation for the domino heart shall be defined as 
the HCFA-designated service area of the OPO where the domino heart is procured. 




























                                                                                                                                          




1. This Act may be cited as the Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act.  
 
Interpretation. 
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires   
"deceased person" includes a still-born infant or foetus;  
"Director" means the Director of Medical Services, and includes the Deputy Director 
of Medical Services and the Superintendent of a Government hospital authorised by 
the Deputy Director of Medical Services in writing to act on his behalf;  
"donor" means an individual who makes a gift of all or any part of his body;  
"part" , in relation to a human body, includes organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, 
blood, other fluids and other portions of a human body.  
 
Person may donate his body. 
3. Any person of sound mind and 18 years of age or above may give all or any part 
of his body for any of the purposes specified in section 7, the gift to take effect upon 
death.  
 
Relatives may donate body of deceased person. 
4. (1) Any of the persons specified in the Schedule, in the order of priority stated, 
when persons in prior classes are not available at the time of death, and in the 
absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the deceased person, or actual 
notice of opposition of a member of the same class or a prior class, may give all or 
any part of the body of the deceased person for the purposes specified in section 7.  
(2) The persons authorised by subsection (1) may make the gift after death or 
immediately before death.  
 
When donee should not accept gift. 
5. The donee of a gift of a body or any part thereof shall not accept the gift if he has 
actual notice of contrary indications by the deceased person or that a gift by a 
member of a class is opposed by a member of the same class or a prior class.  
 
Medical examination of body. 
6. A gift of all or any part of a body shall authorise any examination necessary to 
assure medical acceptability of the gift for the purposes intended.  
 
Purposes of anatomical gifts, etc. 
7. (1) The following persons may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts thereof 
for the purposes stated:  
(a) any approved hospital for medical or dental education, research, advancement of 
medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation;  
(b) any approved medical or dental school, college or university for medical or dental 
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or 
transplantation; or  
(c) any specified individual for therapy or transplantation needed by him.  
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(2) The Minister may, by notification in the Gazette, declare a hospital, medical or 
dental school, college or university to be an approved hospital, medical or dental 
school, college or university for the purposes of this section.  
 
Mode of executing gift. 
8. A gift of all or any part of a body under section 3 may be made by the donor either 
in writing at any time or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during a last 
illness.  
 
Revocation of gift. 
9. A gift of a body or any part thereof may be revoked by the donor at any time   
(a) by a signed statement in writing delivered to the donee;  
(b) by an oral statement made in the presence of two or more persons and 
communicated to the donee; or  
(c) by a written document to that effect found on his person or in his effects.  
 
Donee need not be specified. 
10. (1) A gift of all or any part of the body of a deceased person may be made to a 
specified donee or without specifying a donee.  
(2) If the gift is made without specifying a donee, the Superintendent of the 
Government hospital in which the death of the deceased person has taken place or to 
which the body of the deceased person has been removed may accept the gift as 
donee upon or following the death for the purposes of section 7 (1) (a) or (b), as the 
case may be.  
 
Rights and duties of donee. 
11. (1) The donee may accept or reject the gift of a body or part thereof.  
(2) If the gift is of a part of the body of a deceased person, the donee shall cause the 
part to be removed without unnecessary mutilation. After removal of the part, 
custody of the remainder of the body shall vest in the surviving spouse, next of kin or 
other person under obligation to dispose of the body.  
 
Authority to remove parts of unclaimed bodies. 
12. Where the body of a deceased person has not been claimed from a hospital, 
nursing home or other institution, maintained on public funds, for more than 24 hours 
after death, the Director may authorise in writing the use of the body or any specified 
part for the purposes of medical or dental education, research, advancement of 
medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation.  
 
Person may authorise post-mortem examination. 
13. (1) Any person of sound mind and 18 years of age or above may either in writing 
at any time or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during his last illness 
authorise the post-mortem examination of his body for the purpose of establishing or 
confirming the cause of death or of investigating the existence or nature of abnormal 
conditions.  
(2) Such authority shall be effective upon the death of that person.  
 
Relatives may authorise post-mortem examination. 
14. (1) Any of the persons specified in the Schedule, in the order of priority stated, 
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when persons in prior classes are not available at the time of death, and in the 
absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the deceased person, or actual 
notice of opposition of a member of the same class or a prior class, may authorise the 
post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased person for the purpose of 
establishing or confirming the cause of death or of investigating the existence or 
nature of abnormal conditions.  
(2) The persons authorised by subsection (1) may give the authority after death or 
immediately before death.  
 
Post-mortem examination of unclaimed body. 
15. Where the body of a deceased person has not been claimed from a hospital, 
nursing home or other institution, maintained on public funds, for more than 24 hours 
after death, the Director may authorise in writing the post-mortem examination of the 
body for the purpose of establishing or confirming the cause of death or of 
investigating the existence or nature of abnormal conditions.  
 
Removal and use of body to be lawful. 
16. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the removal and use of any part of a body in 
accordance with section 3 or 4, as the case may be, or the post-mortem examination 
of a body in accordance with the provisions of Part III, shall be lawful.  
(2) No such removal or post-mortem examination shall be effected except   
(a) by a registered medical practitioner, who shall have satisfied himself that the 
death of the deceased person has been determined and certified in accordance with 
section 2A of the Interpretation Act (Cap. 1); or  
(b) with the written consent of the Coroner in a case where an inquiry is to be held in 
respect of the death of any person.  
 
Power of Coroner unaffected. 
17. Sections 3, 4, 13, 14 and 15 shall be without prejudice to the authority of the 
Coroner to direct the post-mortem examination of a body of a deceased person under 





















                                                                                                                                          






1. This Act may be cited as the Human Organ Transplant Act. 
Interpretation. 
 
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires  
"designated officer" , in relation to a hospital, means a person appointed under 
section 4 to be the designated officer of the hospital; 
"Director" means the Director of Medical Services; 
"hospital" means  
(a) a hospital established and administered by the Government; 
(b) a private hospital which is declared by the Minister by notification in the 
Gazetteto be a hospital for the purposes of this Act; 
"medical practitioner" means a person who is registered, or deemed to be registered, 
as a medical practitioner under the Medical Registration Act; 
Cap. 174. 
"organ" means  
(a) except as provided in paragraph (b), the kidney of a human body; and 
(b) for the purposes of Part IV, any organ of a human body. 
Designated officers. 
 
4. The Director may nominate, in writing, any medical practitioner to be the 
designated officer of a hospital for the purposes of this Act. 
PART II 
REMOVAL OF ORGAN AFTER DEATH 
Authorities may remove organ after death. 
 
5. (1) The designated officer of a hospital may, subject to and in accordance with this 
section, authorise, in writing, the removal of any organ from the body of a person 
who has died in the hospital for the purpose of the transplantation of the organ to the 
body of a living person. 
(2) No authority shall be given under subsection (1) for the removal of the organ 
from the body of any deceased person  
(a) who has during his lifetime registered his objection with the Director to the 
removal of the organ from his body after his death; 
(b) unless his death was caused by accident or resulted from injuries caused by 
accident; 
(c) who is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident of Singapore; 
(d) who is below 21 years of age unless the parent or guardian has consented to such 
removal; 
(e) who is above 60 years of age; 
(f) whom the designated officer, after making such inquiries as are reasonable in the 
circumstances, has reason to believe was not of sound mind, unless the parent or 
guardian has consented to such removal; or 
(g) who is a Muslim. 
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(3) Deleted by Act 22/98 wef 02/11/1998** 
 
(4) In this section, permanent resident includes  
(a) a person who holds a Singapore blue identity card; and 
(b) a person who holds an Entry Permit or Re-entry Permit issued by the Controller 
of Immigration, 
and who is not subject to any restriction as to his period of residence in Singapore 




6. (1) If the designated officer of the hospital has reason to believe that the 
circumstances applicable to the death of the person are such that the Coroner has 
jurisdiction to hold an inquest into the manner and cause of death of the person, the 
designated officer shall not authorise the removal of any organ from the body of the 
deceased person unless the Coroner has given his consent to the removal. 
(2) The consent by the Coroner under this section may be expressed to be subject to 
such conditions as are specified in the consent. 
(3) The consent may be given orally by the Coroner, and if so given shall be 
confirmed in writing. 
(4) In this section, Coroner means a Coroner appointed under section 10 of the 




Organ to be removed and transplanted by authorised medical practitioners. 
 
7. (1) No person other than an authorised medical practitioner in a hospital shall 
remove any organ which is authorised to be removed pursuant to section 5 or 
transplant any such organ. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), authorised medical practitioner means a 
medical practitioner who has been authorised by the Director to remove any organ 
pursuant to section 5 or to transplant any such organ. 
(3) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with subsection (1) shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both. 
 
Operation of other laws. 
 
8. Nothing in this Part shall prevent the removal of any organ from the bodies of 
deceased persons in accordance with the provisions of any other written law. 
 
PART III 
REGISTRATION OF OBJECTION 




                                                                                                                                          
9. (1) Any person who objects to the removal of any organ from his body after his 
death for the purpose mentioned in section 5 (1) may register his objection with the 
Director in the prescribed form. 
(2) Upon receipt of the written objection of a person under subsection (1), the 
Director shall issue to that person an acknowledgment in the prescribed form. 
 
Director to maintain register. 
 
10. (1) The Director shall establish and maintain a register in which shall be entered 
the objection of all persons lodged in accordance with section 9. 
(2) The register referred to in subsection (1) shall not be open to inspection by the 
public. 
(3) Any person who wilfully destroys, mutilates or makes any unauthorised alteration 
in the register referred to in subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding one year or to both. 
 
Persons may withdraw their objection. 
 
11. (1) Any person who has registered his objection with the Director under section 9 
may withdraw his objection in the prescribed form. 
(2) Upon receipt of the withdrawal under subsection (1), the Director shall issue to 
that person an acknowledgment in the prescribed form and shall remove the 
objection from the register referred to in section 10 (1). 
 
Proposed recipients of organ. 
 
12. (1) Subject to subsection (2), in the selection of a proposed recipient of any organ 
removed pursuant to section 5  
(a) a person who has not registered any objection with the Director under section 9 
(1) shall have priority over a person who has registered such objection; and 
(b) a person who has registered his objection with the Director under section 9 (1) 
but who has withdrawn such objection under section 11 (1) shall have the same 
priority as a person who has not registered any such objection, over a person whose 
objection is still registered with the Director, at the expiration of two years from the 
date of receipt of the withdrawal by the Director provided he has not registered again 
any such objection since that date. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) (a)  
(a) a person who is a Muslim shall have priority over a person who has registered 
such objection only if he has made a gift of his organ, to take effect upon his death, 
under section 3 of the Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act  
(i) within 6 months from 16th July 1987; 
(ii) where that person is below 21 years of age, before or upon attaining the age of 
21; or 
(iii) where that person is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident of Singapore 
within 6 months from the date he becomes a citizen or permanent resident of 




                                                                                                                                          
(b) a person who is a Muslim and has made a gift of his organ in accordance with 
paragraph (a) (i), (ii) or (iii) shall have the same priority as a person who has priority 
under subsection (1) (a) over a person whose objection is still registered with the 
Director, with effect from the date of such gift provided that such priority shall cease 
immediately upon the revocation of such gift; and 
(c) a person who is a Muslim and has made a gift of his organ under the Medical 
(Therapy, Education and Research) Act after the period prescribed in paragraph (a) 
(i), (ii) or (iii) shall have the same priority as a person who has priority under 
subsection (1) (a) over a person whose objection is still registered with the Director, 
at the expiration of two years from the date of such gift provided he has not revoked 
his gift since that date. 
Cap. 175. 
 
Appointment of a committee. 
 
13. The Director may appoint a committee consisting of not less than 5 members to 
be in charge of matters relating to the selection of proposed recipients of any organ 
removed pursuant to section 5 and such other matters as may be directed by the 
Director from time to time. 
PART IV 
PROHIBITION OF TRADING IN ORGANS AND BLOOD 
Certain contracts etc., to be void. 
 
14. (1) Subject to this section, a contract or arrangement under which a person 
agrees, for valuable consideration, whether given or to be given to himself or to 
another person, to the sale or supply of any organ or blood from his body or from the 
body of another person, whether before or after his death or the death of the other 
person, as the case may be, shall be void. 
(2) A person who enters into a contract or arrangement of the kind referred to in 
subsection (1) and to which that subsection applies shall be guilty of an offence and 
shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding one year or to both. 
(3) Subsection (1) shall not apply to or in relation to  
(a) a contract or arrangement providing only for the reimbursement of any expenses 
necessarily incurred by a person in relation to the removal of any organ or blood in 
accordance with the provisions of any other written law; and 
(b) any scheme introduced or approved by the Government granting medical benefits 
or privileges to any organ or blood donor and any member of the donors family or 
any person nominated by the donor. 
(4) The Minister may, by notification in the Gazette, declare that subsection (1) shall 
not apply to the sale or supply of a specified class or classes of product derived from 
any organ or blood that has been subjected to processing or treatment. 
(5) A person who as vendor or supplier enters into a contract or arrangement for the 
sale or supply of a product derived from any organ or blood that has been subjected 
to processing or treatment, other than such a product which is of a class declared 
under subsection (4), shall be guilty of an offence if the organ or blood from which 
the product was derived was obtained under a contract or arrangement that is void by 
reason of subsection (1) and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
$10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both. 
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(6) Nothing in this section shall render inoperative a consent or authority given or 
purporting to have been given under this Act in relation to any organ or blood from 
the body of a person or in relation to the body of a person if a person acting in 
pursuance of the consent or authority did not know and had no reason to know that 
the organ or blood or the body was the subject-matter of a contract or arrangement 
referred to in subsection (1). 
 
Advertisements relating to buying or selling of organs or blood prohibited. 
 
15. (1) No person shall issue or cause to be issued any advertisement relating to the 
buying or selling in Singapore of any organ or blood or of the right to take any organ 
or blood from the body of a person. 
(2) In this section, advertisement includes every form of advertising, whether in a 
publication, or by the display of any notice or signboard, or by means of any 
catalogue, price list, letter (whether circular or addressed to a particular person) or 
other documents, or by words inscribed on any article, or by the exhibition of a 
photograph or a cinematograph film, or by way of sound recording, sound 
broadcasting or television, or in any other way, and any reference to the issue of an 
advertisement shall be construed accordingly. 
(3) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with subsection (1) shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both. 
PART V 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Act does not prevent specified removal of organ, etc. 
 
16. (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to or in relation to  
(a) the removal of any organ from the body of a living person in the course of a 
procedure or operation carried out, in the interests of the health of the person, by a 
medical practitioner with the consent, express or implied, given by or on behalf of 
the person or in circumstances necessary for the preservation of the life of the 
person; 
(b) the use of any organ so removed; 
(c) the embalming of the body of a deceased person; or 
(d) the preparation, including the restoration of any disfigurement or mutilation, of 
the body of a deceased person for the purpose of interment or cremation. 
 
Offences in relation to removal of organ. 
 
17. (1) No person shall remove any organ from the body of a deceased person for the 
purpose referred to in section 5 (1) except in pursuance of the authority given under 
Part II. 
(2) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with subsection (1) shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both. 
 




                                                                                                                                          
18. (1) Subject to this section, a person shall not disclose or give to any other person 
any information or document whereby the identity of a person  
(a) from whose body any organ has been removed for the purpose of transplantation; 
(b) with respect to whom or with respect to whose body a consent or authority has 
been given under this Act; or 
(c) into whose body any organ has been, is being, or may be, transplanted, 
may become publicly known. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to or in relation to any information disclosed  
(a) in pursuance of an order of a Court or when otherwise required by law; 
(b) for the purposes of hospital administration or bona fide medical research; 
(c) with the consent of the person to whom the information relates; or 
(d) when the circumstances in which the disclosure is made are such that the 
disclosure is or would be privileged. 
(3) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with subsection (1) shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to 





19. The Minister may make regulations prescribing all matters that are required or 
permitted to be prescribed by this Act or are necessary or convenient to be prescribed 
for carrying out or giving effect to this Act. 
 
** The deleted section in original bill as drawn out in 1986: 
 
(3) The death of a person from whose body the organ will be removed after his death 
in accordance with the authorization granted under subsection (1) shall be certified 
by two medical practitioners  
(a) Who do not belong to the team of medical practitioners which will effect the 
removal of the organ from the body. 
(b) Who have not been involved in the care and treatment of the proposed recipient 
of the organ  
Who possess such postgraduate medical qualifications which is recognized by the 

















                                                                                                                                          
Appendix 6: The Interpretation Bill: Criteria for determining death 
 
2A. (1) For all purposes, a person has died when there has occurred either  
(a) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood and respiration in the body of the 
person; or  
(b) total and irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain of the person.  
[22/98] 
(2) The determination of the irreversible cessation of circulation of blood and 
respiration in the body of a person shall, subject to subsection (4), be made in 
accordance with the ordinary standards of current medical practice; and the 
determination of the total and irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain of a 
person shall, subject to subsections (3) and (5), be made in accordance with the 
prescribed criteria.  
[22/98] 
(3) Except in the circumstances referred to in subsection (5), the determination of the 
total and irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain of a person shall be 
certified in the prescribed form by 2 medical practitioners   
(a) at least one of whom has not been involved in the care or treatment of the person 
so certified; and  
(b) who possess the prescribed postgraduate medical qualifications.  
[22/98] 
(4) If the death of a person from whose body an organ is to be removed after his 
death as authorised under the Human Organ Transplant Act (Cap. 131A) or the 
Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act (Cap. 175) is determined by the 
irreversible cessation of circulation of blood and respiration in the body of that 
person, his death shall be certified in the prescribed form by 2 medical practitioners 
  
(a) who have not been involved in the care or treatment of the person so certified;  
(b) who do not belong to the team of medical practitioners which will effect the 
removal of the organ from the body;  
(c) who have not been involved in the selection of the proposed recipient of the 
organ; and  
(d) who will not be involved in the care or treatment of the proposed recipient of the 
organ during his hospitalisation for the purpose of the transplant.  
[22/98] 
(5) If the death of a person from whose body an organ is to be removed after his 
death as authorised under the Human Organ Transplant Act (Cap. 131A) or the 
Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act (Cap. 175) is determined by the 
total and irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain of that person, his death 
shall be certified in the prescribed form by 2 medical practitioners   
(a) who have not been involved in the care or treatment of the person so certified;  
(b) who do not belong to the team of medical practitioners which will effect the 
removal of the organ from the body;  
(c) who have not been involved in the selection of the proposed recipient of the 
organ;  
(d) who will not be involved in the care or treatment of the proposed recipient of the 
organ during his hospitalisation for the purpose of the transplant; and  




                                                                                                                                          
(6) The Minister may, for the purposes of all laws or any specified written law, by 
regulations prescribe   
(a) the criteria for determining the total and irreversible cessation of all functions of 
the brain of a person referred to in subsections (1) (b) and (2); and  
(b) the postgraduate medical qualifications and form of the death certificate for the 
purposes of subsection (3), (4) or (5).  
[22/98] 
(7) Nothing in this section shall   
(a) affect the operation of section 110 of the Evidence Act (Cap. 97) (burden of 
proving that a person is alive who has not been heard of for 7 years), section 100 of 
the Womens Charter (Cap. 353) (proceedings for decree nisi of presumption of 
death and divorce) or any other written law relating to the presumption of death;  
(b) prevent the certification or determination of death in a case where the body of a 
person is not found or recovered.  
[22/98] 
(8) In this section, medical practitioner means a person who is registered, or 
deemed to be registered, as a medical practitioner under the Medical Registration Act 
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